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ABSTRACTS 
APEC was established in 1989 by twelve Asia-Pacific countries in 
response to the changes of and challenges from international political economy. Two 
major impetuses were the possible collapse of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiation 
and the deepening of interdependence (or de facto economic integration) among 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The emergence of APEC was ultimately related 
to the trends of globalization and regionalization. APEC was a collective endeavor to 
achieve trade and investment liberalization, facilitation, and economic and technical 
cooperation. However, right from the beginning, the heterogeneity among APEC 
members prompted them to hold divergent positions on how this forum should be 
developed. This thesis examines four essential contentious issues in the development 
of APEC between 1989 and 1995 in order to illustrate the functions this fomm has 
performed. It seeks to examine the ways in which APEC can provide benefits to the 
participants. This thesis is a qualitative study on the policies of five principal APEC 
actors (Australia, the United States, Japan, ASEAN, and China) in APEC. 
This thesis applies theory of international regime from neo-liberal 
institutionalism in to study APEC. Conceptually, APEC is a "weak" regime. Its rules 
are loose, flexible and non-binding. APEC cannot substantially increase the 
transparency of members' actions and effectively bring about members' compliance. 
Despite these deficiencies, the contribution of APEC to its members should not be 
overlooked. This thesis argues two points. Firstly, although APEC was shaped as a 
weak regime due to the vast diversity in economic conditions among its members, 
APEC could still aggregate its members' divergent interests and cultivate a 
ii 
( 
compromise on several core issues. Secondly, even as a weak regime, APEC was still 
functional in providing information to its members, facilitating the nesting of 
regional and global regimes, and leading to the clustering of different issues. In this 
way, APEC could somehow increase the likelihood of cooperation despite several 
challenges. 
The challenges of cooperation in APEC can be empirically shown by the 
contentions between APEC members in: 1) deciding the desirable compositions and 
groupings for regional cooperation; 2) strengthening the mechanism for organizing 
collaborative works; 3) determining the time schedule for realizing trade and 
investment liberalization; and 4) implementing the vision of trade and investment 
liberalization. As a whole, APEC members disagreed on who, how, and what to 
cooperate. Nevertheless, they gradually agreed that APEC rather than EAEC should 
be the main avenue of cooperation and that a moderate level of institutionalization 
could be proceeded. Consequently, in 1994, they agreed to carry out region-wide 
liberalization as a support to global trade regime and a means to sustain the economic 
development of the region. All these eventual compromises demonstrate the role and 
functions of APEC in fostering members' adjustment of policies. 
To conclude, this thesis argues that the main contribution of APEC is to 
foster the making of consensus over certain essential issues of common interests. 
APEC members need to manage in a better way the economic and political 
relationship between themselves. APEC's peculiar model of "open-regionalism" and 
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§ 1.1 Background: the First APEC Meeting in 1989 
The inauguration of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) 
- t h e twelve founding members being the six ASEAN countries,^ the United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea ~ in 1989 did not capture 
too much attention. During its "warm-up" phase (i.e., from 1989 to 1990), it was 
^ 
"loosely organized, scarcely noticed, and accomplished little substantively." The 
Chairperson of the first ministerial meeting, the Australian Foreign Minister Gareth 
Evans, indicated that the participants were just initiating a process rather than 
0 
launching a formal institution. Indeed, it was only after 1993 that APEC started to 
attract worldwide attention, for its annual gathering of world leaders.^ For some years, 
to many observers, APEC means "nothing more than a trans-Pacific talking shop."^ 
The underpinning reasons are that it is a consultative forum, it represents conflicting |. 
j' 
interests, and it has to satisfy competing expectations of its players. Despite many | 
. . i: 
disputes in the practice of APEC, its significance is easily seen. As Michael Yahuda I 
I 
observes, "it was the first time that a trans Pacific inter-govemmental organization [ 
I 
had been established."^ 
Why did the Pacific Rim states come together to form APEC? Particularly, 
why did the APEC states join hands to promote what appeared to be more of global 
interest rather than regional interests? What are the basic objectives of APEC? Firstly, 
APEC is a collective response to global external problem, i.e. the possible collapse of 
global trade negotiation. According to the formal statements issued by APEC 
. m i n i s t e r s at the Canberra meeting in 1989, APEC was originated "to strengthen the 
multilateral trading system and enhance the prospects for success in the Uruguay 
round."7 Secondly, APEC was aimed at increasing trade and investment flows in the 
region through better cooperation and interdependence am6ng Asia-Pacific 
• 8 • 
countries. Specifically, the Chairman summarized the discussions and consensus of 
the first APEC meeting as follows: 
A key theme which has run through all our deliberations in the last two days is that the 
continuing economic success of the region, with all its implications for improved 




trading system through progressive enhancement of, and adherence to, the GATT 
framework. By contributing to that effort through the Uruguay Round and beyond, 
this region can not only help assure its own economic future but improve economic 
prospects globally. We are all agreed that an open multilateral trading system has been, 
and remains, critical to rapid regional growth.^ 
Indeed, the continued progress of the global trading regime was particularly 
important to the newly industrialized economies fNIEs) and the ASEAN. These 
countries actively pursued an "export-led" strategy to boost their economies since the 
70s. This development strategy relied on the granting of market opportunities 
regulated by the GATT framework. ' 
The second fundamental objective of APEC is to encourage the flows of 
goods, capitals, services and technology to maximize benefits from economic • 
interdependence. Economic interdependence has been led by the contemporary trend 
of globalization and regionalization. Throughout the eighties, Asia-Pacific countries 
:.(: 
witnessed an impressive economic growth, resulting from a dramatic increase in 
,i: 
trade and investment flows. East Asian countries became important trading partners :J 
of North American countries. At the same time, intra-Asian trade expanded i' 
'i-
significantly. Economic globalization and regionalization provided Asia-Pacific 
countries with many new market opportunities and more foreign direct investments. : 
!,�. 
For this reason, these Asian developing countries were able to rely on the "export-
i' 
led" strategy, instead of "import-substitution," as the guidance for economic 
development. The United States, Japan, and the four little dragons (Singapore, 
Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong) were both markets and sources of investment 
for East and Southeast Asian developing countries. Accordingly, objectives of APEC 
are stipulated to be "to sustain the growth and development of the region," and "to 
advance common interests and achieve mutual benefits."^° 
The birth of APEC is therefore related to many economic and political 
issues and controversies. As observed by a report submitted by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia to the Senate of Australia, the creation of 
APEC was related to "the extraordinary dynamism of East Asia, the growing strength 
of regionalism, the search for a post-Cold War order in the Asia Pacific, the 
increasing prominence of economic issues in international affairs, the global trend 
towards trade liberalization and deregulation, and the shift from a North-South 




increased the needs for closer regional cooperation. In an interdependent world 
political economy, a country cannot realize its policy objective by itself. One 
particularly influential event that deserves special attention here is the end of Cold 
War. The end of Cold War increased the chance of trade war whilst simultaneously 
enhanced the prospect and likelihood of cooperation. 
Australia was instrumental in establishing APEC. In particular, reference is 
often made to then Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke's speech delivered to a 
group of Korean businessmen in Seoul in January 1989, in which he demanded a w 
i 
more effective Asia Pacific economic cooperation. The Australian initiative was | 
.i 
supported and assisted by Japan. Though Japan did not appear at the front stage in ； 
order to avoid suspicion by other Asian countries, it did a lot of behind the scene :. 
ground work. Before 1989, Japan had already studied the possibility of 
intergovernmental economic cooperation for many years. It was commonly believed 
that Japan's immediate action was prompted by the formation of the North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European Common Market. Regionalization in 
North America and Europe threatened the Asian countries with exclusion from these 
preferential agreements. At this preparatory stage, the attitudes of the United States :' 
| | ; 
j ! j 
and ASEAN were most critical to whether the idea can be put into practice. Whilst i; 
the United States basically supported the ideas, ASEAN members had divergent P 
1 0 
opinions. Singapore was enthusiastic while Malaysia had deep reservation. Right 
from the beginning, APEC members held disparate view on the nature, form, and 
function of such a cooperative body. This shows where the "politics" of APEC lies. 
To specify the objectives and framework of this thesis, this chapter is 
divided into four sections (including this introduction). Section 1.2 is about the 
research question and the significance of this thesis. Two propositions are formulated 
to summarize the main ideas of this thesis. These ideas are going to be illustrated in 
the rest of this thesis. Section 1.3 describes how the conceptual framework used in 
this thesis is derived. It lays down the premises of this thesis, the dynamics of 
globalization and regionalization, and the resulting necessity for international 
cooperation, with an emphasis on functions of international regimes. It also seeks to 
distinguish the difference between strong regimes and weak regimes. Lastly, section 




§ 1.2 Thesis Statement 
The above discussion briefly describes the evolution and contributions of 
APEC. This study investigates the question: what are the functions of APEC in spite 
of its constraint -- the nature of a "weak" regime in the theoretical sense? This is an 
issue in APEC because the great heterogeneity among Asia-Pacific countries impedes 
the progress of APEC, whilst also causes APEC adopting its unique model of 
regional cooperation ~ "open regionalism." APEC members share a widely different 
social, economic, and political development patterns. As a mechanism for ‘ 
* 
cooperation, APEC has to cope with the divergent and competing needs of all these '. 
different players. For example, the disparity in economic development has often been � 
interpreted as a constraint on APEC. This thesis attempts to understand the ways in : 
which APEC satisfies both the divergent interests and common needs of APEC 
members. This study argues that notwithstanding APEC member countries' divergent 
conditions APEC can still cope with the demands and expectations of the member 
states. This thesis, using theories of international regimes, argues that APEC ! 
performs its functions of a weak regime by providing information to members, 
r 
facilitating the nesting of different institutions, and fostering cross issue-linkage, 
such that transaction costs are reduced. Although APEC is "weak" in the sense that it i|' 
• 'I 
cannot effectively limit the actions of its members, it is a "flexible" institution, as j' 
modeled by "open regionalism." 
In order to evaluate the functions of APEC, this study will examine APEC 
members' perceptions of APEC and regional cooperation. This study will investigate 
APEC members' visions of cooperation through the study of four controversial and 
political issues. The four "political" controversies are the formation of regional 
groups, the institutionalization of APEC, the adoption of a time-frame for trade and 
investment liberalization, and the implementation of APEC liberalization measures. 
These issues are "political" in the sense that some members' interest clashed with 
others. The actors engaged in a hard process of defending the greatest extent their 
own interests. All these political issues posed challenges to the progress of APEC 
and threatened it with disintegration. Nonetheless, according to theory of 
international cooperation, the existence of incompatible interests is a precondition for 
mutual cooperation. Theoretically, "interdependence" and "conflict" can coexist. If 




coopemtion.i3 Indeed, it is the conflict that players want to address and hope to arrive 
at a mutually acceptable and "Pareto-optimal" solution. These four contentious issues 
indicate the position of different APEC members and what each of them was 
demanding. APEC members were divided by the issues of who, how, and what to 
cooperate. What are the causes of these controversies? 
Basically, the allocation of benefits and the distribution of cost from trade 
liberalization divide the East and the West. Developed nations hope that a region-
wide liberalization, starting with APEC, can provide more markets for their exports. 
w 
However, the developing nations do not bear this idea too much in mind. They hope 1 
！ ！ 
that APEC can help the relatively underdeveloped countries to narrow the gap with I 
the developed countries. The less developed countries fear that opening market too 
fast might damage their infant industries and generate social and political stability. 
Indeed, the experience of APEC is not unique. For instance, in the negotiation 
i 
leading to NAFTA, both the U.S. government and Mexico government were aware 
1丨 
that some interests of domestic sectors would be affected. Actually, oppositions from || 
both the U.S. legislature and the Mexico society were very large. Thus, the study of 'i 
cooperation should not be overshadowed by the aspect of controversy. i； 
Empirically, why is APEC chosen as a topic to study? APEC is the first 
!' 
attempt ever to bring together several important and dynamic economies at the | 
regional and global levels as cooperative group. APEC was a product of the post-
Cold War. It was expected to contribute to a new sort of stability in the region. The 
APEC process shows how regional players can establish a new order in the absence 
of immediate military threat with the decline ofU.S. hegemony. APEC is an example 
ofNorth-South cooperation. In short, APEC is a comprehensive forum that seeks to 
achieve several economic and political objectives. The mere fact that APEC 
members have been willing to adjust their positions shows that they have some 
confidence in APEC as a regional framework. State actors will cooperate if and only 
if total benefits exceed total cost. Conversely, the likely damage of not to cooperate 
or to be excluded is high. In 1997, several countries are still applying for membership. 




§ 1.2.1 Propositions of Thesis 
The ideas of this thesis are summarized as two propositions that are to be 
verified in part two and part three of this thesis. Proposition (1) deals with the 
difficulty of cooperation and the form of cooperation, depicting the empirical facts of 
APEC. Having laid down the constraints on cooperation in proposition (1), this thesis 
goes on to argue in proposition (2) the values and theoretical functions given by 
APEC. It attempts to explain why cooperation can occur as described by the previous 
proposition. Taken together, these two propositions address the question of ^ 
cooperation among heterogeneous actors. I 
Proposition (1) 丨 
The first proposition posits that "although APEC was constrained as a ‘• 
'weak' regime because of the vast diversity in economic conditions among its 
r 
members, APEC could still bring about considerable degree of convergence of 
expectations among its participants." This proposition raises three concepts, • 
i'ji 
namely "weak regime," "economic conditions," and "convergence of expectations," 
which are to be discussed as follows. 
i 
Diversity in economic conditions of countries can be measured by their 丨, ：； 
differences in terms of income level (GDP/per capita), tangible physical resources, i^  
amount of export, investment in foreign countries, exchange reserve, manufacturing 
shares, commodity trade patterns/^ and technology level. The differences between 
APEC members in social and economic conditions can be seen roughly from table 1. 
Table 1 - Key Socio-economic Indicators of APEC Members (1995) 
Area^ Population^ GNP^ GDP pc^ Exports^ Imports^ 
Western Hemisphere 
Canada 9,976 29.61 573,695 19,380 192.2 168.4 
Chile 757 14.22 59,151 4,160 16.0 15.9 
Mexico 1,958 91.83 304,596 3,320 79.7 72.9 
United States 9,809 263.12 7,100,007 26,980 583.9 771.3 
Northeast Asia 
China 9,651 1,200.24 744,890 620 148.8 132.1 
Hong Kong, China 1.1 6.19 142,332 22,990 173.9 196.1 
Japan 378 125.21 4,963,578 39,640 443.1 336.0 
Korea 99 44.85 435,137 9,700 125.1 135.1 





Brunei Darussalam 5.7 18.05 4,996 17,039 2.4 2.1 
Indonesia 1,905 193.28 190,105 980 45.4 40.9 
Malaysia 330 20.14 78,321 3,890 74.0 77.7 
Philippines 300 68.59 71,865 1,050 17.5 28.2 
Singapore 0.65 2.99 79,831 26,730 118.3 124.5 
Thailand 513 14.22 59,151 4,160 16.0 15.9 
Oceania 
Australia 7,731 18.05 337,909 18,720 53.1 61.3 
New Zealand 271 3.60 51,655 14,340 13.7 13.9 
PapuaNew Guinea 463 4.30 4,976 1,160 2.6 1.4 
« ji 
Notes: 1. Area: thousands of square kilometers ‘ 
2. Populations: 1995, in millions \ 
3. GNP: 1995, in millions ofUS Dollars J 
4. GNPpc: 1005 GNP per capita using the World Bank atlas method, in US Dollars ^ 
5. Exports: Merchandise trade, 1995, in billions ofUS Dollars : 
6. Imports: Merchandise trade, 1995, in billions ofUS Dollars 
Source: Complied by APEC Secretariat in 1997 and obtained through internet ； 
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/member/indi.html 丨 
The United States and Japan were the two largest and advanced economies that had 
the highest GDP level and income level. Most other countries were far behind them. 
i'.' 
China was still the poorest country when comparing the income level, although its 
amount of imports and exports was higher than many countries. :• 
Whilst the cultural factor and historical experience are usually conceived to , 
1 
be two principal reasons for the slow progress of APEC, this study argues ‘ 
nevertheless that the real problem lies in the economic concern of APEC members. 
The vast economic disparities make it difficult for these members to follow the same 
set of rules because interests of different members are varied. The uneven 
distribution of benefits affects cooperation in two ways. Firstly, the weaker members 
may perceive that the developed countries exploit them. Secondly, certain domestic 
groups, which bear the cost of cooperation, may exert huge pressure on governments 
and resist changes. 
The second core concept is international regime, which is commonly 
defined as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations."^^ The defining elements of a regime are distinguishable by 
the degree of abstraction, in which "principles include not only beliefs of fact and 




rights and obligation; and rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action."i6 As a device to foster stable cooperation, international regimes can be 
classified, in accordance with the "strength" of regimes, into strong regimes and weak 
regimes. Weak regimes are not capable of effectively resolving the problem of 
cheating or non-compliance with regime rules. They lacks monitoring and 
enforcement agencies. They cannot constrain practically the actions of its members. 
The emergence of a weak regime is usually explained by the lack of a 
hegemon to provide for leadership in establishing a strong institution. Apart from this 
« 
explanation, the proposition made by Mark Zachary is quite relevant to the study of | 
APEC. Specifically, he argues that a weak regime will result if the regime rules can \ 
disrupt the distribution of economic gains and losses among the most powerful : 
1 n 
states. A weak regime appears in areas that concern the "central terms of 
18 ‘ competition among the states." The United States, Japan, and China have been [ 
frequently involved with each other on trade dispute seriously. A strong regime of 
APEC trade liberalization will affect the status quo in such a way that the most \ 
better-off actor will certainly be the United States. Obviously, the other two actors 
will not accept such movement. Hence, the consequence is a "weak" free trade ‘ 
.i. 
regime of APEC. ; 
Nonetheless, convergent expectations has been fostered by APEC, a weak \ 
regime. Actors are able to arrive at agreement on essential principles and norms of 
cooperation. APEC's utility to bring about some regional consensus should not be 
overlooked. Such convergent expectations are found in GATT/WTO issues and the 
value of trade liberalization in the region. 
Proposition (2) 
Proposition (2) posits that "provision of information, nesting of regimes, 
and clustering of issues facilitated cooperation in the context ofAPEC." Even as 
a "weak regime," APEC is still functional. Firstly, APEC can be a venue for its 
members to exchange data and ideas. Today, APEC has established a complex web 
of communication channels between the member states formally and informally. 
There is no other place where trade and other important officials of Asia-Pacific 
countries can meet together several times a year to discuss important matters of 
common interests and concern. Such sharing of information is instrumental to 
8 
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Introduction 
crystallize common interests among members, leading to subsequent cooperation 
between actors. Besides, APEC has also set up database on economic activities of the 
region. This can improve the business environment and facilitate political and social 
cooperation. Most importantly, APEC has established sets of norms and rules 
that guide the behavior and policies of its members. APEC was initially founded 
to gather members' position on important issues of common concern. Subsequently, 
the amount of shared information increased. The opportunities for information 
exchange further rose. The 1994 Bogor Declaration and the 1995 Osaka Action 
Agenda established a mechanism to discuss and review what is being implemented 
by each participant, with a view of common action. At a minimum, shared 
information fosters consensus on issues affecting regional prosperity. 
APEC also fosters institutional nesting and cross issue-linkage. The 
integration of different level of regimes causes APEC members to arrive at consensus 
about trade liberalization. The nesting between global regime and APEC is the most 
important of all. According to the principle of "open-regionalism," everything done 
in APEC has to be consistent with rules of the global regime. On the other hand, the 
developing countries' support of trade liberalization not only comes from APEC 
alone but also more essentially from WTO. China's support of free trade scheme in 
APEC is obviously related to her application for WTO membership. Finally, the 
linkage between economic and political issue is an important force that glues Pacific 
and Asian countries together. Although the Cold War has been over, many Asian 
countries still consider that the engagement of the United States is necessary to 
balance the emergent power ofChina and Japan. APEC is therefore a channel to keep 
llie Unilcd Slates engage in Asian affairs. Asian countries cannot ignore the 
economic needs ofthe Unilcd Slates. They have lo make concessions when necessary. 
Economic intcrcsl is not thc only factor that determines an Asian counlr)''s policy in 
APEC. 
§ 1.3 Conceptual F r a m e w o r k 
This section describes the theoretical aspccls of international cooperation 
and how the above propositions are derived. This thesis applies the regime theory of 
neo-liberal institutionalism to the analysis of the role and functions of APEC. Neo-




of cooperation among nations. Neo-liberal institutionalist theory has been derived 
from studies about cooperation between industrialized Western countries that are 
relatively homogeneous. Neo-liberal institutionalist theory postulates that "strong" 
regimes are the most effective and desirable forms of cooperation. This thesis argues 
that for the foreseeable future only the "weak regime" is possible as a model of 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, this low level of 
institutionalization does not preclude the significance of APEC as a functional 
institution. ASEAN is an example that does not constrain too many actions of its 
N 
participants but still can contribute significantly to the welfare of its members. The I 
theoretical arguments of this thesis are developed as follows. 
§ 1.3.1 Premises 
Like other academic exercises, this thesis starts with some assumptions on 
the subject to be studied — the players and the environment where interactions of 
players take place. Like neo-liberal institutionalism, this thesis employs a "statist" 
approach that assumes the conscious and rational act of the state. The basic logic is i 
that APEC is a deliberate choice of institution by the players to satisfy their demands. 
I' 
I I L , 
Assumption of State-Centridty t 
This thesis is a study on the behaviour of states in the "international" 
environment. Level of analysis is on the state rather than other non-state units, such 
as non-governmental organizations. This assumption treats the state as a person, a 
unitary actor in international community. Compared to other organizations, the state 
is distinguished by its possession of "sovereignty," i.e., "that the state is subject to no 
other state and has full and exclusive powers within its jurisdiction"^^ over its 
territory. Together with this principle of sovereignty, the state as a member of society 
of states is central to the theory and practice of world politics. In the case of APEC, 
the state has a final say in almost all of the issue, although many non-governmental 
organizations are involved in advocating policies. Many essential issues of APEC are 
perceived as "high-politics" which lies at the exclusive domain of the state. After all, 
APEC is an international governmental organization in which decisions are made by 




Assumption of Rationality 
This thesis assumes that the states "seek to maximize value across a set of 
consistently ordered objectives."^^ In other words, it acts with rationality. This 
assumption of rationality suggests that the state will adopt a policy only on utilitarian 
and self-interest ground, i.e. when the total benefit exceeds total cost. In other words, 
for a state to cooperate with others, it must perceive that the benefits derived from 
cooperation are more than the cost of sacrificing state autonomy. Rational choice 
0 1 h 
theory assumes that an actor seeks to maximize his/her expected utility. It means ！ 
i 
that the actor has to weight against each alternative and then chooses the one that ； 
i< 
yields highest utility. This assumption is relevant to this study because of its ;• 
V 
simplicity in describing the motivation and consideration of the state. Whilst the state ； 
decision-makers may not actually have a quantitatively preference order, most of the 
cases will be resolved based on a cost-benefit analysis. 
f 
Assumption of National Interest i 
National interest means the interest of a state, as defined by its 
99 “ government. This paper considers that the interest of the state as exogeneously :'‘ 1 
given, to be pursued or guarded by the national leaders in APEC. The previous ‘ 
assumption of rationality requires that the state has a preference order and 
ascertainable interests; otherwise, it is not able to act rationally. In other words, the 
state has to know what benefits the country when arranging the preference order. 
Foreign policy, then, is a reflection of the concern for national interest and a way to 
realize it. For instance, the developed countries want trade liberalization for market, 
whilst the developing countries are interested in economic development or other 
forms of assistance. 
Assumption of Interdependence 
This assumption portrays the relationships between regional players. 
Theoretically, interdependence is a precondition for cooperation. According to Helen 
Milner, interdependence refers to a situation in which "an actor cannot get what 






actors' utilities is not independent" although each state is a sovereign unit?^ This 
assumption is evidenced in the Asia-Pacific region by the complex web ofproduction 
network, the interpenetrating market, and the flow of finance. Domestic economic 
policy, such as currency devaluation, of one country carries clear and immense 
effects on other countries. Inflation or economic recession of one country causes 
problems to other countries by the reduction of portfolio investment or imports. In an 
era of globalization of production and communication, "interdependence" is no 
longer debatable. The challenge for both the state and the people is how to respond to 
•» [i 
this trend which considerably reduces the autonomy of the state in economic realm. | 
Taken together, this set of assumptions stipulates that the states are major 
actors in international politics and in Asia-Pacific region. In a condition of 
interdependence, these state actors behave rationally to pursue their own national ； 
interests, which in many cases requires cooperation with other international players. ^ 
§ 1.3.2 The Political Economy of Globalization and Regionalization 
1 . 
APEC emerged as a result of a conscious choice by international actors 丨： 
under the condition of globalization and regionalization, both of which had created 
incentives for regional cooperation. Globalization is the most important and | 
•t 
influential development in the international political economy in late twentieth | 
century. It changes the life-styles of people and the ways in which the state operates. 
Globalization leads to the disappearing of national boundary as a determinant of 
human activities. People are entering the era of a "global village." According to 
Scholte, there are three understandings of globalization: "globalization as an increase 
of cross-border relations, as an increase of open-border relations, and as an increase 
of trans-border relations."�^ The first type refers to an increased movement between 
countries in terms of goods, investments, people, messages, and so on. It denotes 
internationalization and deepened interdependence. The second type refers to the 
opening of border by the states to remove regulatory barriers to international trade, 
travel, financial transfers and communication. The third, which Scholte thinks is 
most important and innovative, refers to the dismantling of border and the rise of a 
supraterritoriality - "the globe becomes a single place in its own right."^^ Scholte 
points out that globalization in this respect can be signified by the emergence of 




and global money and finance. This trend leads to a decline in autonomy of the state, 
especially in the area of macro-economic management, and a growth of 
multilateralism, the collective governance arrangements. There are many examples of 
multilateral collaborative measures, such as the World Trade Organization, the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the Group of Seven, the Group of 77, and so forth. 
Paralleled with the trend of globalization is the trend of regionalization. 
Regionalization can be understood as "the growth of societal integration within a 
% 
^<n 
region and to the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction." | 
I: a 
Such process can be promoted either by the state or by natural economic actors like ；  
firms and people. Regional cooperation is in need by regional actors to serve the 
purpose of responding to external challenges, cultivating common position, and ； 
98 
dealing with common problem arising out of regional interdependence. Since the 
i 
eighties, many regional trading agreements (i.e. the de jure regionalization) have |: 
i ( ‘ 
been established by the states, including the European Common Market, NAFTA, j 
ANZCER, AFTA, and so forth. Along with these formal types of regionalization are 丨 
de facto economic integration in Greater China (China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) and | 
Northeast Asia (China, Korea, and Japan). When regionalization (the de facto one) is i, 
promoted by natural economic actors, it may still give rise to state-promoted regional f 
integration as the states want to deepen and make use of the benefit of regional 
interdependence. For instance, the ASEAN Free Trade Area is such an attempt by 
ASEAN government to encourage the flows of economic transaction within ASEAN 
and to increase their collective competitiveness. 
Regionalization is an issue because of its impact on the global trading 
regime. Commentators have been worried that the discriminatory nature of the de 
jure economic integration contradicts the ultimate principle of non-discrimination of 
the global trading regime. These trading blocs might confront with each other and 
create trade war, slowing down the global trade negotiation. Thus far, academic 
findings have not been conclusive on whether regionalism supports or undermines 
multilateralism.29 But it is certain that globalization and regionalization lead to the 
need for greater cooperation among nations to pursue their objectives in global and 
regional affairs. These two trends invariably increase the degree of interdependence 




each individual state. Nevertheless, for state-actors, regional cooperation is 
sometimes more practical than global cooperation for its limitation in number of 
actors and the presence of social, cultural, and economic proximity among actors of a 
confined r e g i o n . � � T h i s is why regional cooperation proliferates in an era of 
globalization. In this light, regional cooperation can be a second best solution to 
global cooperation. 
« 
§ 1.3.3 International Cooperation and the Differentiation between j 
,1 
Strong Regimes and Weak Regimes ！ 
APEC is an exercise in international cooperation. How should the term ：. 
'cooperation' be interpreted? In actual practice, different actors have different i 
interpretations of the term. The Western members understand the term to mean some \ 
kind of mutual control or policy coordinationv^adjustment. Cooperation is typically 
defined by Western scholars as happening "when actors adjust their behaviour to the ‘ 
actual of anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy 丨 
31 • I 
coordination." Asian members interpret the idea very differently. Their conception 
1: 
of cooperation is more in the sense of "helping" others rather than "mutual ！ 
I 
constraints" or "changing of policy." The Asian members want cooperation to mean [ 
the development of joint projects or more efficient utilization of resources, such as 
the "growth triangle", but not in controlling of the actions of others. 
According to K.J. Hosti, there are four sources of cooperation, namely to 
reduce costs, to increase efficiency, to tackle common threats or problems, and to 
reduce the negative costs their individual actions may have on others .�� These general 
understandings can be placed under the contemporary trend of international political 
economy. Globalization, with the consequence of interdependence, sharply increases 
the needs for cross-border cooperation. Despite the practical need for cooperation, 
actors are hindered to pursue their common interests for some reasons. 
States do not collaborate with each other willingly in spite of these realistic 
needs for cooperation. The answer lies in the anarchic nature of the international 
environment that makes it a real difficulty to enforce international obligation 
effectively. Unlike in the domestic context, there is no all powerful "world 




commitment. A state is in itself a sovereign, an autonomous unit. In an anarchic 
world system, state actors have two worries. First of all, an actor may not be sure of 
what the other contracting parties will do. Secondly, if a breach of agreement occurs, 
other involving parties cannot take effective steps to remedy the problem.^^ 
Theoretically, the lack of information about others' compliance with commitment and 
the cost of contract monitoring and enforcement are obstacles to cooperation. 
International regime is a means to alleviate the obstacles to cooperation. 
Regime helps the international players to perceive the benefits of collective actions. 
^ 
According to Keohane, state interests are elastic and largely subjective; international ； 
ij 
institutions and regime can enable the actors to realize the long-term optimal 
interests.34 Regime is a device to foster stable cooperation and convergence of I 
expectations. Nevertheless, an "ideal" or "strong" regime is difficult to be established. 
Asia-Pacific region is only an example of cooperation in the form of a weak 
i 
international regime. 
Strong Regimes versus Weak Regimes 丨 
1. |. 
The classification of strong and weak regime is a matter of the "strength" ！ 
of a regime. Regime strength is measured by "the degree of compliance with regime j 
i' 
injunctions, particularly in instances where short-term or 'myopic' self-interests 1 
collide with regime rules."^^ In the international cooperation literature, the emphasis 
is on strong regimes such as the GATT, the European Union, and some regional 
agreements. Theoretically speaking, strong regimes represent a complete solution to 
the problem of collective action, such as free-riding and cheating. Under strong 
regimes, players are strictly bounded by the regime rules. Conversely, the emergence 
of weak regimes implies that cooperation is not really effective in addressing 
problems that impede collective action, such as the possibility of "cheating". Actors 
lack sufficient information about actions of others. In other words, a weak regime 
means that players may or may not obey the rules or requirements of the regime. 
Nevertheless, even as a weak regime, APEC can still bring about certain convergence 
of expectation among its participants. The theoretical importance of "weak" regime is 
worthy to be examined. Then, what are the differences between strong and weak 
regime? 




the area of economic transaction, the General Agreement for Tariff and Trade (GATT) 
^ r • 
is an example of strong regime. Strong regimes carry "legitimacy." It has a tightly 
connected principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedure. The rules should 
reflect the organizing principle of the regime. More importantly, the rules must be 
clear and consistent. The participants should be governed by the same principles, 
norms and rules with few exceptions. Although each member still is a sovereign 
entity under the regime, a strong regime should be able to check whether regime rules 
are broken and it is able to press the violator to correct its state policy. Ultimately, a 
^ 
strong regime should be able to punish violators. Furthermore, a strong regime can j 
effectively act as an arbitrator when there is a dispute among its members. Very often, 
strong regimes are given "explicit" mandate to do these tasks. In short, a strong 
regime is one that can effectively bring about collective action. 
In contrast, a weak regime is not so effective in bringing about the | 
compliance of its participants. A regime is said to be "weak" in several ways. j 
！ 
Conceptually, the linkage between the regime principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedure is not tight or is less coherent. Inconsistency could be sometimes i 
3 7 丨 
found. Regime rules are not clear and contain vague clauses. Regime rules are | 
• 0 0 
differently interpreted or routinely broken. The most important difference between | 
a strong regime and a weak regime is that the later does not have an effective | 
monitoring and enforcing capacity. Bearing with these problems in mind, then, what 
can a weak regime do for its member? Weak regime can furnish some but not all 
functions of an ideal type regime. Thus, weak regime can only provide general 
guidance or content, as stated in regime norms and rules, to the players about what 
they might to do or what is expected on them.^^ Human rights regime is one such 
• . 4 0 
instance. 
§ 1.3.4 Functions of Regimes: Information, Institutional Nesting, 
and Cross issue-Linkage 
A regime makes it easier for its members to make mutually beneficial 
agreement in a situation of anarchy. A Regime mitigates the obstacle to cooperation 
by its performance of certain functions through its defining elements -- principle, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedure. Two most important functions 




cost through institutional nesting and cross issue-linkage. 
Provision of Information 
Information is an essential component in the conduct of international 
relations and economic activities. Information can reduce uncertainties and risks 
faced by international actors in their decision-making process. However, in an 
anarchic world characterized by autonomous sovereign states with clash of interest, 
the obtaining of accurate information is not an easy task. Actors may not want to 
I 
disclose information. Some will provide false information. The search in information I 
I 
is costly, especially when it involves multiple parties and issues. In many cases, i 
information is asymmetrically possessed by actors; those who have less amount of 
information are hesitant to make agreements with the one having more information. 
International regimes are a solution to these problems of opportunism, uncertainty, 
asymmetric information, and enforcement of agreement.^^ Regimes improve the 
quality and quantity of information available to actors. As Douglass North points out, 
"with incomplete information, cooperative solutions will break down unless ! 
institution are created that provide sufficient information for individuals to police ( 
derivations."42 
Regimes convey useful information to their members by the defining : 
principles, norms, and procedures. These elements, constraining the actions of 
participants, make it easier to gather information about policies and actions of other 
states. This will reduce the possibility of cheating ~ an important obstacle to 
c o o p e r a t i o n . 4 3 Regime norms and mles increase the confidence of countries to enter 
agreement with others because international regimes make government policies 
appear to be more predictable and reliable.^^ Strong regimes that are equipped with 
strong monitoring facility can promote "transparency" of actor's decisions and 
actions.45 Regimes also facilitate communication and the exchange of information. 
Regimes can lead to "trans-governmental networks of acquaintance and friendship: 
supposedly confidential documents of one government may be seen by officials of 
another; informal coalitions of like-minded officials develop to achieve common 
purposes; and critical discussions by professionals probe the assumptions and 
assertions of state policies."^^ At least, the extensive contacts cultivated by regime 




Therefore, the ability to make useful and necessary information available is 
a source of and demands for international regimes. The success of a regime in 
providing high quality and quantity information is in itself a cause of regime 
p e r s i s t e n c e . 4 7 Regime is a device for governments to know their partners, not merely 
4R 
know about them. 
Facilitation of Institutional Nesting and Cross issue-Linkage 
The "strength" or "advantage" of a regime is more than the mere provision ,� 
of information. The ideas of regime nesting and cross issue-linkage are derived to ！ 
explain why compliance by actors is achieved through regimes. In international j 
environment, different regimes exist and influence each other. The action of a 
country has to be constrained by several interrelating regimes such that the incentive , 
of not to cooperate is significantly reduced. ‘ 
The concept of "regime nesting" is best explained with reference to a 
hierarchy of obligation systems.^^ There are a number of regimes governing the 
actions of state in an issue area. These regimes form an interlocking system, in which | 
the lower-level regime has to be in conformity with the higher-level regime. For 
example, a country's trade policy is constrained by its agreements made with other 
I 
countries. These agreements are "nested" within more comprehensive agreements, i 
such as a regional free-trade area or even a common market. The regional accord is, 
in turn, nested within the overall global trading regime. The trade regime is nested 
within sets of other arrangements in monetary relations, energy, foreign investment 
and other issues, which together constitute "a complex and interlinked pattem of 
relations among the states."^^ The global trading regime ultimately is nested within 
the overall international strategic system.^^ Therefore, there are vertical and 
horizontal dimensions of nesting that can affect the policy of states. The constraint of 
"institutional nesting," therefore, causes actors not to develop and participate in 
arrangement that can impair the objective of the more important regime.^^ 
Closely related to the pattem of nesting is the concept of "cross issue-
linkage." "Cross issue-linkage" can happen in various dimensions: between different 
items in an issue, between different issues in an issue-area, and between different 
issue-areas. Cross issue-linkage permits the developing of side-payments. Side-




"regimes bring together negotiators to consider a whole complex of issues."^^ Side-
payments means that "a government must give up something on one dimension to get 
something on another."^^ The existence of side-payments increases the likelihood of 
cooperation by offsetting costs in one area with benefits from another, thus 
promoting pursuit of common interests. Negotiators can obtain compensation for 




Demands for International Regimes i 
Regimes contribute to the reduction of transaction costs. Transaction costs | 
consist of "the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged !• 
and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements."^^ Regimes ！ 
can reduce transaction costs by providing general guidance on actions and imposing 
restrictions on behaviours of the states. Regimes play the policing role in enforcing 
international agreements. Furthermore, as regimes deal with several agreements 
altogether or productively nest issues together, the transaction cost of organization is 1 
I cr 
lower than negotiating for bilateral accords on an issue-to-issue basis. The marginal ！ 
I 
cost of dealing with additional issue will be lower with a regime.^^ 
In conclusion, the trend of globalization and regionalization creates 
incentives -- the deepening of interdependence -- for APEC members, who are 
rational actors, to cooperate with each other. Indeed, interdependence is a necessary 
condition for cooperation among countries. Nevertheless, when considering the 
model of cooperation, APEC members were constrained by the vast diversity in 
economic conditions. APEC, as a sort of weak regime, serves the functions of 
providing information, integrating different levels of regimes together, and linking 
different types of issues. It enables the participants to pursue their own interests 
through cooperation. APEC members had been able to adjust their policies and reach 
a compromise in several essential issues, namely the constituent of regional grouping, 
the institutional development of APEC, and most important of all, the values of trade 
and investment liberalization as supportive initiatives to global and regional 
economies. These are the ideas of the two propositions. The causal relationship 
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§ 1.4 Sources of Materials and Organization of the Study 
This thesis is an in-depth comprehensive qualitative research on the 
standpoints and policies of the five influential APEC actors (Australia, the United 
States, Japan, ASEAN, and China). Qualitative method is chosen because this 
research methodology is appropriate in the study of process and context.^^ This thesis 
describes the contentions between them on various essential matters of APEC in 
order to demonstrate the two propositions of this thesis. The time-frame is between 
1989 and 1995 because the most important development and transformation of 
APEC took place in this period. It attempts to understand how major actors of APEC 
perceived the problems and then responded to them. "Qualitative data are in the form 
oftext, written words, phrases, or symbols describing or representing people, actions, 




speeches, statements, or interviews of government officials or persons involved in the 
APEC process. If it can be found out that the APEC members really have an 
appreciation on the regime functions of APEC or that their behaviors reflect the 
regime functions performed by APEC, then the confidence in the validity o f the two 
propositions is increased. To accomplish this objective, this study makes use of three 
sorts of data. 
First, this thesis uses formal APEC documents and statements as well as 
other materials (e.g. government bulletins, speeches, briefings, press releases, etc.) 
written by APEC governments. These materials can provide a direct, straightforward 
verification of the standpoint and policies of APEC and the individual government. 
The interactions between different actors can be comprehended. Secondly, this thesis 
uses news reports to understand the stands of governments. Particular attention will 
be paid to interviews or opinion from a specified, named officials. Sources of 
information are drawn from reliable or reputable agencies, such as the Reuters, Don 
Jones, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Jakarta Post, Far Eastem 
Economic Review, and so on. Thirdly, like any other research, this study has to refer 
to scholarly analyses. Taken as a whole, these extensive resources can supply quite 
satisfactorily a comprehensive delineation of the interests of different APEC players. | 
The organization of this thesis is as follows. Chapter II is a comprehensive | 
literature review on globalization and regionalization, international cooperation, and 
the study of APEC. Chapter III describes the history of development of Asia-Pacific 
cooperation and the major actors' interests in establishing APEC. Afterwards, from 
Chapter IV to Chapter VII onward, this thesis discusses the contentions in the 
development of APEC. These contentious issues are presented in a roughly 
chronological order. Chapter IV is about who should be the eligible actors of Asia-
Pacific cooperation. APEC was challenged by the EAEC proposal which was put 
forward in 1990. Chapter V is about how cooperation should be carried out. When 
APEC adopted it Seoul Declaration in 1991, APEC entered the phase of developing 
the mechanism of cooperation. This established the base for substantive cooperation, 
which is discussed in chapter VI and VII. Chapter VI and VII focus on the most 
important agenda item of APEC -- trade liberalization. This issue dominated the 
agenda in APEC since 1993 when APEC consolidated its organizational 






§ 2.1 Concepts of Globalization and Regionalization 
This literature review comprises of four sections. Section 2.1 reviews the 
concepts of globalization and regionalization. These two trends greatly change the 
environment where the states exist and pose new dilemma and challenges for the 
states. Section 2.2 reviews theories of international cooperation, including the realist 
theories and theories of neo-liberal institutionalism (the game theoretic approach, the 
regime theory, and the hegemonic stability theory). Section 2.3 reviews the study of 
APEC. It is presented under three themes, namely the objectives of APEC, the 
constraints on APEC, and the theoretical implications of APEC. Section 2.4 is the 
concluding remarks. 
Concepts of "globalization" and "regionalization" have been widely 
employed to describe the nature and trajectory of world political economy.^ 
Globalization and regionalization are relevant to APEC because these two trends 丨 
promote the birth of APEC by encouraging the growth of "interdependence," a ！ 
i 
necessary condition for international cooperation. The concept of "globalization" has | 
been used rather loosely and may refer to several things. For this reason, Charles 
Oman has attempted to generalize and clarify what the term "globalization" implies. 
In an abstract sense, "globalization" as a process means "the accelerated movement 
across national and regional barriers of economic goods, including people, products 
and c a p i t a l . " 2 He finds that the contemporary usage of globalization refers to two 
notions, namely as multilateralism and as a micro-economic phenomenon. 
According to the first usage, "globalization" refers to "a multilateral 
lowering of policy impediments to the movement of goods and services across 
national and regional boundaries."^ The GATT is an example of this definition. 
According to the second dimension, "globalization" means "the growth of economic 
activity spanning politically defined national and regional boundaries."^ Being driven 
by the actions of individual economic actors in the pursuit of profit, globalization in 
this respect is a "centrifugal" process and a micro-economic phenomenon. Oman 




induced by the slowdown of the productivity growth rate and emergence of 
stagflation in the United States and Europe. 
What are the implications of globalization for nations? According to Oman, 
the effect of globalization is to "reduce the economic distance among countries and 
region as well as among the economic actors themselves, thereby increasing their 
economic interdependence and tending also to reduce the economic sovereignty of 
governments."^ Consequently, governments cannot solve the problems by themselves 
and have to cooperate more frequently with others, leading to "a powerful demand 
for non-regionally based, issue-specific international institutions designed to solve 
common problems and to manage the many new sources of friction to which 
interdependence gives rise."^ Globalization leads to a change in governance structure. 
According to Philip Cerny, globalization leads to a change in structure of the 
international system.? Under this situation, the role of individual state would 
diminish and the world would be characterized by different forms of collective 
actions that regulates economic activities. 
Regionalization (or regionalism as a conscious policy of states^) is 
frequently regarded as a response to or a consequence of globalization. Globalization 
can give rise to regionalization or regionalism. Globalization creates problems that i 
need collective action from the regional actors who share common identity, similar \ 
intent, and clear linking. International cooperation is more likely in small group than 
in larger group. Regionalization, which means "the accelerated movement by two or 
more societies toward the integration or pooling of their sovereignty,"^ is a 
"centripetal process" that can be driven either by political forces or "the same 
economic forces promote globalization."^^ The first type is de jure regionalization 
and the second type is de facto regionalization. Regarding the first type, 
regionalization or regionalism can be a means to reconcile the challenge or pressures 
from globalization as "states try to control at the regional level what they have 
increasingly failed at the national and multilateral levels."^^ Regionalization in this 
sense is often seen as a defensive instrument, a protection for local industries,^^ and a 
tactic to secure greater regional competitiveness.^^ Regionalization, charged with the 
objective to reduce or eliminate the barrier to movement of goods and factors of 
production, can take various institutional forms, such as preferential agreement, 




regionalization, sometimes referred to as "market-led economic integration," is 
fostered by economic actors, "from private trade and investment flows, and from the 
policies and decisions of companies,"^^ rather than the state. De facto regionalization 
is simply characterized by "a significant increase in cross-border trade, investment, 
and perhaps migratory flows within the region.”(， 
Similar to globalization, the consequence of regionalization is the demand 
for closer cooperation among nations. According to Richard Cooper, the process of 
regionalization or regional economic integration creates what he calls "international 
policy externalities" problems that require collective management and incentives for 
reducing transaction costs and facilitating intra-regional linkages.^^ For this reason, 
cooperative frameworks have to be developed. Oman also has similar theoretical 
deduction. De facto regionalization, which is fostered by micro-economic forces, i.e. 
firms and people, in the pursuit of profit through better use of comparative advantage 
of regional countries, may encourage the governments to create formal structure (de 
jure agreement) of international cooperation that seeks to consolidate or deepen the 
process.i7 
The most important question in the discussion of globalization versus 
regionalization is the relationship between the two processes. Scholars are divided | 
i 
over whether regionalization (or regionalism) would promote or impede globalization | 
(or globalism). Some argue that preferential trading agreement would pose a threat to 
international trading regime, whilst others argue that such regionalism is a stepping-
stone to globalism. Economic theory cannot answer this question since preferential 
arrangement can create trade and divert trade. Oman observes that although 
globalization is a centrifugal process and regionalization is a centripetal process, the 
two processes can be mutually reinforcing -- "a surge of regionalization has often 
given impulse to a new tide of globalization, as well as vice-versa."^^ 
From the foregoing discussion, both globalization and regionalization can 
give rise to the need for cooperation among nations and increase the degree of 
interdependence. Globalization fosters the growth of Asia-Pacific countries by the 
provision of global market and the increase in foreign investments. Developing 
countries are then able to adopt an "export-led" strategy for economic development. 
The continued functioning of international trading regime is important to the welfare 




such governance structure. De facto regionalization stimulated APEC governments to 
create a framework to deepen the development of interdependence. The uniqueness 
of APEC is that it is an attempt to cultivate an explicit linking and a synthesis 
between globalization and regionalization. 
§ 2.2 Theories of Cooperation among States 
A theoretical understanding of the dynamics of international cooperation, 
i.e. the basic nature of international environment, the role of institution and 
organization, and the behavior of the state, is a prerequisite for an empirical 
examination of regional cooperation. Scholars have theorized about the conditions 
under which cooperation is more likely to occur.^^ These theories are of great value 
to the study of APEC. This chapter surveys the two dominant theories of 
international relations, namely realism (or neo-realism) and neo-liberal 
institutionalism. Shortly after World War II, the Cold War happened rapidly. The 
realist paradigm and the study of power politics became the dominant framework for 
the study of international politics. In the late seventies, the realist approach was 
heavily challenged by neo-liberal institutionalism. Since then, there have been 
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continuous academic debates between proponents of each of the schools. 
§ 2.2.1 Realist Theories 
Realism has a long tradition in the Anglo-Saxon culture and history that 
make political theory?^ In the study of international politics, realist scholars perceive 
the pursuit for power and the struggling for survival constitute the basic law of nature 
governing international actors' behavior. Conflicts of interest and war to resolve 
disputes are the recurrent phenomena in history. Realist scholars make several 
assumptions about the system of world politics.^^ First of all, the state, being a 
unitary and autonomous entity, acts in a rational and egoistic manner when deciding 
policy issues. More importantly, realist scholars maintain that international 
environment is of an "anarchic" nature. This means that there is no world government. 
No state or organization can command the subordination of sovereign states. None 
can constrain or determine the behaviour of states?^ State-actor is in a condition that 




In general, realist scholars postulate that "states are preoccupied with 
power and security, are predisposed toward conflict and competition, and often fail to 
cooperate even in the face of common interests."^^ In such an anarchic system, each 
international actor has to build up their national capabilities to withstand the invasion 
by others. "Anarchy and the resulting danger of war and domination cause all states 
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always to be motivated in some measure by fear and distrust." According to Joseph 
Grieco, the sustenance of "independence" and "survival" rather than improving well-
being remains to be the core interests of the state. Because the states are threatened 
by the aggressive actions of others, they are sensitive to the national capabilities of 
themselves and others. Realist scholars are therefore pessimistic on the prospects of 
cooperation. They argue that, even thought cooperation can lead to some kind of 
collective benefits by making all the parties better off, the fact that some members 
can obtain more benefits than others precludes meaningful cooperation. This is 
because the result of cooperation can make the relative position of a state lower and 
thus jeopardize its existence. International institution is not really significant as it 
only constrains actions of the state marginally?^ 
The realist perspective seems to provide us a persuasive model to explain if 
not even predict world politics. This theory is accustomed to our understanding of 
human nature, i.e. self-interest. However, this perspective suffers from some major 
theoretical and empirical problems. First, the internal logic of realist theories is 
questionable. For example, Keohane demonstrated that realists' theory of balance of 
power is inconsistent with its assumption that state seeks to maximize its power?^ 
Moreover, neorealist theory is criticized for being unable to account for changes in 
world politics and "those aspects of behavior that have their source in institutional 
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variation." Since the seventies, the realist theory has been challenged by the liberals 
for its failure to consider "economic and ecological interdependence, changes in the 
functional capabilities of governments, variations in the availability of information, 




§ 2.2.2 Neo-Liberal Institutionalism 
"Functionalism" and "neo-functionalism" emerged in the fifties. These 
post-war liberal theorists disagreed with the realists' state-centric assumption. They 
thought that the realist overemphasized power struggle and confrontations between 
states. However, the deadlock in European Integration in sixties and then 
international conflicts greatly reduced the interest in these theories that stress 
"harmony" among states. Afterwards, in late seventies, "neo-liberal institutionalism" 
challenged the ideas of realism more strongly. Unlike the earlier liberals who were 
criticized for being too idealistic or too "harmony-oriented, the neo-liberal 
institutionalists accept the anarchic nature of international environment and the 
egoistic nature of the state. This is the reason why the prefix "neo" is added to 
indicate its difference to earlier version of liberalism. Meanwhile, as a derivative of 
liberal thought, it retains the feature of emphasizing the role of human-created 
institutions, the importance of changeable political process, and the possibility of 
cumulative progress in human affairs.��Neo-liberal institutionalists seek to prove 
that cooperation is still possible under the realist assumptions. They attempted to 
understand why and how many of the incidents in the world are institutionalized or 
organized. 
Neo-liberal institutionalism is not a single coherent theory. It embraces 
several constituent theories. Game-theoretic approach explores the nature of 
collective actions and the obstacles for cooperation. Regime theory is an extension of 
game-theoretic approach. It emphasizes regimes' functions in solving obstacles to 
efficient collective actions. Nevertheless, the supply of international regime is related 
to the presence of the "hegemon," according the hegemonic stability theory. Game 
theoretic approach, regime theory and hegemonic stability theory, which constitute 
the theoretical approach of cooperation among nations, are discussed as follows. 
Game-theoretic Approach: Cooperation under Anarchy 
Game-theorists explore the inherent problem of collective action by using 
rational choice theory. The strength of game-theoretic approach lies in its rigorous 
deductive theorizing.]! It provides a single theoretical framework to understand 





contextual factors of international politics. It is explicitly concerned with 
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cooperation and conflict in international arena. Game-theoretic approach assumes 
that international players are rational and egoistic, and that they are independent to 
make decisions. Actors are theoretically situated in a game context, most notably the 
Prisoners' Dilemma (PD), which is the "key metaphor of international politics."^^ 
The prisoners' dilemma is a case to demonstrate why and how actors carniot 
cooperate with others in spite of common gains as a result of joint e f f o r t s ” Through 
extensive experiments and theorizing, factors affecting cooperation in competitive 
settings have been identified. Such factors are the payoff structure (the relative 
weight of cost and benefit), the kind of game, the number of actors, the expectation 
of the future, and reciprocity. Regarding the payoff structure, cooperation is more 
likely when the gains from defection are small and the costs of mutual defection are 
high.36 Cooperation is least likely in PD when compared to other kinds of games, 
such as Stag Hunt and Chicken. The likelihood of cooperation diminishes as the 
number of players increases. Cooperation is more likely if players continue to interact 
in future. Besides, players would choose to cooperate if they are certain that such 
move would be reciprocally rewarded. Lastly, cooperation is easier in economic issue 
o ^ 
than in security issue. 
Of course, the game-theoretic approach is not without its problems and 
limitations. For example, it is difficult to apply game theory to real life situations; it 
is not so simple to determine the preference order and the payoff scheme.^^ Other 
common critics include its over-simplification of the complex nature of the actors, 
the distortions of both their goals and policy processes, the failures to acknowledge 
the cognitive and perceptual elements of strategic interactions, the failure to capture 
subtle interaction, and the compression of a variety of bargaining situations into a 
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single type of game. In spite of these problems, the game-theoretic approach opens 
the door to the study of international regime, which is demanded by players to 
introduce some favorable factors into players' interactions so that it is easier to 
cooperate. 
Theories of Tnternational Regimes 
Theories of international regime are essential parts of neoliberal 




the Spring 1982 issue of International Organization. Noteworthy regime scholars 
include Stephan Krasner, Robert Keohane, Ernst Haas, Joseph Nye, Charles Lipson, 
Vinod Aggarwal, Oran Young, and Peter Haas. Why were so many scholars 
interested in "regime analysis"? For one thing, regime theory, in reintegrating "the 
subfield of international politics, economics, law, and organization,"^^ expands the 
prior narrow focus in the discipline of world politics.^^ For another thing, as 
suggested by Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, "the interest in regimes sprang 
from a dissatisfaction with dominant conceptions of international order, authority, 
and o r g a n i z a t i o n . " 4 2 The regime theorists hoped to develop a new theoretical 
construct that is capable of interpreting the newly emerging phenomena of 
international cooperation in areas of trade, natural resources, conservation, control of 
armaments, human rights, and so forth.^^ Regime theorists wanted to explore how 
regime can benefit players in an anarchic world. 
Despite the widespread application, the concept of international regime has 
been defined rather loosely. Some authors applied the concept of regime simply to 
the emergence and existence of regularized activities whilst others used regime to 
refer merely to the explicit rules and arrangements governing actions of players. A 
middle position between these extremes, which evolved as a standard, is provided by 
Stephan Krasner: "regimes are defined as sets of implicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedure around which actors' expectation converge in a given area 
of international relations."^^ The question raised by this definition is how regimes can 
change the behaviour of the state. 
According to game theorists, regime can foster favourable conditions for 
international cooperation. With the installation of international regimes, payoff can 
be restructured, expectation of the future can be lengthened, number of actors can be 
limited, reciprocity can be institutionalized, and different issues can be linked up 
together.43 The sub-optimality outcome in collective action is resolved because 
players are deferred to choose "defection" as their strategy. The risk or uncertainty is 
greatly reduced because with international regimes the players are better informed of 
what others are doing. The possibility of "cheating," an important obstacle to 
cooperation, can be minimized.^^ 
A more influential perspective draws their explanation from transaction 




logic of functional analysis and rational choice theory, international regimes persist 
because of the anticipated benefits to players. Theory of market failure informs that 
sub-optimal outcome occurs as a result of institutional deficiency of a market system, 
i.e. when agreement beneficial to all parties are not made. To overcome this market 
failure problem, social institutions are established to tackle difficulties with 
"opportunism, uncertainty, information costs, measurement problems, and difficulties 
of contract enforcement."^^ The invention of international regime by national player 
is similar to this line of r e a s o n i n g ， R e g i m e is an institution to help actors to achieve 
agreements. 
Keohane's work is a clear illustration of such a perspective. He draws an 
analogy between the realm of economics and the realm of politics. The phenomenon 
of market failure exists similarly in world politics as with economic market. 
According to Keohane, the anarchic nature of international environment leads to 
institutional deficiency, i.e. "political market failure," that blocks the states from 
making mutually beneficial agreements.^^ Anarchy prevents state actors from 
cooperating to pursue for better gains; sub-optimal solution to problem results. 
Regimes exist because they can reduce transaction cost and cope with uncertainty by 
providing information to actors. "Political market failure" leads to the "demand" for 
certain functions of international regimes, namely provision of information and 
reduction of transaction cost. With international regimes, the compliance problem 
can be better managed. This is preferable to the making of ad hoc, issue-to-issue 
based, separate agreement by individual states. Regimes facilitate the productive use 
of cross issue-linkage and the "nesting" of regimes, which increase the chance of 
"cooperation" and cost of "non-compliance". 
Theory of international regimes has been seriously criticized for its 
conceptual imprecision, theoretical inconsistency, empirical validity and normative 
implication. For instance, Susan Strange argued that regime theory is "a fad; 
ambiguous and imprecise; value-biased towards order rather than change or equity; 
essentially static; and finally rooted in a limiting, state-centric paradigm."^^ 
Furthermore, Keohane's functional theory of regime is criticized for its lack of 
empirical indicators or testing on the functions it proclaimed.^^ Also, functional 
theory in itself cannot explain why a regime in certain issue-areas but not the others, 




conclude, concept of international regime needs to be further refined and tested. 
Hegemonic Stability Theory 
The hegemonic stability theory attempts to explain how international 
regimes arise and change. The theory posits that the hegemonic country provides 
indispensable leadership in the emergence, maintenance, and transformation of 
international regimes.^^ For example, Great Britain and the United States are 
frequently viewed as responsible for the open trading regime in the mid-19th and 
mid-20th century respectively.^^ Hegemonic state is responsible for "the provision of 
international stability, international security, rules of behaviour, stability of 
expectations, and enforcement of mles."^^ Since a single hegemon is vital to the 
origin and maintenance of international trading regime, "fragmentation of power" 
causes regimes to collapse.^^ 
Although the hegemon provides leadership for collective action in 
international community, there has not been a full theoretical account on what it 
actually does. Scholars have derived many explanations. The hegemon may use 
carrot to induce cooperation when establishing the regime. Lipson observes that the 
United States institutionalized the liberal trading regime at the outset through a TIT-
for-TAT strategy by its unilateral trade liberalization.^^ Hegemon can also use 
coercion against those who do not obey the rules and provide benefit ^>ositive 
sanctions) to those who support the mles.^^ In all cases, the hegemon takes up the 
cost of initiating and maintaining the cooperative framework. Why does the hegemon 
take up this leadership role? Two very different models of hegemonic leadership 
have been developed. According to the "coercion" model, the hegemon simply use 
the regime for its own advantages. In contrast, the "benevolent" model suggests that 
the hegemon wants to maintain the stability in world economy and to prevent the 
problems of externalities.^® 
Hegemonic stability theory has been criticized for its theoretical and 
empirical flaws. Basically, the concept of "hegemon" is in itself controversial. What 
constitutes hegemonic power and how such power is exercised has to be clearly 
explained. Some scholars challenge the idea of "benevolence." In this light, American 




Some scholars suggest that the post-war trading regime is a strategy against 
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communism, rather than a mere solution to collective action problem. Some 
scholars argue that empirical evidences do not support this theory. Both the Great 
Britain and the United States did not consistently perform the expected role of a 
hegemon.63 g^jjj other scholars observe that cooperation is determined by several 
factors. Hegemonic leadership is just one of the factors. For instance, cognitive 
theorists hold that the underlying values and perceptions of the decision-makers are 
the ultimate endogenous definition of "national interest" that determines cooperation. 
They seek to explain cooperation by referring to ideology, value system, belief, and 
knowledge available， 
§ 2.2.3 Remarks 
Realist theory is based on the assumption of world anarchy, in which the 
states are motivated by self-interest to dominate or survive. Cooperation is difficult to 
achieve. There is no higher authority to enforce effectively the agreement between 
parties. Cooperation may not be favourable to all the parties equally. Weaker states 
may be exploited. There is a danger that stronger states, who can benefit more than 
others, take advantages of the weaker states. Under this condition, the desirability of 
cooperation and effectiveness of international institution are doubted. On the other 
hand, neo-liberal institutionalism asserts that cooperation can be achieved under 
certain favorable conditions. For example, the presence of international regimes can 
provide information to the parties and increase the transparency of state actions. Neo-
liberal theories assume the existence of conflict between members, but argue that as 
long as sub-optimal outcome can be changed into pareto-optimal result there is a 
need for cooperation. 
How can these theories be evaluated? The value of a certain theory should 
be assessed by the degree to which it can account for the relationship between social 
phenomena. In this light, neo-liberal institutionalism appears to be more persuasive 
in the late twentieth century that is characterized by a high degree ofinterdependence, 
the globalization of economic activities, and rapid technological changes. Empirically, 
the number of international organizations increases significantly, together with the 
rise in quantity of covenants made between governments, showing that decision-




find their supporting counter-examples: violation of regime rules by states happens, 
and that the states cannot reach an agreement because of the obvious myopic interest. 
It does not imply that the explanations of realism hold because impediment to 
cooperation is not necessarily related to the gain of others and the possibility of being 
extinct. Neoliberal institutionalism is more sophisticated in analyzing the incentives 
of cooperation and the conditions that foster it. This theory is useful the study of 
APEC. 
§2 .3 The Study ofAPEC 
Many scholarly articles have been published to describe and explain the 
APEC process. Undoubtedly, these works can enrich our understanding on the APEC 
process. Why was APEC established? What were the contributions of APEC? What 
were the difficulties associated with the development of APEC? Nevertheless, very 
few articles use theories of international relations to explain APEC formation and 
maintenance. It is because most articles are written by economists rather than 
political scientists. It is of course not in their interests to use international relations 
which suggested by U.S. international relations scholars to study APEC. The style of 
their works is to a large extent descriptive and prescriptive. Although APEC is a 
valuable case study to apply and verify theories of international cooperation, the 
result is not so encouraging. Interest by political scientists on the matter has been 
lukewarm. Papers contributed by scholars applying international theories are written 
byjust a few persons,? 
The subsequent sections summarize the major findings about APEC by 
scholars from both disciplines of economics and political science. The scholarly 
observations are presented under these themes: objectives of APEC, constraints on 
APEC, and theoretical implications of APEC. 
§ 2.3.1 Objectives ofAPEC 
The demand for APEC stemmed from changes in both the regional and 
international political and economic environments.^^ Among these changes, the 
stalling of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, which was caused by the 




by scholars to be the triggering even t? Regionalization in North America and 
Europe were likely to affect the exports the Western Pacific rim countries (e.g. East 
and Southeast Asian countries, New Zealand, and Australia). On the other hand, the 
phenomenon of endogenous regionalization in Asia-Pacific is also conceived to be a 
strong motivation to foster cooperation. Regional actors need to promote 
r a 
"interdependence" in order to sustain their growth. To illustrate, the trade disputes 
between the United States, Japan, and China have to be resolved if long-term 
prosperity of the region is to be pursued.^^ APEC is a convenient forum to address all 
these issues. 
Scholars7G have also proposed various objectives of APEC, in addition to 
the formal stipulations in APEC documents. Economic cooperation is a loose concept 
subject to different interpretation, ranging from purely consultation to collusion in 
discriminatory market behaviour.^^ Scholars have observed that APEC functions as a 
"multipurpose" organization contributing to the strengthening of GATT/WTO, 
discouraging the "inward-looking" tendency of regional integration, harmonizing of 
sub-regional groupings, and reducing conflicts between regional economies. 
The fundamental intention of forming APEC is to sustain the growth and 
prosperity of the region. In Gareth Evans' account, this means "maximizes trade 
creation, minimizes trade diversion, and preserves the prosperous income growth."^^ 
The objective of maintaining economic growth and prosperity depend on the 
functioning of global trading regime and the interdependent relations between 
regional actors. Thus, the most explicit objective of APEC is to support 
multilateralism^^ rather than to form a trade bloc/^ This is the central idea of the 
principle of "open regionalism." If this can be achieved, APEC could prevent a split 
of the global economy into three defensive trading blocs, which could harm the 
interest of s m a l l East Asian economies” APEC is therefore considered to be "an 
active lobby" for multilateralism,^^ a "free trade pressure group,"?? and "a positive 
force in shaping global rules of trade, investment and other economic transactions."^^ 
APEC is designed, through its principle of open regionalism, to link regional interest 
to global interest. 
To support the global trading regime, APEC should encourage unilateral 
liberalization ofits members7^ To date, East Asian countries have adopted the policy 




could reinforce this positive trend and transcend the achievements of the GATT or 
WT0.8G In this regard, APEC aims to reduce trade barrier in order to facilitate 
economic transaction.^^ Elek has identified four kinds of impediments to economic 
transactions, which could be reduced by APEC. These problems are market access 
barriers, uncertainty about future market access, physical bottlenecks, and differences 
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in domestic rules and legislation. Scholars have proposed measures in trade and 
investment facilitation and technical cooperation, such as sharing information and 
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harmonizing policies and standards, to resolve these problems. 
Ultimately, economic cooperation is also a means to attain broader, long-
term political end.84 Economic prosperity is intimately related to regional stability 
and security. Constructive dialogues between trading partners would improve 
relations and might even lead to cohesion. This will promote a sense of community 
between regional countries. In view of this, it is argued that APEC should "build a 
sense of trust and shared perceptions at the political level."^^ To improve the ties 
between major regional actors, it is imperative "to create an institutional network to 
link the nations on the two sides of that ocean in an effort to sustain global peace and 
prosperity for the decades ahead."^^ APEC mirrors the functions of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) to cope with regional economic and political problems of 
common concern. In this regard, APEC has some definite influence on sub-regional 
groups under its umbrella. 
To conclude, APEC seeks to minimize obstacles to economic cooperation 
within the region. APEC differs from past regional cooperation experience in that its 
scope of activities was very wide, ranging from trade liberalization to developmental 
assistance for less developed countries. Its ultimate goal is to secure the stability and 
prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. 
§ 2.3.2 Constraints on APEC 
APEC is an interesting case study in regional economic and political 
cooperation. It demonstrates how a group of heterogeneous countries could cooperate 
with each other in spite of divergent needs. Unlike Europe, which is united by history 
and culture, "Asia-Pacific" as a geopolitical construct is problematic, if not being 
misleading.87 Policy-makers and academia have been well-aware of the difficulties in 




differences in political system, level of economic development, cultures history, and 
social institutions. These affected the process and outcome of cooperation. 
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Vast economic diversity is a major obstacle to closer cooperation. APEC 
economies can be classified and separated in terms of income, technology and skill 
level.89 They can be differentiated by economic structure and social institution. 
APEC members embrace market economy and socialist economy at disparate stage 
of development. Each of the APEC members has its own economic priority and 
political agenda. This leads to different perceptions, expectations, and approaches to 
economic cooperation. More importantly, "North-South" dimension seriously affects 
cooperative efforts in placing the exploitation and uneven allocation of benefits 
issues into decision-makers' evaluation of cooperation. This issue is particularly 
sensitive to those Asian countries that had been colonized. The weaker economies are 
wary that "discrepancies in national capacities to benefit from joint regional 
development and cooperation could lead to asymmetrical dependency."^ 
As a whole, the divergent needs and the existence ofNorth-South problem 
retard regional cooperation. Firstly, the prevailing models for economic cooperation 
are said to be unsuitable for the region. Cooperation in these formats requires a much 
higher degree of homogeneity that is not present in the Asia-Pacific context. For 
example, a core issue is whether APEC members could cooperate in the form of 
preferential trading agreement. The vast disparity in economic capabilities rules out 
this possibility. Most of the weaker economies are hesitant to engage in a free trade 
area. Greater de jure economic integration is unlikely unless the economic gap 
between developed and developing countries is diminished.^' 
No less important than the economic factor, the cultural and historical 
factors are frequently discussed in the literature on APEC.^^ APEC embraces Anglo-
Saxon and Asian cultures. They are dissimilar in many aspects. According to Crone 
(1993), there is a conflict between Western liberalism and the Asian authoritarianism 
in distribution and allocation of political and economic resources.^^ The West and 
East hold different views on human rights, democracy, and other social issues. 
Disagreements on fundamental values may "foster a climate of mutual non-
understanding or even suspicion."^^ In these years, there has been an emergence ofan 
"Asian" identity that calls for the re-evaluation of Westem values and the promotion 
of Asia's own values. 
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Literature Review 
Among others, Richard Higgott, Donald Crone, and Vinod Aggarwal had 
attempted to explain the restraints of APEC by putting the factors of economic and 
cultural diversities under frameworks devised from theories of international 
r d a t i o n s . 9 5 All of them agreed that APEC is a "weak" regime. The causes lie in 
difference in cultural, historical, and ideological factors, making the values, beliefs or 
judgment of APEC members different from one and other, and affecting the 
cognitive interpretation by APEC members on circumstances of cooperation. Crone 
added that such "value differentials" multiply with economic diversity to "narrow the 
range of normative agreement about cooperation."^^ Higgott concluded that there was 
only a "tactical consensus" rather than a "cognitive" one on the utility of APEC as a 
vehicle for greater economic cooperation.^^ Aggarwal observed that as APEC actors 
disagreed to who would control what there was a demand for "weak" regime only.^^ 
§ 2.3.3 Theoretical Implications of APEC 
APEC is a valuable case study to demonstrate the relevancy, utilities, and 
limitations on international politics theories. Currently, most articles about APEC are 
descriptive and prescriptive. Verifying and modifying existing body of theories were 
not the concern of most writers. Besides, when the articles were written, APEC was 
still at an early stage of development. Scholars were hard to draw substantial 
observations regarding the connection between theory and experience of APEC. 
Nevertheless, a few scholars still had attempted to make a connection between theory 
of cooperation and practice of APEC. 
The experience of Asia-Pacific institution-building and the development of 
APEC can be placed under the debate between neo-realists and neo-liberals. So far, 
many scholars^^ found that the neo-liberal propositions and the relating research 
agenda were becoming more relevant than that of the realist, although they were fully 
aware of the fact that many of the APEC members had been preoccupied with their 
self-myopic interest which frequently clashes with others. To illustrate, Aggarwal 
attributed the relevance of liberal theories to the general observation that 
international institutions do constrain the behaviour of states._ Richard Higgott 
noted that most Asia-Pacific economies, caused either by the robust economic growth 
(Japan and NIEs) or a lower level of development (Thailand, Indonesia), did not have 




Secondly, these works proposed a further refinement in theories regarding 
the development of regime and the concept of leadership. Specifically, they tried to 
supplement the arguments of hegemonic stability theory. It is commonly agreed that 
the lack of hegemonic leadership from the United States is a chief cause of the 
"weakness" of APEC/02 Consequently, institution-building in Asia-Pacific region is 
hard to attain comparable level as the North American (i.e. NAFTA) or the European 
model. According to Aggarwal, this deduction is not sufficient as it treats the concept 
of "hegemony" too simple. He noted that this approach had to be combined with 
other factors, such as institutional nesting, controls of actors, and transaction costs, to 
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account for the characteristics of APEC. Crone found that there was "an optimum 
power stratification" for regime formations in the Asia Pacific region and that the 
concept of "hegemony" should be interpreted with an upper l imi t . ^ Both of them 
held that the role of values and cognition should be better known in the study of 
regime. On the concept of leadership, Higgott went beyond the traditional realists' 
understanding of sources of structural power and proposed the "non-structural" bases 
of leadership in form of innovative and entrepreneurial strategies which was 
exercised by middle powers like Australia.^^^ 
Thirdly, these works seek to enrich our understanding of "new regionalism" 
by referring to special characteristics exhibited by APEC. Asia-Pacific regionalism as 
a whole, and APEC as an example, is found to have these features^^^: outward-
looking, market-led integration or interdependence, less institutionalized, wide 
variety in social and economic system of members, formal and informal contacts 
among members, overlapping of membership, and accommodation of sub-regional 
economic zone. In particular, Higgott stressed that, in comparison with European 
Union, APEC represents an alternate path to regionalism, in which European Union's 
aim of state-sponsored integration or pooling of sovereignty is not and will not be the 
direction of APEC]。？ The appropriate model to examine APEC should either be the 
ASEAN or the Cairns Group. The past experience of ASEAN, combined with the 
newly emerging APEC, shows that "non-legalistic" or loose cooperation can also be 
politically influential in the global or regional context. 
Last but not least, scholars understand the problem of the existing research 
approaches. They note that insufficient attention has been paid to how domestic 




literature has been produced about domestic process and European integration, but 
there has not been any systematic cross-country comparative analysis on the issue in 
Asia-Pacific region/^^ Without this endeavor, one cannot understand "how 
preferences are aggregated, national interests constructed, strategies adopted or 
agreements implemented."^^^ Furthermore, the current theoretical formulations on 
leadership in the Asia-Pacific, Higgott noted, still cannot provide a satisfactory 
answer to understand the prospect of regional cooperation. The study in non-
governmental organizations or policy networks only provides a partial solution to see 
how communication can be achieved or uncertainty can be r e d u c e d " � 
§ 2.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter reviews concepts of globalization and regionalization, the 
theoretical framework of international cooperation, and empirical findings on APEC. 
This thesis applies international relation theories to the study of APEC. It attempts to 
enrich the empirical findings about APEC. Theoretically, this thesis attempts to see 
the degree to which APEC conforms with propositions of neo-liberal theory in 
general and regime theory in particular. The central argument of this thesis is that the 
APEC phenomenon, i.e. cooperation amidst diversity and the reaching of 
compromise, cannot be explained satisfactorily by realist propositions. More 
specifically, realist propositions hold that it is against the self-interest of the 
developing countries to participate in APEC and support the trade liberalization 
scheme. Developing countries, conversely, should distance themselves as far as 
possible from the developed countries to maintain its independence. However, this is 
contrary to what happened in the development of APEC. Thus far, several developing 
countries like India are applying for membership to APEC. How can we explain their 
willing participation in APEC? The most probable answer is that cooperation will 
lead to Pareto-optimal consequence as the neo-liberal theories assert. Besides, 
although the progress of APEC has been slowdown by the cautious Asian members, 
it does not necessarily reflect the validity of the relative gain argument. It is more the 
problem of adjustment cost or domestic pressure than the rise of relative capabilities 











The Creation of APEC and Incentives of Original Players 
§ 3.1 Interdependence and the Development of Non-governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) in the Asia-Pacific Region 
This chapter studies the interests of the founding members of APEC. 
Firstly, section 3.1 is an overview on the evolution of movement of regional 
economic cooperation. Attention will be paid on three important non-governmental 
organizations -- the Pacific Trade and Development Conferences (PAFTAD), the 
Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Conference (PECC) -- and the problems in establishing an effective framework of 
cooperation. The study of them is meaningful in the sense that these non-
governmental organizations have been playing a part in promoting the later 
development of intergovernmental organization by the provision of personal 
networks and policy inputs, and more opportunities for contacts of delegates from 
different countries as a means to forge mutual understandings. Section 3.2 studies the 
reasons for why APEC members (Australia, Japan, U.S., and ASEAN) had interests 
in APEC. This serves to explain the initial functions performed by APEC, which is 
discussed in section 3.3 ~ the concluding remark. 
The motivation in establishing a framework for cooperation can be traced 
back to the 60s，when economic interdependence began to emerge. Hence, the 
emergence ofAPEC in 1989 is not something invented suddenly from empty; rather, 
it is a continuity and a breakthrough from the past in the realization of interest of 
economic cooperation. However, throughout the 60s, owing to a number of 
constraints -- two most influential factors being political suspicion among states and 
heavy reliance on bilateral relationship (particularly between that of the U.S.), 
governments ofboth developed and developing countries did not have much interest 
to establish formal framework for cooperation. The attempt in economic cooperation 
had to be constrained as non-governmental in nature.! Nevertheless, the change in 





§ 3.1.1 Historical Development of Non-Governmental Organizations 
This section traces the development of PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC. 
Firstly, the early interest for Pacific Economic organization came from the academic 
circles in Japan in the mid-1960s. Professor Kiyoshi Kojima of Hitotsubashi 
University presented his formulation of a "Pacific Free trade Area" at the Japan 
Economic Research Centre in November 1965? Afterwards, with the support of th is 
centre and the Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, a "Pacific Trade and Development 
Conference (PAFTAD)" was convened in January 1968 in Tokyo to discuss the pros 
and cons of a "Pacific Free Trade Area" among the five developed Pacific countries 
(Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States). Although it was 
then concluded that this idea was not practical, successive gatherings of academics 
had continued to be convened. These meetings finally evolved into an organizational 
form. Today, PAFTAD is identified as "the major intellectual resource for those in 
the Pacific area interested in the analysis of regional economic prospects"? The 
conference provides a venue for "intelligent consideration of economic policy issues 
of importance to Pacific development."^ It aims at giving academic advice to the 
governments and the business sectors in dealing with the challenges of Pacific 
development.^ Today, PAFTAD also invites scholars and researchers from the 
developing countries. 
Whilst PAFTAD is an organization for the academica, the Pacific Basin 
Economic Council (PBEC) is an organization for the business leaders and the 
representatives of big corporations within the region. The purpose of PBEC is "to 
strengthen economic and business relations among its members, and to promote 
economic and social progress in the Pacific area."^ Principal objectives o fPBEC are 
to: 1) strengthen the business enterprise system; 2) improve business environments; 3) 
generate new business opportunities and relationships; and 4) increase trade and 
investment.7 The idea of PBEC initially came from the business leaders of the 
developed countries, namely Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United 
States in 1967.8 As this organization evolved and many developing countries had 
experienced a drastic economic growth, business leaders in developing countries 
began to join that organization. Today, PBEC's multinational membership includes 




and countries. In recent years PBEC has attempted to ascend its profile and influence 
public policy through closer contact with state officials.^ 
The Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference [later renamed as Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council] (PECC) emerged in the early eighties. It was viewed 
by commentator as "the logical extension of the PAFTAD and PBEC efforts."^^ This 
organization incorporated delegates from the academics, the business sector and 
government to form a tripartite organization. This composition "allowed PECC to 
play an important role in the advancement of regional economic cooperation."^^ 
Firstly, state officials' participation in PECC means that contacts between different 
states as well as between the states and the society could be extended and deepened. 
This is the most important advantage of PECC over the other two NGOs. Secondly, 
the participation of the business sectors ensures that their interests and concerns are 
properly taken into account by government. Thirdly, the continuous participation of 
researchers ensures that PECC is filled with sufficient brainstorming and expertise 
advice.i2 Similar to PAFTAD and PBEC, the emergence ofPECC is also an effort of 
Japan and Australia. Today, PECC includes 22 member economies, plus observers 
from PAFTAD and PBEC. 
Since the proceeding of PECC required the attendance of state official 
(hence an indirect participation of the state), its progress was slow at the initial period 
because of the suspicions of the developing economies. The third PECC meeting in 
1983 at Bali marked the beginning of the consolidation ofAPEC by establishing the 
standing committee and the task f o r c e � � Afterwards, PECC adopted in 1986 the 
"Statement on Pacific Economic Cooperation" which lay down clearly the 
background, premises, structure, organization and activities of PECC. In essence, 
PECC is to "achieve increased economic cooperation and interaction" so as to "bring 
about greater economic and social benefits and well-being for the peoples and 
contribute to the stability, prosperity and progress of the entire region."^^ To attain 
this aim, the activities ofPECC regard the "examination ofkey problems and issues 
influencing regional economic growth," "provision of opportunities for identifying 
regional interests and consensus," and "promotion of greater awareness and 
understanding of the increasing interdependence of the Pacific economies."^^ 
Recently, one ofits pressingjob has been to strengthen its role through working with 




§ 3.1.2 Problems ofEconomic Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
Region 
From the above, the pattern of development was a slow evolutionary three-
stages' process. The first stage was the emergence of ideas in the mid-1960s. The 
second stage was the examination of ideas by some private efforts, together with 
some preliminary actions. The third stage involved the participation of government 
and the resulting of some actions. Hence, the formation o fAPEC in the late eighties 
was a continuing or logical development of this evolutionary process in which formal 
participation by governments increased and then substantial attempt for coordination 
ofpublic policy was resulted. However, more than two decades had passed before the 
idea for regional cooperation was transformed into some meaningful and observable 
actions. For some twenties years, regional governments were not interested in 
deepening their involvement in formal cooperation. They were reluctant to set up 
governmental trans-Pacific governmental organization. Many arguments have been 
put forward to account for the slow pace of this development. For instance, Richard 
Solomon, the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the United 
States, pointed out that the vast geographic expanse, cultural diversity, historic 
rivalries and resentments, and different level in economic developments were the 
obstacles to closer economic cooperation." 
Firstly, painful memories about World War Two and the colonial history 
are the unfavorable factors that impede cooperation. As Hadi Soesastro argued, 
"ideas on cooperation in the Pacific often are scrutinized not on the basis of the 
soundness of the concept itself but with reference to the originators or actors 
involved."i8 From the instances considered in which Japan had long been a major 
proponent for cooperation movement, it is not inconceivable that states from 
Southeast Asia doubted Japan's motivation and were cautious to the suggestion. 
Japan had tried to establish the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in World 
War II. Moreover, as most of the Southeast Asian developing countries had just 
struggled hard to be independent from the domination by the imperial powers, they 
were sensitive to any proposal that might affect their state autonomy.^^ 
Secondly, ASEAN did not see any urgent need to establish any formal 
mechanism for Pacific Economic Cooperation that led to uncertainties. The primary 




Economic Planning of the Philippines explained the position of ASEAN in this way: 
In the first place, ASEAN has, as its main agenda, the strengthening of its own 
organization. Second, it wants to pursue its dialogues on a bilateral effort with other 
groups and countries. These are substantial concerns, and they are taking a great deal 
of time already. ASEAN has to be convinced that its dialogues are better undertaken 
within the framework of a wider regional organization; that would take a lot of 
convincing since the machinery for these dialogues or consultations are on-going.^ ® 
Similarly, the Prime Minister of Malaysia also expressed his worry that the identity 
of ASEAN would be marginalized in such grouping that may be dominated by "the 
more forceful members of the group."^' Both Malaysia and Indonesia were concerned 
with their position of non-alignment with major external actors?^ The threat of Cold-
War reinforced their worry of cooperation with Westem powers. ASEAN held a firm 
stance in separating itself from the great powers as much as possible. According to 
ASEAN's Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration (ZOPFAN) in 1971, 
South East Asia should be "free from any form or manner of interference by outside 
powers." During the Cold War, the high-politics of regional conflict in terms of 
military tensions, ideological and geopolitical disputes prevented any effective form 
of dialogue to foster economic cooperation.^^ 
Thirdly, the idea of Pacific Economic Cooperation received little support 
not only from governments of the developing countries but also from that of the 
United States who exercised its leadership and obtained its interests through global 
institutions and bilateral relationships rather than regional cooperation. It was only in 
1978 the idea for Pacific economic cooperation was started to be considered by the 
U.S. Congressional Research Service and that really marked the beginning of a more 
profound discussion of the possibility ofPacific economic cooperation. Nevertheless, 
the United States did not see any pressing need to change the status quo and install a 
framework of governmental cooperation as in Europe. 
To conclude, strong impetus for regional cooperation at the governmental 
level was not present, although the fact of economic interdependence had been 
appreciated by the academia, the business sector and even the government. The 
overall political environment -- the cold war between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, the chaotic situation in Indo-China as exemplified by the Vietnam War, 
the threat posed by the revolutionary Communist China, and domestic political unrest 
in many Southeast Asia countries -- constituted a major obstacle to cooperation as the 





both kinds of influential actors were not really interested in constructing a new 
mechanism of regional cooperation, the resultant organization were private in 
nature.24 
Though the contributions of these NGOs cannot be overlooked, the 
establishment o f A P E C shows that these organizations have some drawbacks. After 
all, these organizations were difficult to tackle substantive policy issues that can be 
done only by the state.^' Indeed, except PECC, the other two organizations were not 
vested with any explicit obligation to foster substantive collaboration. They were not 
able to achieve genuine cooperation. Moreover, even under the context of PECC, 
participation by state officials was not equivalent to formal diplomatic contact or 
negotiation between governments. Nevertheless, the development o f N G O s indicates 
the demands for some kinds of communicative channels between governments and 
between different actors of society. As the degree of interdependence deepened in 
late seventies, incentive for governmental participation greatly increased. From the 
following table, it can be noted that the intra-regional trade share increased 
significantly since 1970s, representing the obvious growth ofinterdependence among 
APEC countries, East Asian countries, and so on. For instance, intra-APEC trade 
share increased from 56.2% to 64.2% between 1970 and 1990，whilst East Asia 
countries also traded with themselves much more than before in this period 
(increased from 30.1% to 39.9%). Eventually, the stronger trade ties among these 
sub-regions o fAPEC determines the overall trend ofregionalization in APEC. 
Table 2 - Regional Trade Shares within APEC, East Asia and NAFTA, by years 
(Percent) 
R.egk)n 1970 1975" "' —T^ j ^ ~ ~ 7 ^ ~ m 5 ~ “ 
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Notes: * APEC region included eighteen members in 1995 
**Japan; NIEs(Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Chinese Taipei); ASEAN-5 (Brunei 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand); China ， 
*** United States, Canada, and Mexico 




§ 3.2 Interests ofFounding Members in the Formation ofAPEC 
Whilst Chapter I has provided a brief introduction on the background of 
APEC, this section addresses the interests and policy considerations o f the founding 
members in more details. Australia was an initiator of APEC. Australian Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke delivered a speech to a group ofKorean businessmen in Seoul 
at January 1989, in which he called for a formal mechanism for achieving economic 
cooperation. Upon his instruction, Australian officials were dispatched to visit 
various countries in an attempt to actualize this proposal. A close partner assisting 
Australia was Japan, who participated extensively in past effort of regional 
cooperation. In the negotiation process of setting up APEC, the attitudes and 
reactions of the U.S. and the ASEAN were critical to its final emergence. Thus, the 
objectives and consideration of the four influential founding members of APEC, 
namely Australia, Japan, the United States, and ASEAN, will be surveyed. Answers 
to this question should lead to an understanding ofcommon interest on them. 
APEC members' interests gave rise to the preliminary flmctions ofAPEC. 
Basically, APEC members wanted to know what others would do on some important 
issues ofglobal economy. They wanted to have a collective stand towards the issues. 
The developing countries were particularly alarmed by the policy ofthe United States 
and Japan. They wanted to make sure that these two actors considered the interests of 
their trading partners. In other words, there was a demand for information. Moreover, 
the idea ofeconomic cooperation did transcend the mere provision ofinformation. At 
least for the United States and Japan, the idea ofeconomic and political nesting was 
relevant. Although APEC was supposedly to deal with economic issue only, Japan 
saw it a device to induce U.S. engagement whilst the United States thought APEC 
might assist its overall bilateral and multilateral foreign and economic policies. 
Economic cooperation, above all, is a step towards regional stability and prosperity. 
§ 3.2.1 Australia: an Endeavor ofa Middle-Power 
APEC was most actively advocated by the regional economies located in 
the Westem Pacific rather than the global power in the North America?^ In January 
1989, the then Prime Minister ofAustralia, Bob Hawke, announced his proposal for 




. • .the time has come for us substantially to increase our efforts towards building 
regional co-operation and seriously to investigate what areas it might take . . . We 
want to assess what the region's attitudes are towards the possibility ofcreating a more 
formal intergovernmental vehicle of regional cooperation. A meeting of ministers 
from throughout the region would be a useful forum to investigate the question?? 
Australia proposed an OECD-style economic cooperation in "data compilation, 
policy dialogue and in the development of cooperative strategies in particular 
sectors"28 Hawke proposed that the future organization had to cope with three 
specific tasks: first, to promote a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round; 
second, to discuss obstacles to the growth of intra-regional trade and explore the 
possibilities for liberalization; and thirdly, to identify common interests and 
capitalize on regional economic complementarities. 
Australia encountered several unfavorable conditions of international 
political economy. These challenges were the deadlock in Uruguay Round 
Negotiation, the emergence of confrontational trading blocs in Europe and North 
America, and the U.S. unilateral sanctions on other countries. The annual report 
issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade described the challenges 
faced by Australia as follows: 
• . . protectionism and trade friction persisted in international product and service 
markets constraining output growth and representing a major source of international 
e=nomic and political tension. These difficulties were of particular concem to 
ethcient agricultural and raw material producers and exporters such as Australia 29 
. . . I n December 1988, a ministerial-level meeting was held in Montreal to review 
progress at the mid-point of the [GATT] Round. The Montreal Mid-Term Review 
j3roved inconclusive, with the US and the EC unable to reconcile their views on the 
long-term goals for agricultural trade reform.^® 
As only a middle power, Australia could not encounter this trend by its effort alone; 
it had to attach itself into a larger group to prevent its exclusion from other emergent 
groups. Australia could use the APEC initiative to show its commitment and 
affiliation with the Asian countries. A report submitted to the Australian Prime 
Minister carries this viewpoint: 
,：.as a nation of substantial but limited weight, we have relevance to international 
e = r ， a f ， c t i n g our future, but not the capacity to secure objectives througCh 
exercise of national power. As a 'middle power’ we must rely on persuading oAer 
o = i e s , and mfluential groups within these countnes, that it fs in tL i r own fntefe 
to move in directions that are consistent with our own interests.3� 
APEC provided a channel for Australia to assert and expand its influence. In case of 




Hawke's idea simply reflects the demands and situations of Australia. 
Australia's economy has long been dependent on the GATT trading system. It has 
been benefited by the dramatic growth of the Asian markets. According to Gareth 
Evans, the Foreign Minister of Australia when APEC established, 
By the late 1980s the world had become well aware of what those in the region itself 
had long been conscious: that the Asia Pacific in general, and the western Pacific rim 
in particular, was the fastest growing and most economically dynamic region in the 
world. . • . Dynamism and interdependence of this order have not been without 
problems and tensions. These tensions partly reflect the major trading imbalances 
between the United States, on the one hand, and some East Asian economies, most 
conspicuously Japan, on the other, although a variety of other factors have also 
contributed.32 
Against this background of dynamic regional growth, growing regional 
interdependence, and the emergence of trade tensions, the Australian initiative was 
launched. Its objective was to help promote conditions in which the dynamism of the 
region could be sustained over the next decade and beyond. More than three-quarters 
of our exports and over two-thirds of out imports are directed to or sourced from our 
Asia Pacific neighbours.�� 
From the above, economic imperative built upon globalization and regionalization 
seems to be the fundamental drive of Hawke's initiative. APEC was developed to 
sustain the positive factors of these trends and minimize the adverse problems, such 
as trade disputes, that had emerged. 
In short, the explicit drive lies in the desire to contribute to the successful 
conclusion of the GATT Negotiation. It was in line with the economic needs of 
Australia as an export country of raw materials and agricultural products. In addition, 
it can contribute to Australia's intention and demonstration to engage itselfin Asia to 
catch up with the economic dynamism. At a minimum, the APEC initiative can 
enhance Australia's "maneuverability in international economic diplomacy."^^ 
§ 3.2.2 Japan: Easing Trade Tensions and Sustaining Growth 
Momentum 
Without the support of Japan, APEC cannot be realized. Quite interestingly, 
the outcomes ofPAFTAD，PBEC and PECC were all thejoint-efforts from Australia 
and Japan. In the case of APEC, various sources have shown the indispensable but 
behind-the-scene effort spent by the Japanese officials. Some Japanese MITI officials 
even thought that the credit for the birth ofAPEC should be given to Japanese MITI 




participating in such grouping aroused much more sensitivities or strategic 
calculation than Australia did. It had to evaluate the cost and benefit of such action 
on its relation with the United States and Europe, both of whom are the two main 
outlets for Japanese products, and also the perception of other Asian countries on 
Japan. In contrast to the Ministry ofForeign Affair's cautious attitude, MITI had long 
been interested in promoting economic cooperation and noted that governmental 
cooperation was inevitable? 
MITI studied the advantages of cooperation and the direction of 
cooperation from individual, regional, and global perspective. MITI appeared to be 
concerned with the growth and prosperity of not only Japan but also other countries. 
It suggested that "Asian economies had to enhance infrastructures to develop their 
huge economic potentials" and that "cooperation should cover various fields such as 
trade, investment, technology, infrastructure and so forth."^^ The reason for this far-
reaching analysis is simple. Japan's growth relied upon more and more on the 
economy ofother Pacific and Asian countries. Japan tried to make use of the trend of 
Asia-Pacific regionalization and the growth of the Asian countries to satisfy its 
interests. It hoped to take a lead in this development. 
According to Funabashi, nearly a year before Hawke announced his 
proposal for APEC, Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, after a visit to the 
United States, instructed the MITI to explore the prospects for economic cooperation 
in the Asia Pacific in January 1988.'' Consequently, the MITI Interim Report 
(Sakamoto Report), which was released in June 1998, described a range ofpossible 
futures for regional economies. It called for cooperation to stabilize the world's 
economy.39 This report proposed a regional change from "development through U.S. 
dependency to collective role-sharing；' a gradual cooperation progress taking account 
of existing organizations, and a more active role of Japan in economic affairs by 
increasing its imports from and FDI in the region, and supporting regional human 
resources development. 
The MITI established the four principles of cooperation: "promotion of 
multifaceted, gradual cooperation; mutual respect and equal footing in participation 
by all participants; promotion of multilayered cooperation, and; cooperation based on 
private-sector vitality and the free-market mechanism".4�The Sakamoto Report 




Pacific region; at the same time, it pointed out that the difficulties for future lay in the 
deterioration of the United States, particularly the huge trade imbalance between it 
and other economies, and also the friction in global trading system that many Asian 
economies relied upon. All these difficulties carried essential implications to Japan. 
First of all, as the economic problem of trade imbalance and financial 
deficit of the United States became acute since the mid-eighties, the Asian exports 
would be affected by its these economic problems. More importantly, the United 
States began to take strong and firm unilateral sanctions, such as the section 301 of 
the 1988 U.S. Trade Act (the so-called Super 301), to rectify its problem, especially 
when the cold-war did not really posed a threat anymore. Accordingly, "regionalism 
might offer the government in Tokyo a useful tool with which to offset what 
Japanese officials saw as an aggressive American shift to managed bilateralism."^^ 
The simplest approach would be to cultivate a concerted effort among the Asian 
nations to oppose the American policy by the formation of another bloc. However, 
this option was by far the least viable. To the contrary, regionalism in the Asia-
Pacific context was constructive and facilitating rather than destructive and 
confrontational. Thus, to tackle the American pressure, the upcoming idea was to 
"enhance the Asia Pacific nations' function as 'absorbers' through economic 
cooperation, thereby lightening the over-burden which the United States has bore."42 
On the other hand, Japan hoped that through engaging the United States, the policy of 
the United States could be constrained. In short, Asia-Pacific regionalism aimed at 
engaging the interests of the United States. 
With respect to the challenges in Global trading system and the emergent 
protectionism in North America and Europe, Japan experienced little difference from 
other Asia Pacific economies. Whilst its commodity or service export was dependent 
upon the proper functioning ofthe GATT, its import ofvarious natural resources was 
also governed by the international trading regime. Hence, the GATT was of utmost 
importance to Japan. As suggested by Nobuo Matsunaga, an advisor to the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, "the successful completion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
negotiations remains the most pressing challenge in the trade policy ofJapan."^^ As 
reported by the Far Eastern Economic Review, "Japan knows it could be a loser if the 
free-trade talks collapse. Trade actions targeting Japan have been on the rise as 




the GATT trade liberalization would also impose a huge pressure on Japan's 
domestic market, especially the protected agricultural sector. 
Funabashi proposed that Japan's interests in APEC were multifold: "to 
promote globalism in and from the region, to contain US unilateralism and prevent 
Europe and the Western Hemisphere from becoming protectionist, to strengthen ties 
with ASEAN, to engage China in the region, to ensure the US security presence, and 
to elevate Japan's status from a regional political power to a global political power by 
strengthening its ties with the Asia Pacific."^^ Conceptually, Japan's interests in 
APEC lay in three aspects, namely global, regional, and bilateral dimensions. In the 
global dimension, APEC should be consistent with Japan's interests in the GATT 
negotiation. In the regional dimension, the economic side would be a developmental, 
cooperative strategy envisioned by Japan as an attempt to sustain a long-term growth 
of the region, most probably by not over-relying on the United States. Politically, 
APEC enabled Japan to play a leadership role and increase its influence. In the 
bilateral dimension, APEC could improve the ties Japan and the United States, and 
also with other Asian Pacific countries. Hence, Japan's APEC tactic would attempt to 
maximize the payoff from all those relations. In view of this, it is not difficult to 
understand the somewhat ambivalent position ofJapan in many APEC issues. 
§ 3.2.3 The United States: Engagement and Economic Benefits 
The third critical actor to be considered is the United States. Although the 
United States did not actively advocate the concept of economic cooperation, its 
bottom line was that it could not be excluded from such grouping. A primary 
information resource by Funabashi discloses the disappointing attitude of the Unites 
States about the lack of consultation by Australia on the initiative of regional 
cooperation.46 Indeed, that the original proposal did not explicitly embrace the North 
American countries placed the United States under considerable degree of stress to 
review its unenthusiastic position on governmental regional cooperation. Nonetheless, 
before the prospect for the Hawke initiative was certain, the United States took a 
low-profile, cautious approach in order not to complicate the issue. 
Consequently, when it appeared that the ASEAN accepted the Hawke 




formally announced the Bush administration's supportive attitude towards a new 
mechanism for multilateral cooperation among Pacific countries.<? He indicated that 
the United States would not offer a definitive blueprint but be looking for a 
consensus from Asia-Pacific leaders. The new mechanism should be based on these 
three principles of encompassing a wide variety of issues, being inclusive, and 
recognizing the diversity of social and differing levels ofdevelopment.^^ Washington 
acted and responded prudently to address the sensitivities ofAsian countries.^^ 
What were the interests of the United States in regional cooperation? What 
was the meaning of APEC to the United States? As early as the late eighties, voices 
from politicians or some government officials had been made on the possibility for 
an intergovernmental mechanism for cooperation in Asia-Pacific region. For instance, 
former Secretary of State, George Shultz, suggested in July 1988 the creation o f a 
"Pacific Basin Forum where like-minded countries could compare experiences, 
discuss ideas, and prepare analyses ofsubjects that are ofinterest to ^ s t countries in 
the region."50 Senator Bill Bradley soon afterwards called for a coalition of eight 
Pacific Rim countries to support the Uruguay Round of the GATT, enhance policy 
coordination, and remove obstacles to the growth of less developed countries, 
whereas Senator Alan Cranston proposed an annual Pacific Basin summit meeting to 
discuss economic, security and diplomatic issues unique to the region.'^ The interest 
ofthe United States was not so much different from the case ofAustralia and Japan. 
Despite these rhetoric grounds, the core interest of the United States was, 
through the so-called "engagement" in Asia, to continue to assert its influence and 
leadership in the region, and to obtain its economic benefits to the greatest extent by 
maintaining commercial access. Former Secretary of State George Shultz held that 
American leadership and ongoing engagement remained cmcial to continuing success 
and prosperity o f t h e reg^.52 ln June 1989, Secretary Baker also highlighted the 
crucial role of the United States in designing the architecture of the region. 
Nonetheless, the practical problem for the United States was to maintain its 
leadership in the post-cold war era when its hegemonic power declined significantly. 
Without the threat of cold war, the Asia-Pacific structure in the eighties built upon 
the premise ofcold war was no longer appropriate or effective as before. 
Unlike Europe, which had developed an effective mechanism to foster 




had not developed similar institution. Hence, the United States was interested in 
installing or supporting the development of a regional institution, which might assist 
its bilateral and global effort in foreign policy. Stephen Boswarth, President of the 
United States-Japan Foundation and former U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, 
talked about the significance of APEC in this way: 
While the eventual institutional shape and content ofAPEC are still not defined, U.S. 
support for the organization shows that America has begun to realize that, as U.S. 
economic power in the region declines, new structures must be found to advance its 
economic interests. Other countries will no longer automatically follow the American 
lead. U.S. leadership will now depend more on consensus building within multilateral 
institutions." 
Richard Solomon, a high ranking U.S. official, elaborated the relationship between 
post-cold war security and economic cooperation; "APEC can build shared benefits 
through economic expansion, and by emphasizing economic progress rather than 
defense issues as the basis for regional integration, we can provide a more broadly 
acceptable framework for assuring security in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-
Cold War era."54 To sum up, the political interest of the U.S. in APEC has to be 
examined through its rationale and strategy in engagement policy. 
In the economic dimension, APEC could promote the U.S. interests in 
several ways. APEC might contribute to the fulfillment o f the U.S. agenda oftrade 
liberalization. This effort could relieve the huge financial deficit problem and provide 
more opportunities for U.S. exports and investment. The improvement of market 
access had long been an objective in America's trade and foreign policy. In particular, 
apart from the trade barrier in Asia, the United States also worried the protectionist 
tendency in Europe also attracted no less attention from the United States. U.S. 
Secretary of State George Shultz argued in 1988 that the U.S. interest should not be 
jeopardized by the market integration.55 Like Australia and Japan, the U.S. hoped that 
APEC could contribute to the conclusion ofthe GATT negotiation consistent with its 
vision. An Asia-Pacific grouping might be a double-edged sword for the United 
States. It could be a leverage on EU to make them support the global trading regime. 
Ifthe negotiation had failed, the United States would have formed the largest trading 
group with Asia-Pacific countries. APEC was thus an "insurance" policy. 
To conclude, APEC conveyed political and economic benefits to the 
United States. APEC could foster the U.S. "engagement" in Asia. This engagement 




It was particularly important when there was a possibility that the United States could 
be excluded from an Asian grouping and viewed by some Asia Pacific countries as 
adversaries. In the economic dimensions, the United States and the Asian economies 
had been closely interdependent. As they had a strong stake in the GATT regime, it 
was natural for them to cultivate a better mechanism for dialogues and cooperation. 
§ 3.2.4 ASEAN: Changing Environment and Cautious Participation 
ASEAN's participation in APEC was a precondition for the success of 
APEC. Despite their initial reluctance and worry, ASEAN countries were willing to 
get in the APEC train eventually. Then, why was there an adjustment ofattitude from 
the past? To answer this question, it is necessary to explore the condition under 
which ASEAN countries accepted the APEC proposal. ASEAN decided to accept the 
Hawke initiative after the Post-Ministerial Conference in Brunei in July 1989, based 
on their so-called "three noes": "that APEC have no legally binding authority, that it 
have no negotiating rights, and that it pursue no regional agreements beyond those 
reached in the GATT."^^ Afterwards, in 1990, ASEAN formally determined that 
common position towards APEC, known as the "Kuching Consensus." The "Kuching 
Consensus" stressed the preservation of ASEAN's own identity, the equality and 
mutual respects between APEC members, the need to cope with the differences in 
social and economic conditions among members, the consultative nature ofAPEC as 
a forum without any mandatory power, and the gradual approach in APEC's 
institutionalization.^^ In short, the primary concem of ASEAN was to maintain the 
collective influence and identity of ASEAN and to prevent the domination by 
superpowers or unequal treatment to the developing economies. Meanwhile, this 
declaration also shed light on the interests of ASEAN, such as the worry on the 
formation of economic bloc, the determination to maintain the multilateral trading 
regime, and the need for closer consultations among governments to deal with 
common problems and interest. 
Then, what were the problems perceived by ASEAN as significant and 
deserved a cooperative effort? At the Twenty-Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 
M y 1989, the ASEAN ministers expressed their wary about the formation oftrade 
blocs and protectionism, together with the using ofbilateral measures in settling trade 
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disputes. They called for economic cooperation to foster free and fair trade and 
support the GATT system.^^ At the Twenty-Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 
July 1990, ministers felt that "it was essential for the developed and developing 
countries to enhance their cooperation in addressing the global problems of an 
increasingly interdependent and integrated world economy."^^ The principal interest 
for ASEAN to join APEC was the unfavorable factors from international 
environment. By late 1989, ASEAN was providing lukewarm support for the idea of 
economic cooperation. The Minister for Trade and Industry of Singapore, explained 
that the "new realities" of European integration and Eastern European change forced 
adjustment from earlier nationalistic reticence of the ASEAN towards 
intergovernmental cooperation， 
m the early eighties, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, 
said that "interdependence is still very much an economic concept that has no reality 
for a lot of poor nations. True interdependence must mean not just mutually 
dependent on each other but some degree of equality of strength to support each 
other."6i This situation somehow had changed in late eighties. Although except 
Singapore other ASEAN countries were still characterized as developing countries, 
their relative and absolute economic strength had grown up significantly. For 
instance, by comparing the economic size of ASEAN with the United States, the 
relative economic sizes of most ASEAN economies had increased substantially 
between 1965 and 1989. Among them, the performance of Singapore and Indonesia 
is most impressive. This can be seen in table 3. 
Table 3 -- Pacific Relative Economic Sizes (% ofU.S. GNP) 
1965 1989 
Australia 3 3 5 5 
Canada 6.7 95 
NewZealand 0.8 0 8 
Japan 13.0 547 
South Korea 0 4 4 1 
ASEAN (exclud. Brunei) • 
Philippines o.9 0 9 
Singapore 0.1 0 6 
Thailand 0.6 j 4 
Malaysia 0.4 0 7 
_Indones ia _ ^ j g 
mmEmmsmmBmrn： 26.s : 7 Q R � ’ • ‘ 
S _ e : Donald Crone "Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political 
Economy," World Politics 45 (July 1993): 510. 
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More relevant was the dramatic growth rate from the late eighties onwards, ranking 
ASEAN as one of the fastest markets in the world.^^ ASEAN's impressive 
performance in growth of production and exports is illustrated in table 4. 
Table 4 -- ASEAN: Production and Exports (percent average annual growth) 
Growth of Growth of Trade as % 
Production Exports ofGDP 
1980-1992 1980-1992 1992 
Indonesia 5.7 5.6 48.3 
Malaysia 5.9 11.3 137.3 
Philippines 1.2 3.7 48.2 
Singapore 6.7 9.9 294.6 
Thailand 8.2 m 66:2 
Source: Hadi Soesastro, "ASEAN Trade Liberalization in the Regional and Global Context," in 
Indonesian Perspectives on APEC and Regional Cooperation in Asia Pacific, ed. Hadi 
Soesastro (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1994)，257. ， 
In short, the success of the ASEAN economies led to an upsurge of confidence in 
regional cooperation. 
Incentives for economic cooperation were more than the need to manage 
interdependence and external challenges of regionalization. The difficulty for 
ASEAN was that, as noted by Hadi Soesastro, "ASEAN is too small to be effective in 
its external economic diplomacy; to increase its effectiveness, ASEAN sees the need 
to be part oflarger groupings such as APEC."^^ Higgott and Cooper (1993) argue that 
instead ofdiluting ASEAN, "the APEC initiative could have increased the solidarity 
of the group, forcing it to redefine its interests in an era ofwaning strategic concerns 
and new economic challenges."'' In addition, Funabashi is of the opinion that "in 
political and strategic terms, APEC can bolster the ASEAN Regional Forum process 
by increasing the dialogue of the region's major powers."'^ These value-added 
advantages are gradually noted as APEC evolves. 
Above all, ASEAN's participation in APEC was caught by a dilemma 
between the possibility ofbeing marginalized in a larger group and the need to react 
against the unfavorable developments in international environment. They had to 
ensure that APEC was consistent with their individual interests. Hawke, the former 




• • . their [ASEAN] economic success was not, due essentially to cooperation with 
other ASEAN members. Their individual policies of liberalized economic 
management and high savings rate were supplemented by growing North-East Asian 
investment. As this North-East Asian investment used the comparative advantages of 
the ASEAN countries as a base for increasing exports into the United States and 
Europe, ASEAN became, to that extent, more involved in and concerned by the matrix 
of problems between these dominant centres of economic power. ASEAN therefore 
had every reason of self-interest to be responsive to the APEC proposal. Its members 
saw themselves poised, in varying degrees, to make the sort of individual take-off 
achieved earlier by those new investing heavily in them, and like them, ASEAN 
countries need an open multilateral trading environment to achieve those goals.^ ^ 
Whilst it was imperative to counteract the threat from the external environment, it 
was not really economically and politically feasible for the Asian economies to form 
an exclusive bloc by themselves. ASEAN's interest in APEC lies in its provision of 
an additional avenue to assert ASEAN's influence beyond the regional context. 
hi short, ASEAN's initial interests in APEC were caused by the alarming 
development of regionalization that placed a major impediment to the GATT 
negotiation. Although the GATT problem presented a common "threat" to them, 
there were still some conflicting interests between ASEAN and the developed Asia-
Pacific countries. These problems prevented them from deriving a strong framework 
for cooperation. Hence, ASEAN proclaimed that APEC should simply be a loose and 
consultative forum. They adopted a "gradualist" approach to protect their interests 
and prevent any development inconsistent with ASEAN's initial objectives. 
§ 3.3 Concluding Remarks: Initial Demands on APEC 
Apart from the above four actors, another major Asia-Pacific actor that 
needs to be considered is China, who was nevertheless not invited to attend the first 
APEC meeting. For China, participation in APEC meeting is a desirable option 
consistent with its policy of economic reforms and improving its relationship with 
other countries. If it were excluded from APEC, it would miss the opportunity to 
obtain usefbl information about the stands ofother actors or about regional economic 
activities. It would miss the means to participate in the process that might decide the 
"rules of the game" of the region. When Australia promoted APEC in 1989, Chinese 
officials expressed China's keen interest in the concept. Chinese officials emphasized 
the importance of the region to China's trade and investment policies and expected to 




participation, APEC would not be complete."^^ Trade officials attending the first 
meeting also said that APEC's effectiveness would be limited by the absence of 
China.69 China's initial exclusion from APEC was due to its diplomatic relations with 
the Western countries as damaged by the June 4th Incident. Besides, China had not 
established formal diplomatic ties with several Asian countries, some of whom 
worried that the influence of China would accordingly increase. Eventually, due to 
the fact that China was an important actor of the region, China, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong were jointly admitted to APEC in 1991. 
Having supplemented the description about China, the discussion can be 
turned back into members' initial expectation on APEC. APEC members were 
affected by an alarming change in international political economy. They had been 
deriving substantial economic benefits from the trend of regionalization and the 
consequence interdependence. For each of them, the information about others' stand 
was important to reduce uncertainty about the development of global trading regime. 
APEC's functions in providing information lay in two aspects. Firstly, APEC could 
provide a channel for members to exchange their opinion about what they should do 
to mitigate the dangerous development in global trading regime. Secondly, APEC 
could provide a place for the pooling of useful information, such as trade policy of 
actors and facts of economic activities in the region. This sort of information would 
be necessary to better manage "interdependence" among Asia-Pacific countries. 
These two kinds of information were keys to attain the common interests of APEC 
members. It was expected that the sharing of information and deepening of 
understand could finally lead to consensus among these countries. 
For Australia, such diplomatic channel was useful to improve its ties with 
other Asia-Pacific countries and to prevent it being excluded from any major 
grouping. Since most of Australia's export is to Asia-Pacific countries, it must ensure 
that its position is taken by others when deciding actions. Australia has been a major 
initiator of the Caim Group, which advances its member's interest in GATT 
negotiation. It tried to repeat its success through APEC. For the United States, it had 
to know other Asia-Pacific countries' understanding and reaction to its policies. 
APEC provided a venue for it to clarify NAFTA and U.S. trade policies. It had to 
make sure that these Asia-Pacific countries do not form an exclusive bloc by 




For Japan, APEC was a valuable channel to persuade other Asian countries to adopt 
policies that can contribute to the long-term growth of the region. APEC could 
enhance its endeavor as a regional leader. For ASEAN, APEC could be a venue to re-
strengthen their group cohesion. APEC could make ASEAN be better informed of 
what their major industrialized trading partners are thinking about. ASEAN could 
make use of APEC to convey their collective idea to their trading partners. This 
pressure could be more effective than their own effort. China expected APEC to 
satisfy its economic need of economic reform and political need of improving its 
relations with others. For all APEC members, APEC should contribute to their 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral diplomacy efforts. 
The concept of cross issue-linkage is also applicable here. Japan and 
Australia thought the engagement of the United States was the key to the stability of 
the region as a whole. Economic cooperation was a means to foster political 
cooperation. APEC could be a device to minimize economic conflicts among actors 
and strengthen the common interests. For Japan and South Korea (another founding 
member of APEC), United States had been the principal actor who guaranteed 
stability in Northeast Asia. Both of them provided military bases for the United 
States and considered the alliance with the United States to be a cornerstone oftheir 
foreign policy. Within ASEAN, Singapore and the Philippines also welcomed the 
U.S. military presence in the region. Thus, as the Cold-War was over and there was 
voice in America to urge a retreat of the United States from Asia region, APEC could 
be a channel to attract the U.S. interests in the region. Lastly, in terms ofnesting of 
regimes, APEC was nested under the GATT and aimed at supporting the GATT. 
In short, the initial demand on APEC was to provide information as a 
consultative forum. The emergence of a dialogue channel is already a breakthrough 
from the past and a prerequisite for future governmental collaboration. The historical 
legacy and political constraints on actors still existed and prevented member from 
achieving a full-scale formal cooperation. The pace and objective were intentionally 
kept low so as to gain confidence of participants. While the broad principle of 
cooperation has been established since 1989, there have not been any specific norms 
and rules to govem actions of actors. Actors had not prepared to transform their 
views into actions. APEC simply provided a chance for these countries' officials to 




CHALLENGES OF COOPERATION 
AND DIVERGENT PREFERENCES 
OF THE MEMBERS 
I 
Formation of Regional Groups 
Chapter IV 
Formation of Regional Groups and 
Politico-Strategic Interdependence 
§ 4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has described the founding members' interests in 
APEC and the initial functions vested with APEC. This existence ofcommon interest 
cannot conceal the divergent perspectives among APEC states. This chapter begins to 
examine the contentious issues of APEC. The first controversy discussed here is the 
choosing ofactors and the compositions for cooperation. As many critics have put it, 
the concept of "Asia-Pacific" is in itselfproblematic: "there is no Pacific community 
in a linguistic, religious, cultural, political or ideological sense, nor is there much 
historical evidence of a regional consciousness; rather, there is long-standing 
historical antagonism.'" The constitution of 'region' remains a major political 
question for individual state actors in the Asia Pacific region.' In the development of 
APEC, two incidents were pertaining to the "geopolitics" ofregional cooperation: the 
admission o f the "Three Chinese entities" and the formation o f a n exclusive regional 
group as exemplified by the "East Asia Economic Caucus" (EAEC), in which the 
EAEC issue was the major challenge to APEC. The membership of other Pacific 
countries like Russia and some Latin-American countries also posed a problem to 
APEC. These events share at least one common feature: certain players considered 
that the participation of some other players in their regional grouping was not 
compatible with their national interests and was thus undesirable. 
However, economic objective and political objective cannot be separated. 
This chapter describes the interdependent relation among members and the nesting of 
issues existed. Although Asia-Pacific is a heterogeneous region, there has been a 
large degree of politico-strategic interdependence among the actors. This leads to a 
large room for cooperation and a demand for communicative channel. On the other 
hand, the cost offorming an exclusive group that excludes some influential regional 
actors is high. Such action is incompatible with the overall objective of achieving 
regional consensus and stability. The regional stability is defined by the U.S. 
engagement, the balanced power among the United States, Japan, China, and other 
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Southeast-Asian countries. In this light, any regional economic institution should take 
this fact into account and assure that these actors have a harmonious relation. 
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 4.2 is about the involvement of 
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in APEC. This is the first contention in membership 
that APEC states faced. Section 4.3, which is the main body ofthis chapter, analyses 
the contention in East Asian Economic Caucus, with an emphasis on how the nesting 
of issues, especially the engagement of the U.S., led to actors, final compromise. 
Finally, section 4.4 is the concluding remarks. 
§ 4.2 The Participation of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong 
When Australia prepared the formation of APEC in 1989, it had not 
decided whether China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong should be included. It had to listen 
to opinions ofother major players, especially the ASEAN. Whilst in economic term 
all these three actors had played a substantial and indispensable role in the Asia-
Pacific region, the participation of them was still politically sensitive. Firstly, the 
diplomatic relation between China and some countries had not been nonnalized at 
the time being. Also, some countries were worried that their participation would 
endanger the position of the weaker members. Secondly, China had insisted that 
Taiwan and Hong Kong were not sovereign states and should not be allowed to I 
attend the ministerial meeting. Moreover, the June 他 Incident in 1989 also 
hampered China's participation in international economic affairs. Eventually, due to 
two years' diplomatic consultation within APEC members, and also Chinese 
government's pragmatic attitude towards the problem ofTaiwan and Hong Kong the 
admission ofthese Chmese entities was resolved before the third meeting in Seoul in 
1991. 
Evidences from various sources indicate that the opposition or worry 
stemmed from some members ofASEAN, who might fear that "ASEAN's collective 
voice within APEC would be muted and their lives with Beijing would be 
complicated."3 Prior to the first APEC meeting, the Foreign Minister ofIndonesia 
had expressed serious reservations about the role ofChina.^ At the time being, China 
still had not established any formal diplomatic relation with three of the ASEAN 
members，namely Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei. Among these three actors the 
d _ m a t i c relation between China and Indonesia was the most important one 
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affecting whether China could be admitted in APEC since Indonesia had been the 
leader in ASEAN. Before the mid-sixties, the relationship between these two 
countries had been very close. However, their relation was suspended in 1967 
because of the abortive communist coup against the then president Mr. Sukamo. 
Formal diplomatic tie between China and Indonesia had not resumed until 
1990. Without doubt, the normalization of diplomatic relation with Indonesia 
contributed positively to China's foreign policy. Firstly, according to an Asian 
diplomat, "in the wake of the resumption of Sino-Indonesian ties Singapore and 
Brunei are ready to build formal links with China."^ Chinese Premier Li Peng visited 
Singapore soon after his trip to Indonesia in August 1990. There he was told that 
China should join APEC. Singapore President Wee Kim Wee pointed out in 1992 
that China's APEC membership was an important step leading to the continued 
stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.^ Secondly, it was a victory o f the 
Chinese government to break the diplomatic isolation caused by the June 4th Incident. 
Thirdly, the substantial improvement in relation between the two most politically 
influential countries would undoubtedly have a positive effect on the long-term peace 
and stability of the region. On the whole, China's improvement with ASEAN was a 
precondition for its active participation in governmental cooperative affairs in 
Southeast Asia. | 
i 
In contrast to ASEAN's initial reservation, the attitudes of Australia, the 
United States, and Japan were more much positive to engaging the three Chinese 
entities into the grouping. Eventually, a compromise was worked out in 1991 to 
allow all three entities to attend the APEC meeting from that year on. According to 
the "memorandum of understanding", there were restrictions on delegations of 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, requiring that only minister(s) in charge of APEC-related 
economic affairs could attend the ministerial meetings.? Since 1991, there had not 
been any signal of contention between these three entities and the Southeast Asian 
nations, although disputes had been arisen among China and Taiwan about Taipei's 
plan to send higher level political figures like President Lee Tung-hei or the Premier 
to attend the APEC summit. Since most members did not want APEC to be 
politicized，Taiwan's plan could not be realized. As Taiwan still wanted to be an 
APEC member, it reluctantly accepted the reality. Hence, the "Three Chinese 
entities" problem had not been so disputatious since 1991. On the other hand, China 
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had been constantly showing togetherness with ASEAN and other Asian members to 
tackle the pressure from the United States and other non-Asian members. Indeed, 
China is a qualified participant in the Asian grouping proposed by Malaysia. 
The participation of China illustrates two difficulties in Asia-Pacific 
economic cooperation, namely unpleasant historical legacy (regarding China's past 
revolutionist ideology), and the disparity in economic or political power. 
Complicated by China's past support of communist movements in some ASEAN 
countries and the sensitive overseas Chinese issue, the relation between China and 
ASEAN has for a long time been tense. Besides, China, by its huge population, 
extensive territory, and military strength, is in itself a regional power. Compared to 
China, the capability of individual ASEAN country is quite small. It is therefore not 
inconceivable that Southeast Asian countries had to take a cautious position in the 
matter of cooperation. Nonetheless, what decision-makers consider was not only 
legacies of the past but also constraints and interests of the present and future. For the 
ASEAN countries, China is undoubtedly a major actor of the region. In the past, 
China had been a principal factor of regional stability and confrontation. Due to the 
economic reform and its orientation of pragmatic foreign policy, Southeast Asian 
countries had felt much more comfortable to improve their relation with China and to i 
engage China. | 
i 
In the economic front, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong had been playing 
very different but indispensable role in the region. Whilst China has become a giant 
exporting country lately, Taiwan and Hong Kong have long been major sources of 
capital in ASEAN countries and also major importers of products of ASEAN. For 
instance, in 1990, Hong Kong accounted for more than twenty per cent o f the total 
foreign investment in Thailand (29.0%) and the Philippines (21.6%). Meanwhile, 
more than thirty per cent ofMalaysia's foreign investment came from Taiwan. Japan 
and the NIEs (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) were the major 
investors in ASEAN and were responsible for the economic boom exhibited by 
ASEAN. Hence, there was a practical need from the ASEAN's perspective to invite 
Hong Kong and Taiwan to participate in APEC. The sources of foreign direct 
investment for selected ASEAN countries in 1990 can be seen from table 5. 
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Table 5 - Distribution ofSources ofForeign Investments in ASEAN, 1990 (%) 
F m n r - ^ ^ ^ l Thailand Philippines Malaysia T n d o n e . i . ~ 
Japan 26.7 37.5 28.5 25 7 
Hong Kong 29.0 21.6 2 2 11 4 
South Korea 3.1 2.2 2.6 8 3 
Singapore 4.6 1.5 5 2 2 5 
Taiwan 10.4 14.7 37 8 7.1 
Europe 7.4 4.7 8.3 13.5 
U-S. 6.5 6.2 3 0 1 0 
Others 12.3 11.6 12 4 29 1 
WorldTotal 100.0 删 100.0 100 0 
Source: Tan Kong Yam, Toh Mun Heng, and Linda Low, "ASEAN and Pacific Economic 
Cooperation," ASEANEconomic Bulletin 8，no.3 (March 1992):319. 
Although China's economic linkage with ASEAN was not close in late 80s, 
as an emergent economic power, China's trade and fiscal policies would have direct, 
indirect, and externalizing effect on ASEAN's economy. China's devaluation of its 
currency to boost its export would undoubtedly affect the economic well-being of 
these developing countries. China has been a major competitor o fASEAN in terms 
of export markets and attracting foreign direct investment. For these reasons, it is 
necessary to engage China and to make it follow the rules ofintemational society and 
take into account of the views of its neighbours. Thus, without the involvement of 
these three actors, the significance ofAPEC is greatly reduced. 
ni the political dimension, China is a key actor who is influential to the 
stabmty o f the Korea peninsula. China also participated in the peacefbl resolution of 
the Cambodian conflicts. The whole region's stability lies m the strategic relation 
between China, Japan, and the United States. Accordingly, Chma's participation in 
regional organizations is a necessary and inevitable development to bring about 
regional stability. After Chma's admission to APEC in 1991, China was invited to 
attend the ASEAN foreign ministers' conference at the same year and soon became a 
founding delegate m the ASEAN Regional Forum m 1993.8 In 1996, China attended 
the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting/Post-Mmistenal Conference as a Dialogue Partner 
for the first time. All these events show that China had participated more deeply and 
positively in regional affairs. ASEAN had perceived the need to engage China 
through various channels including APEC. 
From the Chinese perspective, APEC was a usefbl tool for China to pursue 
several economic and objectives. As stressed by the Foreign Mmister ofChina, the 
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development of China's economy had depended on the cooperation with Asia-Pacific 
countries; three-fourth of China's external trade had been conducted with Asia-
Pacific countries whilst four-fifth of China's foreign direct investment had came from 
Asia-Pacific region. China claimed that it would enthusiastically participate in the 
fomm to make use the opportunities given.^ According to Qian Qichen, two regional 
economic issues were alarming to countries of Asia-Pacific region; first, the 
emergent seriousness of protectionism, and second, the slowdown in economic 
growth of developed countries, both of which leading to a diminishing global market 
for developing c o u n t r i e s � � I n this respect, China was experiencing similar problems 
with other Asian developing countries. APEC was a means for China to 
communicate its needs to outside world and to integrate its needs with other 
developing countries. China hoped that APEC could contribute to multilateralism 
which protects the interest of developing countries. As China had not resumed its 
status in the GATT, APEC was the only formal regional organization that China 
involved. The trade liberalization and facilitation programs envisioned by APEC 
could improve the external environment for China's export. APEC programs provide 
an additional impetus for China to reform its mechanism or institution to meet the 
standard of international community. Despite these obvious advantages, the peculiar 
characteristic of China of being a developing agricultural socialist country constrains 
China's APEC policy and makes it cautious to any progressive measures. China's 
economy has been highly regulated, and the average tariff level is also high. It would 
be a great challenge for China to get in the APEC train. According to Lu Jianren, a 
researcher of APEC from the Chinese Academy of Social Science, China's APEC 
policy can be summarized by five rules: flexibility, non-discrimination, development 
and technical cooperation, non-binding, and the strict focus on economic matter” 
The participation of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong illustrates the two 
propositions of this thesis that depicts respectively the cultivation of consensus and 
demands for regime functions. The issue of actor's participation finally emerged as a 
consensus within APEC via extensive, effective consultation between ASEAN and 
other concerning actors. All of these actors agreed with the necessity to engage and 
contain the power of China. Disagreements between China and other actors about the 
modality ofChina, Taiwan and Hong Kong's involvement were also resolved through 
diplomatic dialogues. The interests of these actors were elastic rather than rigid; the 
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interests of attaining long-term collective benefits could outweigh the suspicion 
among actors. Common interests could be realized through ongoing communication. 
The demands for regime functions in communication are also observed 
among members of APEC. As far as the provision of information is concerned, China 
had to know what other Asia-Pacific countries thought and did. Eighty per cent of 
China's foreign investment came from the Asia-Pacific region, and APEC members 
accounted for seventy-five per cent of China's foreign trade.^^ APEC was a good 
bridge linking the interests of China and Asia-Pacific countries. Since China had not 
been a member of any other regional economic organization, APEC had been the 
only place where China could participate and discuss economic affairs jointly with 
ASEAN, the United States, Japan and other Asia-Pacific countries. APEC could be a 
stepping stone for China's entry to WTO. Hence, the presence o f t h e two economic 
powers -- the United States and Japan -- did not decrease China's keen interest in 
joining the group. Meanwhile, the loose structure and consultative nature of APEC 
clearly satisfied the needs of China. From an ASEAN perspective, a regional 
consensus that was supported by China would contribute to the long-term interests of 
the Southeast-Asia as a whole. APEC was a channel to obtain information about 
China's economic policies and activities, and to nest China's policy within the 
regional architecture. 
§ 4.3 The East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC): 
Dividing the Asia-Pacific? 
Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian countries had experienced a dramatic 
economic growth, which was followed by an increase ofdegree of interdependence 
among these countries. Since the Asian countries have more commonality with others, 
as the extent of regionalization increased, it was quite natural for them to consider 
forging a cooperation mechanism among themselves. As Asia-Pacific region is in 
itselfavast heterogeneous region that includes several "sub-regions," some countries 
may not consider cooperating with the largest circle, where there are members with 
different sort of culture and higher level of economic resources, the most desirable 
optioiL Conversely, small group cooperation may appear more suitable. 
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§ 4.3.1 Malaysia's Proposal for an "Asian-only" Core 
The root of an exclusive Asian grouping could be traced back to the 
preparation for APEC meeting in 1989 when Australia did not explicitly invite the 
United States and Canada to attend the APEC meeting. When APEC was prepared, 
Malaysia did not really favour the inclusion of North American countries. Some 
Asian countries thought that it was unreasonable to allow dual membership in North 
America trading bloc and in APEC. They worried that this would jeopardize the 
interest of Asian countries. What the Malaysian proposal for EAEC differed from 
this previous case is that the qualified membership of EAEC was restricted to East 
and Southeast Asia economies only. Australia and New Zealand were to be excluded 
from the proposed grouping and were perceived to be more or less the same as North 
American countries. 
Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, firstly put forward his 
idea o f a n East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG) in December 1990 when visiting 
China. He mentioned that "the Asia-Pacific countries should strengthen further their 
economic ties to form a bloc to countervail others."^^ In a subsequent occasion where 
he elaborated on the proposal in a moderate manner, the Prime Minister of Malaysia 
justified his suggestion in this way: ': 
It is paradoxical that even as the centrally planned Eastern bloc economies espouse ； 
the free market systems as a solution to their economic problem, the erstwhile free 
traders ofthe west are opting for a controlled international marketing system But the 
fact is that with the formation of the European Union and the American free trading 
zone, that is what is happening. 
The question is what do we in this region do to rescue the free trading system ofthe 
: r l d ? Two wrongs do not make one right. We in East Asia must not form a trading 
bloc ofour own. But we know that alone and singly we cannot stop the slide towards 
controlled and regulated international commerce; which in fact is no different from 
the command economies of the socialist Soviets, only the scale is international To 
stop the shde and to preserve free trade the countries of East Asia, which contain 
some ofthe most dynamic economies in the world today, must at least speak with one 
voice. 
It will be impossible to do this unless we can consult each other, unless we can have 
some fbm ofgrouping which is recognizable. A free trade arrangement between us is 
—ossible at this point in time. • • But a formal grouping intended to facilitate 
consultationand consensus prior to negotiating with Europe or America or in 
t 7 r f T T . s ^ as the GATT is not too far-fetched an idea. It is also not against 
= A p l r Princi^^nor will it run contrary to membership in such organizations as 
the APEC, in which the United States and Canada are members while having an 
economic union with each other. 
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Judging from these a r g u m e n t s p "风 Malaysia was not proposing the formation of 
another 'trading-bloc'. Rather, Mahathir was suggesting another sort of mechanism 
for consultation and cultivating an "Asia-only" voice before America or Europe. 
However, his idea was usually portrayed by the West as an exclusive bloc and 
received severe oppositions. Later, in response to the hesitation of Japan and other 
potential members, Malaysian Minister of Trade and Industry Datuk Rafidah Aziz 
stressed the loose, consultative nature of EAEG and its similarity to the Caims 
Group.15 The immediate objective o fEAEG should be to push for the completion of 
the GATT negotiation, while the long-term objective would be to discuss ways to 
improve trade flows within the region.!6 EAEG was then renamed the East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC) in October 1991 to highlight its nature ofconsultation. 
Mahathir's thought about fostering the solidarity of the developing 
countries to defend their interests could indeed be traced back as early as the late 
eighties. At a lecture delivered in Singapore in 1988, he discussed the challenge of 
regionalism and globalism. He argued that: 
= r a s they may be, the countries ofthe South together still constitute a huge market 
But the key word is together. Alone, their individual market is too small to influence 
he att,tude ofthe rich. It is, therefore, important that the countries of theSoutha 
least present a united front, ifnot unite�7 � u t h at 
From the very beginning, he doubted the desirability ofPacific economic cooperation 
from the standpoint of unequal possession ofpower and resources, which might in 
turn enable the stronger countries to take advantage of the weaker countries. He 
argued that: 
We are also interested in cooperation in the Pacific Rim. But there are so manv 
r S ； ^ ： ： ! ? ^ ^ _ o m i c and political clout. . . . We are very ’ 口 ^ ^ 乂 
j ' , ' ' . f ' R : J f , ofcourse，we are going to be democratic at the nationallevel then 
tliinl^it vyould be worthwhile to concentrate on Pacific cooperation 
1 would hke to see a much democratic world so that we can participate and feel safe 
: : : ^ ? P along with neighbours and partners who are hu/e c o . J a r e d t ^ 1 ^ 
Mahathir had a high expectation on Japan and other relatively developed Asian 
countries in the context of EAEC to help the less developed members via providing 
models ofsuccessful economic policies, and accelerating the investment m the less 
developed members through better coordination and stimulation by EAEC - Despite 
the benefits Mahathir mentioned, in practice the EAEC initiative camed a big 
ddemma for Japan and other ASEAN countnes, due to the strong opposition by the 
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United States. 
§ 4.3.2 Responses of Major Actors 
Stemming from the economic and political interests associated with 
different sorts of regional group, major APEC members reacted differently to the 
EAEC proposal. As it can be easily understood, those who would be excluded did not 
welcome the suggestion. On the other hand, Asian countries generally felt that they 
should have the opportunity to cultivate a closer tie among themselves and assert 
their collective interests more effectively. However, most Northeast and Southeast 
Asian countries were careful in dealing with the issue because they were also deeply 
concerned with their political and economic relationship with those excluded actors, 
most notably the United States. 
The TJnited States' Opposition 
The United States reacted vigorously to the EAEG proposal. The then 
Vice-President of the United States, Dan Quayle, reportedly claimed that "the EAEG 
would not succeed without the United States and that, without American 
participation it would be counterproductive."^^ The Malaysian initiative was heavily 
denounced by the United States at the Seoul Ministerial Meeting in 1991. The U.S. 
Secretary for Department of State, James Baker, told reporters that "a regional 
subgrouping (in Asia) that draws a line down the Pacific would undermine the 
prospects of a young, but growing economic forum which encompasses both Asian 
and the Pacific."^^ The U.S. took many measures, ranging from open criticism to 
behind-the-scene lobbying, to suppress the proposal. Moreover, Baker had sent a 
memorandum to the Japanese Foreign Ministry asking Tokyo to oppose the Mahathir 
plan.22 The Japanese Foreign Minister then indicated that it would be unwise to 
proceed with an Asian trade grouping that did not include the United States. The 
reason for the U.S. opposition was very simple: it was against the interest of the 
United States of opening and securing markets in Asia-Pacific region in case the 
caucus evolved into a "bloc". Moreover, such development would be likely to invite 
more protectionist pressure from the Congress and interest groups within the United 
2 3 
States. As a protest against the United States, Malaysia sent a lower-ranking official 
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instead of the trade minister to participate in the Seoul meeting.^^ 
After the Seoul ministerial meeting, the United States continued to exert 
pressure on the development ofEAEC and attempted to restrict its development. The 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and the Pacific Affairs, Winston 
Lord, pointed out that the Asia-Pacific region, which was the most dynamic area 
economically with the fastest growing economies, was relevant to Clinton's priority 
of reviving the U.S. economy?^ This statement implies once again that the United 
States did not welcome any move that could increase the leverage of Asia countries 
against the United States and might thusjeopardize its economic benefits. As a senior 
U.S. official put it, "the United States is afraid the EAEC, rather than encouraging 
free trade, will be restrictive."^^ Think tanks or academic circles o f the United States 
also shared this kind of opinions. In an essay published in the analysis of the National 
Bureau of Asian Research, Paul Wolfowitz argued that the consequence of EAEC 
would be disastrous for both the United States and the Asian countries as it 
diminishes market access m u t u a l l y . � ？ Likewise, Richard Wilson, the executive 
director of the Center for Asian Pacific Affairs at the Asia Foundation, considered the 
rationale of EAEC as "never very persuasive" and then questioned the real 
contribution of EAEC from the angle of trade liberalization and the provision of a 
mechanism in resolving disputes between the United States and Japan.^^ Today, the 
official position of the United States has remained almost the same. An ambassador 
of the United States, Walter Mondale, held that "our government would like to see 
APEC implemented in a broad, regional Pacific sense. . . . we [U.S.] have been 
opposing the idea of setting up sub-caucuses and we continue to do so."^^ 
Australia's Worry aboiit Dividing APFr 
As a major proponent of APEC, Australia, who has considered APEC as its 
essential diplomatic achievement, should not welcome the emergence of EAEC, 
which excluded its participation. Nonetheless, since Australia wanted to cultivate a 
closer tie with Asian countries since the late eighties, it did not oppose the proposal 
as vigorously as the United States. The emergence of EAEC simply contradicted 
Australia's endeavor to affiliate itselfwith the Asia. According to Australian Foreign 
Minister Gareth Evans, "Australia was not part of the Asian land mass, but it was in 
the East Asian time zone and listed a litany of statistics linking Australia with East 
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Asia, . . . we [Australia] are an East Asian hemisphere nation."^^ He complained that 
some Asian nations were resisting Australia's efforts to reposition itself in the 
region.3i Obviously, he was referring to Malaysia who consistently opposed 
Australia's diplomatic effort.^^ After the Seattle Summit in 1993, Malaysia frequently 
expressed its suspicion to Australia's identification with Asia and participation in 
Asian groupings. Malaysian official made it clear that EAEC would not include 
Australia and New Zealand.^^ 
The most desirable outcome for Australia would be that EAEC was not put 
into practice. Recalling that one motivation behind Australia's pushing for APEC was 
its fear of being excluded from any regional group, the actual formation of an 
exclusive trading bloc would put Australia in a similar circumstance. Therefore, if 
EAEC came into existence, Australia would try its best to ensure that APEC would 
not be displaced by EAEC. Australia's comment on EAEC was quite negative, 
arguing that "almost every East Asian economy has a major economic relationship 
with North American."^^ Despite its disappointment, as ASEAN had formally 
endorsed the EAEC proposal, Australia had to accept the reality. The government of 
Australia hoped that EAEC would remain merely as a discussion group within the 
much broader APEC and would not assume a life of its own as an economic 
grouping.35 From an Australian perspective, EAEC would be a "bloc" and tended to 
split APEC. Australian Trade Minister Bob McMullan claimed explicitly that EAEC 
did not make any real contribution to APEC.^^ Nonetheless, due to the long-term 
strategic and economic interests, Australia somehow softened its stance against the 
proposal and argued that: 
The worry we had originally about the EAEC was that it was so potentially divisive at 
a time when APEC was still finding its feet. Now that APEC is a thoroughly going 
concem with a great so much commitment including from the Malaysians. No matter 
how much we might want to occasionally make up some anti-point about the extent of 
the voluntary works of the APEC system, the truth ofthe matter is APEC is alive and 
well and flourishing and in that context, EAEC is less potentially risky than it was at 
the outset when APEC was a more fragile institution.^^ 
Being closely linked to East Asian countries in terms of both exports and 
imports，the formation of an exclusive Asian bloc would undoubtedly damage 
Australia's interest. If EAEC just developed into a consultative forum, there would 
also be a danger that the significance of APEC could be decreased and Australia 
would find it in a bitter position. The worry of Australia could be illustrated by 
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Evans’ remark; "No country in the modern world particularly likes to be an island, 
going it alone in international affairs without any larger sense ofgroup identity."^^ 
Japan,s Amhivalent Position 
The active participation of Japan was a necessary condition to make EAEC 
really influential. Malaysia had been most enthusiastic in pushing Japan to make up 
its mind. A diplomat in Kuala Lumpur argued that Mahathir wanted Japan to be an 
ally of Malaysia against the United States and the West.^^ Mahathir himself argued 
that Japan belongs naturally in the Asian geopolitical community. He held that Japan 
rather than the United States should be the "spokesman" for Asia.^^ Besides, he 
considered Japan to be "the only Asian country with the ability to help fellow Asian 
countries."4i According to Linda Low, the intention o fEAEG is to anchor Japan to 
East Asia.42 Despite the earnest invitation by Mahathir to lead the group, the 
seemingly undecided position of Japan shows the complicated consideration of 
Japan. 
When Mahathir firstly proposed EAEG which carried too much implication 
o fan exclusive bloc, the Japanese response was firmly negative since the emergence 
o fan exclusive trading bloc in Asia was not consistent with Japan's national interest. 
Nobuo Matsunaga, an envoy of the Japanese Government and an advisor to the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, identified the policy objective of regional cooperation 
as follows: 
The key word descriptive of the Asia Pacific region is "openness," and Japan has 
much to do with ensuring that this goal is met. Japan firmly believes that any regional 
economic cooperation should forestall trade protectionism while remaining open to 
participation from outside the region.^ ^ 
According to Funabashi, although Japan was potentially affected by the North 
American Free Trade Area, the Japanese government was afraid ofEAEC's negative 
consequences of further stimulating regionalism or protectionism in North America 
and Europe.44 The Japanese government believed that APEC members should 
endeavor at the moment to foster the successful conclusion ofUmguay Round rather 
than complicating the matter. The attitude of Japan had not become more positive 
until it was later assured that EAEC would not take the shape of an exclusive bloc, 
which would displace APEC. Consequently, Japan conveyed its support in 1995, but 
insisted that Australia and New Zealand should also be included.^^ 
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To account for the Japan's noncommittal reaction for EAEC, analysts 
offered many explanations. These arguments include: 
strong American opposition; reluctance, in light of Asian sensitivities outside 
Malaysia; fear the EAEC would be perceived as a step toward an Asian bloc that 
would feed back into and encourage further defensive North American and EC 
markets; doubts about the viability ofamore self-contained Asian regionalism given 
critical dependence on North American and EC markets; and more speculatively 
suspicions that the aim of Mahathir's scheme was to gain easier access to Japanese 
markets. 
A deeper examination into Japan's consideration shows that the opposition from the 
United States and the future impact by EAEC remained to be the critical factors in 
Japan,s decision-making. According to Kazuo Ogura, Japan's deputy vice-minister 
for foreign affairs, "Japan's Asia policy can be explained for the most part as 
basically a policy toward America or a policy designed to play a role in America's 
strategy for Asia."^^ Since Japan's strategy for Asia had been to cooperate with 
America's Asia strategy, it is easy to understand why Japan had expressed strong 
reservations about EAEC, which was denounced heavily by the United States.^^ 
Accordingly, Japan's tactic was to avoid choosing side, so as to maintain a sound 
relationship between themselves with the United States and its Asian neighbours. 
On the other hand, EAEC was capable of providing some economic and 
political benefits to Japan. Actually, there was considerable support ofEAEC in the 
Japanese government and business circles.^^ First of all, Japan might manipulate 
EAEC to cope with emerging regionalization in North America and Europe. 
Tactically speaking, EAEC could act as a leverage against the U.S. pressure and 
protectionist tendency in Europe. Voices had been raised in Japan against the U.S. 
unilateral sanction on Japan's export and the measures forcing Japan to open its 
agricultural markets. For instance, Kazuo Ogum, Japan's ambassador in Vietnam, 
held that Japan should encourage Asian countries to oppose the unacceptable 
demands on them and push the Westem states to listen to Asian opinions；^ EAEC 
could enhance the bargaining position of Japan and Asian countries as a whole. 
Moreover, EAEC could further improve the ties ofJapan with its Asian neighbours 
and allow Japan to play the role of leader. EAEC was echoing the voice of 
"Asianism" that advocated that Japan should approach more to the East rather than 
the West.5i 
In short, EAEC carried both pros and cons to Japan. Nevertheless, unlike 
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Malaysia who sought to deploy EAEC as a means against pressure from the West and 
a platform to resolve North-South problem, Japan itself did not consider this problem 
as severe as Malaysia. To make the EAEC proposal acceptable to the United States 
and other Asia-Pacific nations, Japan argued that the caucus should be more inclusive 
to allow Australia and New Zealand to participate, and it also openly held that APEC 
should be placed in a higher priority than EAEC. 
ASEAN,s Gradual Support 
At present, ASEAN has produced a common position on EAEC. 
Nevertheless, scholarly analysis tended to argue that this issue was really 
controversial in ASEAN and that the acceptance of the idea initially varied across 
ASEAN members. Singapore Prime Minister disclosed that "there was no real 
ASEAN position on APEC but each member took its own position on the 
grouping, . . . we know that Malaysia prefers EAEC to APEC but the other five 
countries support APEC."^^ In fact, due to the lack ofsolid support from ASEAN, the 
EAEC concept had been slow in transferring into real action. This situation had been 
reported to be unchanged until 1995 when Singapore and Indonesia made more 
explicit support for the idea. In 1995, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas urged 
the United States to accept the EAEC idea so that Japan and South Korea could be 
ready to join the caucus. He pointed out that EAEC was an ASEAN consensus and 
simply a caucus within APEC and that the United States had nothing to fear or 
suspect.53 In fact, the foreign minister was simply reiterating the ASEAN consensus 
on EAEC adopted in 1991. 
When Mahathir firstly suggested the EAEG in December 1990, the initial 
reaction from other ASEAN members was not really positive. An U.S. official had 
speculated that Mahathir was discontent with the lack of EAEG from East Asian 
countries they were "too polite to reject it outright."^^ According to Linda Low, the 
response from Singapore was at first cool from the minister of state for trade and 
industry, because of Singapore's established policy of being a free trader and non-
alignment to any trade bloc. However, due to close relations between Singapore and 
Malaysia as well as political sensitivities of the issue, Singapore soon afterwards 
gave in-principle endorsement of the concept and eventually tumed out to be 
Malaysia's strongest supporter when it offered to help to expand the idea of EAEC.^^ 
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Thailand was also reported to be doubtfol o f the EAEG idea, and it preferred to see 
intra-ASEAN cooperation strengthened before any other trade bloc was formed.^^ 
Linda Low noted that Thailand was more in favour o f the APEC framework, but it 
had likewise been willing to discuss the EAEG proposal in the coming ASEAN 
summit.57 
Also, Indonesia, the most influential country in ASEAN, was reportedly to 
be skeptical of the idea ofEAEG since, as various sources revealed, Malaysia had not 
pmperly consulted other ASEAN leaders prior to announcing the suggestion. This 
unilateral approach made Indonesia irritated because some Indonesians feel that their 
country should be the one taking the lead in regional diplomatic affairs.^^ A senior 
Indonesian diplomat had criticized Malaysia implicitly that "some member countries 
are acting as iftheir interests are more important than ASEAN."59 Mahathir himself 
also admitted this mistake. According to a report ofFar Eastern Economic Review, 
Mahathir had subsequently apologized to Suharto "for being a little bit brash on this 
matter [EAEG]."60 In addition, Indonesia argued that the implication to "grouping" 
was too sensitive and not acceptable to the West. It therefore proposed to change it 
into a "caucus" withm the framework ofAPEC. In contrast to Malaysia's strong and 
skeptical position towards the United States and other Western countries in APEC, 
Indonesia wanted the development of EAEC to be moderate enough. ‘ 
When ASEAN trade ministers met in Kuala Lumpur in October 1991, the 
EAEG proposal was endorsed as an ASEAN initmtive.6� Next to that, at the Fourth 
ASEAN Summit held in Singapore in January 1992, ASEAN leaders affirmed the 
contribution of EAEC. ASEAN leaders argued that "consultations on issues of 
common concern among East Asian economies, as and when the need arises could 
contnbute to expanding cooperation among the region's economies, and the 
promotion o f a n open and free global tradmg system."62 However, details o f t h e 
EAEC had not been given. ASEAN's support ofthe idea remained to be rhetonc The 
form and substance of EAEC had not been settled down until the 26th ASEAN 
Mmisterial Meetmg in 1993, in which the Foreign Ministers considered that the 
ASEAN Economic Ministers Meetmg would be the appropnate body to provide 
support and direction for the EAEC, and that the EAEC was a caucus withm APEC 63 
This represented ASEAN's consensus on EAEC. What was still lackmg was the 
acceptance of the invitation by other non-ASEAN participants. 
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On the whole, ASEAN members inclined to support rather than turn down 
the proposal. They thought it was "unreasonable" to reject the concept, provided that 
the concept did not compete with APEC or led to an exclusive trading bloc. EAEC 
could further enhance ASEAN's bargaining power and group solidarity among East 
Asian countries. Since each of the ASEAN members was vested with their respective 
self-interest, a moderate, flexible, and non-threatening EAEC would be more 
desirable by members. Indeed, whilst Malaysia wanted to engage Japan into East 
Asia, for Singapore, Indonesia, and Philippines, the relation between themselves with 
the United States or the Western world is no less important. They had to make a 
proper balance between EAEC and APEC, and the present tactic of putting EAEC 
under the larger framework of APEC was a working compromise between different 
parties. 
§ 4.3.3 Nesting ofIssues and the Importance ofU.S. Engagement 
The EAEC issue illustrates the complicated relations between several of 
the Asian countries with the Western countries like the United States, Australia, and 
New Zealand. The presence of common economic and security interests between 
Asian and Western countries made it difficult for several Asian countries to adopt a 
hard-line policy and choose decisively the EAEC option. The concept of "national 
interest" is much more complex than it appears and cannot be deduced solely from 
"commercial interest." Malaysia's proposal stemmed from its perception o f a n e e d to 
defend the Asia's economic interest by forming a "united front" or a common position. 
However, the payoffwas not so simple; otherwise, the EAEC suggestion would have 
received firm support from Asian countries. Japan did not take up its role ofleader as 
Malaysia originally expected. The position of South Korea was vague. The support of 
ASEAN was not so strong that the idea could be actualized. Malaysia's anti-Western 
sentiment was not received equivalent support from other Asian countries. Rather, 
many Asian countries thought it was imperative to cultivate the link among Pacific 
countries themselves. 
Most importantly, the indecision of Japan is the major reason why EAEC 
could not be materialized. Japan's interests can be inferred from its relations with the 
West, especially with the United States, from the economic and security dimension. 
Japan has been one of the few regional players who unequivocally advocates the 
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engagement of the United States as the major guarantee of the stability of the region. 
Besides, it has consistently made it clear that its alliance with the United States has 
been the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Although the Japan-U.S. relationship in 
recent years has subject to strains in terms of huge imbalance of trade, the United 
States continues to be the most important trading partner and security ally of Japan. 
The United States has long been the largest absorber of Japan's export, whilst Japan 
also has huge investment in the United States. In security sense, Japan provides the 
largest base for the U.S. troops in Far East, and most of Japan's defense facilities and 
technology are obtained from the United States. Japan needs the United States to deal 
with the potential crisis in Northeast Asia caused by North Korea and to balance the 
emerging military strength of China. In a political sense, Japan's attempt of ascending 
its international profile requires the cooperation of the United States. Japan is not in a 
position to do anything that will "substantially" undermine its partnership with the 
United States. Moreover, Japan's attitude towards Australia and New Zealand is 
much more positive than that of Malaysia. Japan thought that these two countries 
should be brought into the consultative framework ofEast Asian countries. Japan did 
not welcome a strong anti-Western stand. Therefore, a strong EAEC, which was 
disliked by the United States and Australia, simply contradicted the national interest 
of Japan in maintaining a harmonious relation with the economic, security, and 
political partners. 
The intertwining of economic and political (security) issue is evidenced not 
only in Japan but also in other Asian countries. Although ASEAN formally adopted 
an independent security policy that opposed the involvement of external global power 
in Southeast Asian affairs, individual members did either explicitly or implicitly 
consider the United States as an indispensable factor of regional stability. They 
actually maintained close security relation with the United States. During the Cold 
War, Thailand and the Philippines were bilateral treaty allies of the United States for 
many years. With the end of Cold War and the growth of national capabilities, there 
was political pressure and nationalist sentiment from Southeast Asian countries 
urging a redefined role of the United States, leading to the closure ofmilitary bases in 
the Philippines in 1992. However, for ASEAN as a whole, the engagement o f the 
United States is demanded to cope with the Korean confrontation, the Taiwan-straits 
confrontation, the problem in Indo-China, the potential territory dispute in South 
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China sea, and to balance the emerging power of Japan and China. Indeed, although 
the Cold War has been over, the Asian region is still full of potential crisis. For this 
reason, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was launched in July 1993 to foster 
communication among major states of the Asia-Pacific region on security issues. 
The linking of economic and security matter was evidenced in arguments 
of regional statesmen. There were worries from Asian countries that the United 
States might pull out of the region because of the end of Cold War and domestic 
pressure, leading to a regional security vacuum. Even though Indonesia maintained a 
non-aligned position, its military chief General Try Surtisno (vice-president in 1995) 
had pointed out that "a declining American military presence could encourage states 
such as Japan and China to emerge and vie for influence in the region."^^ The 
Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew wrote that "it is stupid if we [in East Asia] 
do not go out of our way to help American investments come into our region and 
make it productive, to help American trade, and to buy American wherever. That is 
our quid pro quo for [a U.S. military presence to keep regional] peace and 
s t a b i l i t y . " 6 5 In a conference held in Tokyo in May 1995, the demand for U.S. security 
participation was acknowledged by Asian leaders who called for delivering of 
economic benefits to the United States.^^ According to Lee KuanYew and other 
participants, APEC is more than an exercise to promote trade liberalization; it can 
anchor U.S. interests in the region and thus maintain "the stability that keeps East 
Asia's economic miracle going" (comment of the presidential security advisor in the 
P h i l i p p i n e s ) . 6 7 These arguments show that the United States has still been welcomed 
by several Asian countries in the post-Cold War era. Even though ASEAN is 
politically unfeasible to openly invite the United States to interfere in regional affairs, 
they do actually cooperate with the U.S. engagement policy. 
In short, the advantages of APEC over EAEC lie in its ability to foster 
long-term common interest of regional stability. There has been an immense 
overlapping in both the economic and security interests between East Asian countries 
and the Western countries like the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. In 
strictly economic sense, EAEC may appear more rational or desirable than APEC for 
the similar cultural bond and similar economic level of its members. However, 
EAEC would engender the cost of jeopardizing the relationship with several 
important Westem nations of the Pacific. EAEC not only excludes the United States 
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but also Australia and New Zealand, both o fwhom have maintained good relations 
Japan, Singapore, and even Indonesia. Japan and Singapore would rather like to see a 
relatively "inclusive" EAEC. Due to the nesting ofeconomic and security issues plus 
the risk and cost ofworking with a new framework, EAEC had not been realized in 
any significant manner. Most members still preferred a framework that can 
constructively engage the economically and politically interdependent regional 
actors. 
§ 4.4 Concluding Remarks 
The controversy over the boundary of grouping covers not only the 
participation of the three Chinese entities and the formation ofEAEC, but also the 
involvement of South Asian countries, Latin American countries, and Russia. The 
difficulties for admitting these countries are of another nature of problem - the 
dilemma of widening the association over deepening cooperation. If a nascent 
organization, like APEC, includes too many members at the beginning, it will be 
harder to consolidate the organization and carry out collective actions efficiently. In 
response to this dilemma of widening versus deepening, senior officials ofAPEC had 
been working on policies of new membership and observer status since 1994. At the 
Vancouver Meeting in 1997, APEC ministers endorsed the "Guidelines on APEC 
Membership" which stipulated that APEC should be limited in size for the need to 
remam manageable and effective. Qualified member should has substantial 
economic linkage with APEC members and be able to implement the programs 
decided by APEC.^^ 
This chapter has described and analyzed the contention over what is the 
appropriate composition for regional cooperation. Competing ideas on regionalism 
(APEC vs. EAEC) pose hard choice for different regional actors due to the cost 
associated with each of the proposals. The ansmg ofthe issue lies in the vagueness of 
the term "Asia-Pacific." In this broad region, the interconnectedness among members 
vaned greatly. When APEC was formed, a chief cohesion was the mterdependent 
relationship, in both economic and security dimensions, among the North American 
countries, East and Southeast Asian countries, and the Oceanic countries. For this 
reason，APEC was intended to engage those important actors o f the region and to 
remain inclusive. An inclusive APEC could facilitate communication among these 
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actors, leading eventually to regional stability. Hence, the inclusion of China, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong was more of a technical matter than a real contention, and was 
considered a logical development. APEC could engage the interest of China and 
encourage it to follow the rules of international community. The participation of the 
three Chinese entities simply reflects the economic reality of the region. 
The emergence and development of EAEC clearly illustrate the two 
propositions mentioned by this thesis. Firstly, Mahathir's rationale for EAEC clearly 
lies in the vast disparity in economic level between many of the Asian countries 
(except Japan) and the Western nations. The economic difference led to the 
possibility that East Asian countries would be deprived oftheir benefits. Nonetheless, 
APEC members were able to arrive at a common position on using APEC as the 
main venue for cooperation. The reason is that, as proposition (2) argues, the 
relationship between East Asian and Westem countries had been linked by both 
economic and security interest. Although the preference of Malaysia or some other 
Asian countries differed from that ofWestern APEC members, EAEC had not been a 
real challenge to APEC. After all, North American market was important to the East 
Asian countries. Moreover, unlike Europe, even though intra-Asian trade increased 
significantly, East and Southeast Asian countries had not formed a mature market in 
itselfthat could replace the position of the huge external market. The engagement of 
U.S. was important because of its capability to absorb exports from Asia. On the 
other hand, Japan had not increased its import from other Asian countries 
significantly like the U.S. due to its economic recession in the nineties. The 
quantitative difference between Japan and U.S. as destinations for Asia's export can 
be seen in table 6. 
Table 6 - Volume & Percentage of Asia's Export Going to Japan and the U.S. 
Year Total Exports (US$ bn) To japangjs$ bn) (%) To the U.S.(US$ bn) r%^ 
1980 141.6 31.5 22.2 30.4 21 4 
1985 187.1 33.3 17.8 57.3 30 6 
1990 423.1 62.5 14.8 97.9 23.1 
1991 483.9 68.4 14.1 102.3 211 
1992 549.9 70.2 12.8 118.2 21 5 
i223 ^ 76.9 12.5 131.8 9i . 
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Note: "Asia" includes China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
Source: Donald C. Hellmann, "America, APEC and the Road Not Taken: International Leadership in 
the Post-Cold War Interregnum in the Asia-Pacific," The National Bureau of Asian 
Research Analysis, vol.6, no.3 (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, November 
1995), 17. 
An even more important incentive for APEC was the implicit nesting of economic 
and security matter, causing long-term stability of the region. This implicit nesting of 
economic and security regime is the strength of APEC. As said by the Deputy 
Secretary of State of the U.S., "APEC, even though it is, strictly speaking, an 
economic organization, contributes to security."^^ 
In short, this chapter argues that the formation of regional groups has to be 
considered from both the economic and security rationale. Even in terms of economic 
need, it is unwise to undermine the overall cooperative atmosphere. As the Singapore 
Prime Minister put it, "there should not be an Asian Pacific and Western Pacific 
divide. If there is, then trade and investment flows between the countries on both 
sides of the Pacific would be a f f e c t e d . " ? � S i n c e all members had a strong interest in 
sustaining the long-term stability of the region and preserving the current balanced of 
power among major actors, they would make proper adjustment of policies. The 
United States had gradually, conditionally accepted EAEC, whilst the Asian 
counterparts stepped down the anti-Western or confrontational image of EAEC and 
stressed the highest priority given to APEC. This incident reflects the necessity to 
create a framework that can deal with the economic needs and enhance the overall 
strategic relationship among regional actors. 
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Chapter V 
The Institutional Development of APEC 
and the Provision of Information 
§ 5.1 Introduction 
The second contention to be discussed in this chapter is the structure and 
process of APEC. This can illustrate APEC's function in the provision of information. 
Although APEC started out as only a series of meetings, it has evolved into a form of 
international organization. International organizations are influential to the 
development of regimes through "facilitation of agreements, the altering of states' and 
nongovernmental actors' influence in the formation and implementation of regimes, 
the promotion of compliance with regime rules, and the legitimization of particular 
ideologies or international practices."^ Organizational structure is an essential matter 
because it directly affects the allocation of interests to its members. Indeed, 
participation in any organization entails uncertainty or risk. According to Haggard 
and Simmons, inequalities may be institutionalized by regimes? The history of 
APEC has been characterized by the dilemma between intensifying cooperation and 
preserving autonomy of individual members. This chapter illustrates nevertheless that 
within certain limits APEC members were willing to let the organization be 
"institutionalized." 
Today, even the most cautious, conservative officials and observers would 
agree that APEC has been experiencing a "gradual" and "inevitable" process of 
institutionalization. This means the making of more specified rules, and the 
strengthening of the administrative organs. In a general sense, institution-building 
refers to "a process by which political authorities (often states) deliberately establish 
frameworks or systems to achieve some ends and is a conscious response to some 
n 
perceived need." Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, who had once said that 
APEC was resistant to any move aimed at institutionalizing or giving some form to 
structure to APEC, admitted in 1994 that APEC had already undergone 
institutionalization in small stages.^ He pointed out that it was not really the 
institutionalization of APEC that Indonesia and other countries opposed but the pace 
of process. He cited examples of the establishment of the APEC Secretariat and the 
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formation of various committees and advisory bodies as evidence of ASEAN's 
support for steady institutional development.^ In retrospect, the development of 
APEC was proceeded in a faster pace than most ministers would originally expect in 
the first APEC meeting in 1989. 
To uncover the institutional development of APEC, the functions APEC 
and the controversy between different actors, this chapter is arranged as follows. 
Section 5.2 explores the development and purposes of various decision-making, 
administrative, and advisory bodies within APEC. This will enhance our 
understanding of APEC on how an outcome is produced and how different players 
interact with each other. After that, section 5.3 contrasts different players' opinions 
on the desirable nature and decision-making process of APEC. Lastly, section 5.4 --
the concluding remark -- infers the features of APEC from the previous discussions 
and compare APEC with other styles of cooperative framework. As this chapter will 
suggest, APEC is similar to ASEAN or Cairns Group, both of which do not rely on 
complicated bureaucratic structure or legalistic framework to constrain the 
behaviours of its participants. These cooperative models have a salient emphasis on 
"consensus building" and "mutual-interest." 
§ 5.2 Structure of APEC and Facilitation of Communication 
APEC started out from the ministerial meeting in 1989. Afterwards, it 
became to comprise of a series of meetings at various levels, ascending from the 
working groups to the Informal Leaders' Summits. The work of the lower level is 
supervised and directed by the higher level. There has also been an establishment of 
various committees and advisory bodies to deal with practical matters. These 
meetings and advisory bodies provided opportunities for officials and 
businesspersons from various Asia-Pacific countries to communicate with others. 
And through such interactions, certain norms, such as "free-trade", could be 
consolidated. These comprehensive communicative channels provided useful 
information to participants and contributed to the process of confidence-building. 
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§ 5.2.1 Meetings and Working Groups 
The core meeting of APEC includes the annual informal leaders' summit 
that has been convened since 1993, the annual ministerial meeting of APEC 
ministers from different area, and the senior official meetings held several times each 
year. The work of the lower level meeting is supervised and directed by the higher 
level one. All members have the opportunity to host the meeting and took the 
chairmanship of that year. As a whole, these meetings are the main fora for policy 
discussion, information sharing and decision-making. 
The convening of Leaders' Meeting was not prescribed by the Seoul 
Declaration. U.S. President Clinton, with suggestion from Australia, took the 
initiative to invite leaders of APEC economies to gather together after the ministerial 
meeting in 1993. The meeting was an opportunity for "APEC leaders to collectively 
reaffirm their vision for future and commitment to work for a new era in the 
Pacific."6 According to Fred Bergsten, chairman of the Eminent Persons' Group, "the 
decision to hold annual summits assures that the leaders will continue to focus on 
APEC and get to know each other better, that all APEC members will broaden their 
perspectives, and that ministers and officials will be fully energized to carry out their 
leaders' instructions."^ Indeed, outside APEC, there had hardly been any other 
occasion where leaders of APEC could talk with each other collectively on common 
economic interests. 
Although the annual ministerial meeting has been "overshadowed" by the 
leaders' summits in these years, the ministerial meeting is formally the highest 
decision-making organ in APEC. The ministerial meeting was held annually "to 
determine the direction and nature of APEC activities" and "decide on arrangements 
for implementation."^ Additional ministerial meetings could be convened in to deal 
with specific issues of common interest. For instance, there was a special APEC trade 
ministerial meeting in September 1990 to discuss the deadlock in the GATT 
negotiation, and a finance ministerial meeting was also held in 1994. 
Senior officials from the APEC members met several times annually to 
implement the decisions of the ministerial meetings and make recommendations to 
their ministers. Besides, senior officials oversaw and coordinated, with approval from 
ministers, the budgets and work programs of the committees and working groups.^ 
They acted as a "board of directors" to supervise the work of the APEC Secretariat 
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and the operation of the APEC Fund. In other words, SOMs were the core places 
where APEC members communicated with each other and constituted the executive 
body or the engine of APEC. The SOMs were responsible for developing the APEC 
process. The senior officials' meeting was chaired by a representative of the host of 
that year's ministerial meeting, and would make necessary preparations for the 
, . 10 meeting. 
Although remained at the lowest level of the hierarchy, the working groups 
were the starting points in which concrete cooperation projects could be built upon. 
To date, there has been ten working groups that carry out practical research, 
education programmes, and cooperative projects in these areas: Trade and Investment 
Data; Trade Promotion; Investment and Industrial Science and Technology; Human 
Resource Development; Regional Energy Cooperation; Marine Resource 
Conservation; Telecommunication; Transportation; Tourism; and Fisheries." These 
working groups included delegates not only from governments but also from the 
business sectors and academic communities, similar to the tripartite structure of 
PECC. APEC economies could participate as "shepherds" in these working groups if 
having a leading interest in the issue area. 
§ 5.2.2 The APEC Secretariat 
Although considerable worry was found among ASEAN members, the 
Bangkok Meeting in 1992 eventually approved the establishment of the Secretariat. 
"Ministers recognized that APEC has reached that stage in its evolution where 
institutionalization could further strengthen APEC's role and enhance its efficiency in 
1 0 _ 
promoting regional economic cooperation." The APEC Secretariat was established 
to perform these two functions: "first, to facilitate and coordinate APEC activities, 
provide logistical and technical services as well as administer APEC financial affairs 
under the direction of the APEC Senior Officials' Meetings; second, to act on behalf 
of APEC members under the direction of Ministers as communicated through the 
APEC SOMs."i3 Afterwards, the Budget and Administrative Committee (BAC) was 
established in 1993 to "advise Senior Officials on operational and administrative 
budget issues, financial management, and project management of the APEC work 
program."i4 When the Secretariat was set up in January 1993, the size of bureaucracy 
was intentionally kept small (with a total number of professional and support staff 
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being less than thirty^^) in order to ease participants' worry about financial burden 
and domination of strong countries. However, as APEC activities had increased 
substantially and the scope of APEC had expanded considerably, this small 
secretariat could not cope with the increase in demands from APEC members. A task 
force was therefore established in 1994 to review the operation of the APEC 
Secretariat. In the 1995 Osaka Meeting the ministers endorsed the recommendations 
of the task force. 
§ 5.2.3 Advisory and Research Bodies 
In addition to the above meetings and administrative organ, several 
advisory and research committees have been formed to provide information and 
analyses to APEC members. The two advisory bodies are the Eminent Persons Group 
(EPG, 1992-1995) and the Pacific Business Fomm (PBF, 1993-1995), both ofwhich 
had fostered academic and business participation in APEC. Besides, two research 
committees - the Committee on Trade and Investment and the Economic Committee 
~ were formed to study economic activities and facts of interdependence and to make 
practical policy suggestions on the basis of the findings. 
The Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was the most influential, essential 
advisory body in APEC. Its policy suggestions had been subject to criticisms by some 
developing countries, most notably Malaysia, because of the resolute preference for 
free trade. At the Bangkok Meeting in 1992, APEC ministers decided to set up an 
independent, non-governmental Eminent Persons Group, consisting of twelve 
distinguished persons from the business sector and the academia, to "enunciate a 
vision for trade in the Asia Pacific Region."^^ A senior U.S. official explained the 
rationale for this forming this body as that: 
people outside the government process, people who have standing within the 
economic and political communities can be more adventurous, somewhat more bold in 
their thinking, than government officials who are engaged in the ongoing 
responsibilities of day-to-day negotiations. The thinking is that this group will provide 
a sort ofvision of the future for trade liberalization ~ to think the unthinkable, give us 
a way to go, a goal to aim for in the next five to ten years]? 
Since its formation, it had produced three annual reports^^ for their ministers. The 
work ofEPG ended after 1995. 
The formation of the Pacific Business Forum could be traced back to 
86 
Institutional Development ofAPEC 
Leaders' Summit at Seattle in 1993, where APEC Leaders asked business leaders "to 
establish a Pacific Business Forum to identify issues APEC should address to 
facilitate regional trade and investment and encourage the further development of 
business networks throughout the region."^^ The PBF, formed in June 1994, included 
representatives of one large and one small business sector from each APEC member 
economy. The two Reports released by this forum called for the removal of barriers 
to economic transactions, the development of human r e s o u r c e s �。， t h e realization of 
Bogor vision of trade liberalization, and the production of concrete and pragmatic 
results.2i In 1996, this forum was replaced by the APEC Business Advisory Council 
(ABAC), a permanent business forum. 
The Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) was established in 1993 to 
replace the Informal Group on Regional Trade Liberalization (RTL). It was charged 
with the mission "to increase economic activity and facilitate the flow of goods and 
services among member economies, cooperate to liberalize and expand trade, and 
nurture a more open environment for investment among member economies."^^ 
Accordingly, CTI had undertaken a number of projects and activities in these broad 
areas: tariff data base, simplification of customs procedures, market access, 
investment regulation handbook, government procurement, dispute mediation, 
deregulation, trade impediments, competition policy, Uruguay Round 
^ o 
implementation, and so on. This committee had been the first permanent committee 
that would have the ability to give policy suggestions in areas of trade liberalization 
and facilitation. It signified APEC's long-termed goal in addressing these questions 
and it also led to persistent policy inputs and cooperative efforts. 
The Economic Committee (EC) was established at the ministerial meeting 
of 1994 to replace the former Ad Hoc Group on Economic Trends and Issues (ETI) in 
"promoting economic dialogue throughout the region and encouraging economic 
growth and increasing the economic well-being of all peoples"^^ and "enhancing 
APEC's capability for analysis of economic trends and studies of specific economic 
issues . . . supporting the policy activities underway in other APEC fora."^^ It had 
been expected that through its extensive research projects the phenomenon of 
economic interdependence could be better comprehended?^ At present, ten research 
topics, under the two headings of "economic and technical cooperation" and "trade 
and investment liberalization projects," had been studied by the committee.^^ 
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§ 5.2.4 The Regime Function of APEC: Provision of Information 
Although APEC started out as a simple ministerial meeting in 1989, it had 
evolved into a relatively complicated mechanism in since then. Its development 
proves that APEC members perceived the needs to intensify communication and 
cooperation despite the controversy in organizational development. These meetings 
and working bodies increased the frequency of contact among APEC member 
economies and allowed them not only to exchange information but also to produce 
collective actions when necessary. The difficulties of establishing these frameworks 
were related to vast economic disparities as proposition (1) describes. But APEC 
members were able to settle down their disputes and arrived at a mutually acceptable 
solution. As proposition (2) states, the information provided by these various 
components of APEC was appreciated by the decision-makers. As the former 
executive director of the APEC Secretariat put it, APEC was a "confidence-building 
operation" that set "a pattern of positive dialogues not necessarily achieved in 
98 
bilateral trade negotiations." 
Firstly, the informal leader's summit and the ministerial meeting could 
provide valuable channels for these top-level leaders to discuss multilateral and 
bilateral issues. Whilst the collective discussion might be confined to economic 
issues or agenda of APEC, the individual bilateral contacts between leaders and 
ministers might foster communication in political, economic, and even security 
issues. These direct, personal dialogues of regional leaders obviously had a 
conducive impact on regional stability by fostering confidence and decreasing 
suspicion. For instance, the historic bilateral meeting between U.S. President Clinton 
and the Chinese President Jiang Zemin was the spotlight of the Seattle Meeting. 
Indeed, this event was highly appreciated by the Chinese side. At the 1994 
Indonesian meeting, the Japanese Prime Minister made use of its bilateral meeting 
with China to discuss its concem about China's nuclear test whilst assured that the 
OQ 
plans of Japanese loan remained intact. U.S. President Clinton told his Japanese 
counterpart in the bilateral meeting to further deregulate its market and distribution 
system.30 Obviously, the informal leaders' summit provided a "two-track" (formal & 
informal) channel to foster cooperation and regional stability. Australian Prime 
Minister's words summarized the "political" significance of the leaders' summit; 
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"There [is] no other body where the prime minister of Japan and the president of 
Korea or the president of China or the President of the United States can meet 
together; outside UN there is no other body."^^ Moreover, the leaders' meeting, for its 
authority, could resolve the deadlocks of the lower level meetings and gave a 
substantial momentum to the development of APEC. 
Apart from this high-level leaders' summit, meetings at the ministerial 
levels, not only between foreign and economic ministers but also between the 
ministers of environment, finance, trade, telecommunications, and so forth, allowed 
APEC members to familiarize better with each other by working towards some 
common ends. Through these ministerial meetings, information about other 
members' stands or actual policies could be acquired and verified. The increase in 
scope of these meetings shows that APEC members were confronted with various 
practical problems of the region. The willingness to gather together and discuss 
common issues is necessary for future substantial cooperation. Together with the 
SOMs, APEC had already been filled with a series of interrelated meetings that could 
greatly increase the intensity of contacts among various APEC member economies. 
Although these meetings might not produce immediate tangible result, they would be 
instrumental in pooling information, exchanging ideas, and even fostering common 
position. 
The gradual institutional development of APEC, as illustrated by the 
establishment of the Secretariat, the Eminent Persons Group, and various advisory 
bodies and committees, shows that the decision-makers had an objective to improve 
the work of APEC and the quality of information obtained. Moreover, these research 
works and policy studies can pull different members together. APEC's working 
groups also published customs, investment, telecommunications and transportation 
guides that provide information and make regional regimes and regulatory 
)0 
environments more transparent. Moreover, like PECC, APEC have actively 
encouraged business and academic participation through EPG, working groups, and 
the business forum. In this way, decision-makers of the states can be better informed 
of the needs of the business sector and the professional advice from scholars about 
what is desirable for the region. All such research works could contribute to better 
knowledge about the interdependent economic relationship among members. For 
instance, the Committee on Trade and Investment produced reports on a number of 
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practical economic issues like tariffs, custom procedures, intellectual property rights, 
competition policy and so forth. The Economic Committee had also worked with 
several research projects. The findings of these advisory or working bodies would 
produce a further thrust to APEC in supporting trade and investment liberalization 
and calling for greater effort in different areas of cooperation. 
As a consultative forum and a weak regime, APEC's function in the 
provision of information was fostered by voluntary actions and peer-group pressure 
rather than strict, formal stipulations. Nevertheless, APEC members have agreed to 
implement collective program in trade liberalization and other areas of common 
interest; they were ready to strengthen the rules of cooperation. The ministerial 
meetings and the senior official meetings soon became the venue to review the works 
of each individual member and to discuss the disputes happened in this course of 
cooperation. The actual pace of institutional development may depend on economic 
conditions of the region, the political conditions, as well as the effort paid by 
individual APEC members.^^ The next section illustrates the divergent opinions of 
different APEC members. 
§ 5.3 Controversies in the Institutional Development of APEC 
The process of APEC's institutional development was characterized by 
members' varying degree of skeptics and suspicions. Firstly, APEC members had 
difference in their perceptions on the nature of APEC. Secondly, the decision-making 
procedure of APEC was also subject to challenge when APEC members found it 
harder to obtain consensus on every issue. These controversies demonstrate that, as 
proposition (1) states, vast economic diversity was a major casual factor that impeded 
APEC's development in institution. Developed APEC members were more 
enthusiastic about institution building in APEC. These countries supported the 
change of APEC from a purely discussion forum to a negotiation forum. Besides, 
although they appreciated the importance of decision-making based on "consensus," 
they noted the problems associated with this style of decision-making. Developing or 
most East Asian countries, on the other hand, held that APEC should be a 
consultative forum, in which the pursuit for consensus should be the fundamental 
mode of decision-making. Eventually, in practice, APEC members held negotiations 
on several issues when APEC proceeded and still attempted to obtain consensus to 
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the greatest extent. 
§ 5.3.1 Nature of APEC: Consultative Forum versus Negotiation 
Forum 
The foregoing discussion holds that APEC has provided a set of means for 
extensive communications. This is, of course, a consultation, and no one would deny 
that APEC was basically a consultation forum. Nevertheless, since 1993, as APEC 
began to deal with the difficult issues of trade liberalization and trade facilitation, 
some APEC members have voiced that there was a tendency for this forum to 
become a negotiation venue. They objected this kind of development and held that 
the discussion in APEC should not lead to any binding effect. They were especially 
sensitive to the Uruguay Round style of negotiation that involves "reciprocity." The 
implication of this controversy is about the basic value of APEC ~ whether some 
kind of collective action is required. If collective action is demanded by members, 
then negotiation, defined here as "the process whereby macro-political actors interact 
in order to effect a number of goals be realized byjoint agreement,"^^ is unavoidable. 
Australia and the United States have been favoring this development of 
granting a more progressive role of APEC. Australian Foreign and Trade Minister 
Gareth Evans was of the opinion that "inevitably APEC will become more and more 
a structured organization, rather than the loose consultative process it was at the 
outset."35 He reportedly claimed that APEC had already taken on the role of a 
negotiating forum in Seattle when it adopted an agenda for facilitating trade and 
i n v e s t m e n t . 3 6 The making of such agenda involved not merely consultation but 
negotiation of agreed outcomes. Obviously, Australia wanted APEC to go beyond a 
simple role of "exchanging information" or "policy-dialogues" to "producing 
significant agreements in hard-edged areas."^^ Australia's perspective can be 
understood from the foreign minister's comment on the Osaka Action Agenda 1995： 
The real point about Osaka is that it unequivocally marks the transformation of APEC 
from a consultative body to an action body: we have spent a lot of time exchanging 
information, analyzing issues, formulating objectives and crafting frameworks for 
action. None of that time has been wasted; none of that effort was unnecessary. But it 
is now time to really start getting the runs on the board -- delivering the benefits which 
APEC is eminently capable of generating.^^ 
The policy choice of Australia can be explained from its perception of its national 
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interests. The sustenance of favorable environment for domestic export had remained 
a central objective of Australia's participation in multilateral or regional organization. 
Since Australia had already implemented a series of economic reform to 
internationalize its economy, it was willing to negotiate with other players to obtain 
additional market access for commodities, manufacturing products and services. 
Obviously, a "free-trade" oriented and "institutionalized" APEC served the interest of 
Australia by effectively lowering the barriers imposed by other players. 
The United States not only shared this line of reasoning but also took the 
initiative to make APEC moving to that direction. The upgrading of the APEC 
process and the drafting of the non-binding trade and investment framework were 
achieved under the chairmanship of the United States in 1993. The Acting Secretary 
of the U.S. Department of State announced the U.S. objectives in APEC at a Senior 
Officials' Meeting in December 1992, shortly before its assumption of chairmanship, 
as follows: 
We must now move beyond the phase of institutionalizing APEC to making it 
operational; we must move, in short, from rhetoric to results. Our goal should be to 
make of APEC a pre-eminent regional organization which can serve as the Pacific 
community's common voice in helping to shape the international economy of the 21st 
century.39 
Accordingly, the U.S. proposed seven "agreements''^^ to be achieved in 1993 and 
years after.^^ To pursue these objectives, from an American perspective, APEC 
should be "expanded from an annual high level dialogue into a living, breathing, 
i n s t i t u t i o n . " 4 2 Quite obviously, the United States wanted to change APEC from a 
loose consultative forum on trade issues into a negotiating one. Sandra Kristoff, the 
United States ambassador-designate for Asia-Pacific affairs, suggested that APEC 
should adopt a negotiating approach that ends up somewhere between the two 
extremes of a GATT-style negotiation and a purely unilateral approach, with the 
requirement of collective decision making and action.^^ As expected, the U.S. 
approach received significant opposition from Asian members. A senior Japanese 
official commented that the United States seemed insensitive to Asians' feeling that 
APEC should not be a negotiating fomm.^^ Actually, U.S. officials were aware ofthe 
sensitivity of the issue, but felt the debate of whether APEC should be a consultative 
forum or a negotiating fomm was a "relatively false one."^^ The realistic situation 
was that it was hard to promote the interests of the United States and other 
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industrialized members in APEC if no meaningful negotiation could be held. 
Most Asian APEC members did not envisage such a negotiation role of 
APEC. Malaysia and others held that APEC was neither an institution nor an 
organization. They held that APEC could not be a venue for negotiation. Thailand's 
ambassador to Indonesia thought that once APEC became a negotiating process, it 
would tum into a North-South confrontational type of thing.^^ Among others, 
Malaysia was most outspoken in resisting any kind of negotiation being held under 
the context of APEC. Its Trade Minister made it clear that APEC should not be 
allowed "to start negotiating trade-offs in liberalization or to have negotiating on 
tariff cuts and demand reciprocity."^^ From the Malaysian perspective, APEC should 
only be a consultative forum focusing on trade facilitation, technology transfer and 
4R 
human resource management, rather than a structural organization in which 
members accept decisions made by A P E C , China also believed that APEC should 
be a consultation mechanism rather than an institutionalized organization.^^ In a 
seminar on "Pragmatic Approach to Free Trade in the Asia-Pacific Region," trade 
policy experts and senior officials noted that turning APEC into a negotiating forum 
was opposed by some members, "partly because they did not want to divert attention 
from the GATT negotiations, partly because of differences over the tempo of trade 
liberalization and partly because of disparities in bargaining power among APEC 
members."5i 
Japan adopted a middle position on the issue. It did not oppose all the 
initiatives to make APEC be an action-oriented entity, but it usually allied itself with 
the Asian members to offset the pressure from the United States. In 1993, when 
attending the Seattle Leaders' Summit, Japanese Prime Minister Morihoro Hosokawa 
rejected the suggestion that APEC should take part in negotiations on international 
trade liberalization. Nevertheless, according to a Japanese ambassador for Asia-
Pacific cooperation, Tetsuya Endo, Tokyo indeed shared some of the U.S. preference 
for encouraging APEC to develop into a trade negotiating forum, but only for settling 
trade disputes that cannot be resolved bilaterally or by the new World Trade 
Organization. He elaborated that Japan generally accepted the proposal to foster 
concrete results in trade liberalization and facilitation activities.^^ Similar to ASEAN, 
Japan did not favour the "legalistic, confrontational" method employed by the United 
States. The head of Japanese MITI argued that the U.S. was not accustomed to the 
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Asian approach of handling matters.^^ Ippei Yamazawa, Japanese delegate of the 
Eminent Persons Group, suggested that it might be possible to evolve an "APEC 
style of negotiation" by combining free consultation among members on economic 
and trade issues with "peer pressure" for the opening of markets.^^ 
In short, as APEC began to touch upon some concrete issues on 
cooperation, the countries could not avoid the process of bargaining. This made it 
difficult to attain consensus in every issue in the decision-making process. 
§ 5.3.2 Decision-making in APEC: a Case Study of the Indonesian 
Meeting 
This section discusses the prevailing decision-making practice in APEC. 
Decision-making process is one of the defining elements of a regime. From the very 
beginning, APEC members had decided that "consensus" should be the fundamental 
mode of cooperation. During the first APEC meeting at Canberra in 1989, ministers 
had already decided, as one general principle of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, 
that "cooperation should involve a commitment to open dialogue and consensus, with 
equal respect for the views of all participants."^^ This statement was stipulated 
formally in the Seoul Declaration adopted in 1991. The Eminent Persons Group 
(EPG) likewise considered that decision-making based on consensus was "realistic 
and p r o d u c t i v e " ) 6 although it was fully aware of the inherent problem. This issue is 
important in the APEC process because it directly concerns how an idea was formed 
and then transformed into action. 
A decision-making style based on consensus gave APEC member 
economies, especially the weak members, a sense of protection because all kinds of 
opinion had to be taken into consideration. Asian APEC members particularly 
supported this principle, which could prevent polarization and promote harmony. 
Nobutoshi Akao, Japan's ambassador to the International Organizations in Vienna, 
pinpointed that this mechanism was important to the survival of APEC by fostering 
the support of developing countries. He mentioned that: 
In regard to decision making, the key to APEC's long-term survival and growth is to 
work toward a consensus through discussions wherein all members participate on an 
equal footing rather than let a minority of developed members dictate to the rest. 
Bearing in mind that APEC is nothing without the active participation of the 
developing members, particularly the ASEAN countries, the forum should make a 
point of respecting the opinions of those members. This will entail a time-consuming 
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decision-making process，and indeed, the key to APEC's success henceforth will be to 
avoid haste and tackle each issue with patience.^^ 
According to the Australia's Minister for Trade Senator Bob McMullan, this 
consensus approach had proven to be a great source of strength because: 
the search for consensus, for example, means that all members can generally live with 
the result, and peer pressure is likely to draw along members who would opt out of a 
more formal and binding process. At the same time, APEC's characteristics limit the 
kinds of policies which can be usefully pursued, within it, to those with broad 
support.58 
Despite of these kinds of appreciation, as the exact meaning of "consensus" had not 
been put down clearly, any one of the members, in theory, could block the overall 
progress. For this reason, the development of APEC had been constrained by the 
willingness of the most hesitant member, the so-called "lowest common 
denominator." Moreover, as any decision had to be shaped to include the view of 
different players, the efficiency was inevitably reduced. From the outset, whenever 
APEC member economies had divergent opinions on certain issue, the principle of 
"consensus" was employed by some members as a defensive ground. 
As a matter of fact, in spite of the seemingly collective support from all 
APEC member economies to the maintenance of "consensus," some participants held 
reservations. The core problem was how to treat minor or dissimilar opinion in 
formulating concerted actions or common perspective because a unanimously 
approved decision was hard to be obtained. For instance, the U.S. Under Secretary of 
State Joan Spero called for the abandonment of the consensus principle to meet the 
challenge of freeing trade.^^ Thailand's deputy prime minister Supachai Panitchpakdi 
explained why it was difficult to maintain "consensus": "I don't think we can go by a 
consensus basis in that every one of the 18 countries would have to agree on 
particular dates or work programs."^^ Mari Pangestu, a PECC delegate who had 
observer status in APEC meeting, disclosed that a number of countries expressed 
during the Indonesian meeting that the forum would be more efficient if the 
consensus decision-making procedure was dropped.^^ An Asian official who had sat 
in on many APEC meetings pointed out that they could not have consensus on 
everything and might have to move away from that principle.^^ Nevertheless, 
changing the present system to a voting system is politically not so feasible for its 
implication of tuming APEC into a binding and formalized institution. 
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During the APEC meeting in Indonesia in 1994, the deadlock existed in the 
adoption of the non-binding investment principle could illustrate the fragility of 
consensus decision-making procedure. Before the 1994 ministerial meeting in 
Indonesia, the United States still continued to uphold its objection to a set of 
investment principles proposed by the APEC Committee on Trade and Investment 
(CTI). The controversies existed in the "weak" language in three clauses ~ the 
national treatment for investors, performance requirement, and repatriation -- that 
harmed the quality of the document. The United States wanted a declaration of 
aspirations to principles of liberal investment and viewed the investment initiatives 
/CQ 
should be one of very high standards. It refused to accept weak language. For 
instance, on the issue of national treatment, the United States suggested to replace the 
word "with exceptions" by "with limited exceptions" for the applications of domestic 
laws on foreign i n v e s t o r s , < Concerning the matter of performance requirement, the 
United States wanted APEC members to "eliminate" rather than "minimize" the use 
of performance requirements if such requirements distort trade and investment.^^ Last 
but not least, United States asserted the principle of "repatriation" ~ "the right of a 
foreign company to transfer its profit to home freely."^^ But China opposed this 
point. 
Asian participants, such as Indonesia and China, did not agree with what 
the United States held. One Asian delegate explained the problem as that; "the United 
States wants to include certain words that would set certain standards to be followed 
by APEC economies. This is not possible as the principles are supposed to be non-
b i n d i n g . " 6 7 According to a Japanese official, the developing countries had put priority 
on protecting domestic industry, although they also accepted the argument that 
"Asia's growth follows a pattern in which investment gives rise to exports, leading to 
a higher economic growth."^^ On the other hand, in order to demonstrate its 
affiliation with the Asian countries, Australian officials had generally been 
sympathetic to the Asian preference for consensus and regarded it as the pragmatic 
approach. The Australian Foreign Minister appraised that the consensus approach 
made any APEC member no mandatory obligation to participate in any project it did 
not wish to do so, enabling APEC members to join a broadening consensus at its own 
pace without penalty.^^ Australian government backed the Asian opposition to 
demands from Washington on investment principle. The firm attitude of the United 
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States caused the possibility of making "consensus" considerably lowered, which 
might in turn minimize the significance of APEC. 
As Hadi Soesastro put it, the investment code was the first serious test case 
for APEC. If the summit had failed to reach consensus on it, then APEC would have 
seriously lost its c r e d i b i l i t y . ? � H e n c e , this deadlock was eventually resolved at the 
eleventh hour in the ministerial meeting because the United States did not want to 
derail the APEC process and the ministers agreed to work toward strengthening itJ^ 
A source supplemented that another step to gain the United States' support for the 
code was ministers' decision to implement trade-related investment promotion 
measures agreed to in the Uruguay Round global trade talks7^ Perhaps, the softening 
of stand by the United States was correlated to achievement of another more 
ambitious goal -- free trade and investment in the region by 2020. 
In short, consensus decision-making procedure is both a strength and 
weakness of APEC, reflecting the complicated interaction between members and 
clustering of issues. Although ASEAN's lowest-common-denominator approach had 
produced a 'dismal' record on economic cooperation, by shying away from internal 
tension, ASEAN had come to enjoy a 'great sense of togetherness.'^^ This is probably 
why ASEAN and other Asian members preferred this style of decision. 
§ 5.4 Concluding Remarks: the Choice of APEC Model 
The preceding discussion has studied the nature and decision-making 
procedure of APEC. Some commentators^^ have proposed that culture can be a 
pertaining reference to understand the difficulties in the development of APEC. It is 
argued that the Westem culture fosters the so-called "institutional" or "legalistic" 
approach in economic cooperation, such as the calling for "time-table" in the course 
of liberalization and the establishment ofbinding rules as manifested in the form o f a 
"free trade area." In contrast, the Asian culture is responsible for the so-called 
"evolutionary" approach, which simply calls for gradual development ofregional ties 
and firmly rejects anything like a trade bloc with preferential treatment for members. 
Admittedly, culture has a place in explaining the difference in approaches of 
cooperation. But a closer examination of the issue shows that in the development of 
APEC cultural difference was not the core problem. What made the participants 
disagreed with each other was the benefit of cooperation. The developing countries 
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were merely using all the workable means to defend their interests. For instance, 
Singapore, as an Asian country, did not oppose to the proposal of strengthening 
APEC and liberalizing trade. It was a matter of differing level of development rather 
than cultural difference that accounted for members' behaviors. Asian countries had 
to evaluate their national interest before deciding whether to institutionalize 
cooperation. Most Asian countries had a decided preference for vagueness or 
flexibility, simply because this would preserve the autonomy of the state and 
minimize the cost of adjustment. 
To date, APEC has developed its own model of cooperation, something 
that lies between the extremes of strong international regimes and purely discussing 
forum. Due to the realistic difficulties in divergent state preferences, it was 
unrealistic to expect APEC becoming a rule-based institution. The objective of 
deriving a mechanism of information exchange and communication had been 
generally supported by APEC members. The most prominent feature of APEC was 
its emphasis on common interest and flexibility. The objective of APEC was to foster 
common positions among its members on certain important economic matters in case 
of uncertainties. Consensus was achieved through constructive communication and 
the emphasis on common interest rather than organizational sanctions. In this regard, 
APEC had established a series of communicative channels that could improve the 
quantity of information available to players. International cooperation may 
theoretically take the form of strong and weak organization. APEC was an example 
of slightly institutionalized economic cooperation. 
The experience of ASEAN can provide some hints on the development of 
APEC. ASEAN, which was established in 1967, was an attempt to foster common 
positions and collective response to the then unstable political environment in the 
region. Formally, ASEAN was charged with the mission to foster economic, social, 
and cultural cooperation. Like APEC, the structure of ASEAN was also relatively 
loose, consisting of ministerial meetings, committees, and a small secretariat. The 
autonomy of the individual members was to be respected; consensus was also the 
modality of decision-making. Judging from the Westem standard, ASEAN's degree 
of institutionalization is low. But the achievement of ASEAN cannot be overlook, as 
it had been able to minimize the conflicts among its members in an era of political 
instability and to preserve regional stability to the greatest extent. 
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Another frequent model for cooperation is the Cairns Group. This group, 
consisting of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay, 
was a coalition of the developed and developing country agricultural exporters7^ It 
was set up under the initiative of Australia in 1986, right before the Uruguay Round 
Negotiation, to defend the interests of its members by supporting agricultural trade 
liberalization or fair trade. "By acting collectively this disparate group has had more 
influence and impact on the agriculture negotiations than any individual members 
would have had independently."^^ The group became an important third force, in 
addition to the United States and the European Union, in the farm t a l k s . ? ? This group 
also operated in a loose structure, even without any regular ministerial meeting or 
secretariat. The group took a consensual approach to decision-making. Its major 
achievement included putting farm product into the agenda of multilateral trade 
negotiation and making a reform in farm trade under the Uruguay Round. 
Theoretically, the study of international cooperation usually emphasizes the 
process of formal institution-building. Attention is paid on organizational structures, 
membership, deciding modalities, rules-making and implementation, and functions 
of the secretariat. The rights and obligations of participants are clearly prescribed by 
the charters of the international organizations. Such a highly institutionalized 
organization can give high quality information to its members about what others are 
doing and is more effective in resolving the collective action problem. 
Exercise of regional cooperation elsewhere usually takes one of these 
forms, namely sectoral cooperations, free trade areas, custom unions, common 
markets, and economic and political unions/^ Whilst all these arrangements share a 
"unifying" characteristic -- "the preferential terms of trade participants have over 
non-participating countries,"^^ they vary in terms of degree of formal integration, or 
the decision-making authority retained by each state. Sectoral cooperation and free 
trade areas do not require the establishment of new regional decision-making and 
management organizations that restrict the sovereign decision-making authority of 
participating states, as other more institutionalized co-operations do. According to 
Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, different sorts of trade institutions (e.g. 
unilateralism, multilateralism, and regionalism) can be differentiated by the number 
of member parties, rules of accession and openness of membership, tolerance for 
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discrimination and condition of treatment, and governance structure. Governance 
structure, as an obvious difference between institutions, concerns how agreements 
among participants are enforced ~ whether it is a self-help enforcement or third-party 
enforcement.8i 丁^已 central point here is that the enforcement of rules and the 
presence of higher-organization underline formal and efficient cooperation. With this 
in mind, a comparison with APEC can be made. 
APEC has not been a highly "institutionalized" form of cooperation. Its 
characteristic is summarized in table 7: 
Table 7 -- Comparison Between Different Forms of Cooperation 
“ A P E C ASEAN Cairns iEu! W.T.O. 
Group (Regionalism) (Multilateral.) 
Membership Fairly Open Exclusive Exclusive Exclusive Inclusive 
(conditional) 
Nature Consultation / Consultation / Consultation / Trade Regulation of 
Information Regional Common stand Liberalization / Economic 
Exchange Stability Political Transaction 
Unification 
Decision- Consensus / Consensus Consensus Voting Voting 
Making Informal 
Specificity of Flexible / vague Flexible Flexible clear/strict clear /strict 
Rules 
Enforcement Self- Self- Self- Third-Party Third-Party 
Agency enforcement enforcement enforcement 
Structure / Loose / small Tighten / Loose / no Strong / Huge Strong / Huge 
Organization secretariat moderate secret. secretariat bureaucracy bureaucracy 
Source: summarized and complied by author. 
As APEC proclaimed itself as an "open" fomm, it did not have a vigorous restriction 
on membership. APEC, ASEAN and the Caims Group belong to the same category 
of "Asian" model of cooperation that stresses constructive dialogues, consensus, 
informal and flexible cooperation, autonomy of participants, and loose organizational 
structure. The cost of establishing these cooperation frameworks is relatively low. 
Nevertheless, these models are invariably fulfilling the raison d'etre ofcooperation --
the fostering of common action. On the other hand, the cost of establishing a "highly" 
institutionalized form of cooperation is much higher. In the absence of strong 
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leadership and immediate demand for collective action, strong organization for 
cooperation is hard to be made. Indeed, the Eminent Persons Group had also 
suggested that APEC should subscribe to the principle of "pragmatism," which 
means focusing on result rather than form and avoiding over-institutionalization and 
Q ^ 
over-bureaucratization. For this reason, the European model is clearly rejected, and 
so is the multilateral model. 
As a weak regime that lacked strict and strong organization of rule-making 
and collective decision implementation, APEC did not require very strong 
commitments or responsibilities from the participants. However, in practice, APEC 
and its members had been caught by a complex web of interdependent relationship 
and realistic problems that prompt them to devote commitments and take 
responsibilities. The evolution into a loose "Asia-Pacific" economic community 
could be a possible direction or incentive for the moderate institutional development 
of APEC. According to the former Australian Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans, 
the concept of such community was spreading as a consequence of "economic self-
interest and technological and cultural convergence."^^ Besides, it was argued by a 
PECC participant that, by drawing the experience of ASEAN, "continuous 
consultation breeds community" and "process can be substance."^^ Actually, an 
accelerated institutionalization was witnessed between 1993 and 1995 in terms of 
organizational structure and substantial agenda. At the very least, APEC members 
had agreed on the principle and norms that define the relationship between them. 
Indeed, there had been a consensus on the nature and reality of economic problems of 
the region. For this reason, as the following two chapters demonstrate, APEC had 
been able to move APEC forward by delivering the program of trade-liberalization. 
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Chapter VI 
Politics of Trade Liberalization: Vision and Time-Frame 
§ 6.1 Introduction 
Having settled down the EAEC dispute and implemented a moderate 
degree of institutional development, APEC could begin to devote its effort to some 
substantive issue for cooperation in 1993. Without doubt, trade liberalization is the 
most controversial but important agenda item in the APEC process. Chapter VI and 
VII demonstrate that APEC members initially disagreed on almost all aspects about 
liberalization. An interesting question is why did they compromise at the very last 
moment. One possible answer to this question is that, even for the developing 
countries, it is in their long-term interest to liberalize and deregulate their economy. 
Liberalization can raise these economies' competitiveness and efficiency. There was 
an acceptance of free-trade at the high political level. The Indonesian meeting 
marked the beginning of a new era in the development of APEC. The meaning of 
regime became more relevant after this meeting because APEC determined to 
implement collaborative action and gave out specific goal and timetable for such 
action. Besides, more detailed rules or guidance would be made to coordinate the 
actions of APEC members. Each of them would know better of what others were 
doing and ought to do. Nevertheless, since the mles were still quite vague and did not 
display strong internal consistency, and with the lack of strong monitoring and 
enforcing devices, APEC was still a weak regime. In 1994, Indonesia and other 
supporters of the trade liberalization intentionally avoided the discussion of the hard 
and difficult issues and left them to the subsequent APEC meetings. 
This chapter discusses the contentious issue of trade and investment 
liberalization in the chronological order. Section 6.2 discusses the first report of the 
Eminent Persons Group that puts liberalization into the agenda of the 1993 
ministerial meeting and the relating principle of "open-regionalism." Section 6.3 is 
about the second EPG Report and the 1994 Bogor Declaration. Focus is paid on 
APEC members' divergent opinions and considerations of interests, followed by the 
implications of the liberalization measure. Lastly, section 6.4 is the concluding 
remark that argues the emergence of compromise from functions ofaregime. 
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§ 6.2 The Initial Thrust of the First Eminent Group Report (1993): 
The Vision of Trade and Investment Liberalization 
Trade liberalization as a fundamental goal of APEC was laid down 
explicitly at the Seoul Declaration in 1991. This controversial issue had not been 
taken up seriously by ministers until 1993 when the Eminent Persons Group 
submitted its first report in October 1993. The first EPG Report, entitled A Vision for 
APEC ~ Towards an Asia Pacific Economic Community, served as a foundation for 
APEC's subsequent development. This report established three initiatives OpiHars) of 
cooperation programs ~ trade liberalization, trade facilitation and technical 
cooperation ~ and called for modest institutionalization of APEC. Assuming that an 
open global trading regime and free trade are vital to the region, the Report held that 
APEC should pursue an active program of regional trade liberalization on a GATT-
consistent basis. It recommended "APEC members agree now to reach in 1996 on a 
target and timetable for the achievement of free trade in the region."^ Diplomatically, 
APEC ministers were restrained in their response to the EPG Report? At the 
ministerial meetings, they were averse to endorse all the bold suggestions and only 
reaffirmed generally the desirability of enhancing APEC as a vehicle for regional and 
global trade liberalization. Whilst the United States, Australia and Singapore 
basically supported the progressive ideas stipulated at the Report, a number ofAsian 
countries (Japan, China), especially the ASEAN (Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, 
and Malaysia), expressed skepticism about the free-trade proposal. 
The United States appreciated the EPG Report as "a blueprint for 
expanding trade and economic relations over the long term" and considered the 
Seattle Meeting "an important step toward a more open trading regime among the 
members of APEC."] Warren Christopher (U.S. Secretary of State) also mentioned 
that "APEC's work to liberalize trade certainly advances American interests."^ EPG's 
recommendation simply coincided with President Clinton's earlier vision for a "New 
Pacific Community"5 which entailed a trans-Pacific architecture in both economic 
and security dimension in post-Cold War era. Similarly, the department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade of Australia retrospectively thought the EPG report provided "the 
backdrop against which the Department has been pursuing much of its work on trade 
facilitation and liberalization."^ However, to cope with the reactions from the Asian 
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participants, the developed countries did not press the idea too much to avoid 
affecting the cohesion and confidence of the developing countries. In 1993，the 
immediate short-term objective was to cultivate a sense of community and make the 
"historic" first leaders' meeting a real success. 
Japan raised its reservation that reflected its mixed attitude; its foreign 
minister held that "while the report should be put to good use to strengthen APEC, 
members should give due consideration to the diverse stages of development among 
the region's economies. Cooperation should be promoted increasingly."^ Moreover, 
the Chinese President Jiang Zemin made it clear at the leaders' meeting that "APEC 
should be an open, flexible and pragmatic forum for economic cooperation and a 
consultation mechanism rather than a closed, institutionalized economic bloc."^ In 
the statement delivered at the leaders meeting, Jiang said nothing about trade 
liberalization or reducing barrier to economic transaction but emphasized the need to 
strengthen cooperative projects to assist the development of the poorer countries. The 
most critical and outspoken opponent was Malaysia, who delivered this opinion at 
the ministerial meeting, "Malaysia was wary and chary about accepting any 
recommendation that would radically change the original mandated form and profile 
of APEC beyond what it was supposed to be."9 Besides, it was an ASEAN consensus 
that the Uruguay Round was the highest important priority.^^ 
Indeed, at Seattle, these APEC members had not prepared to accept a 
greater role of APEC and any progressive programs. They were not given enough 
time to discuss the matter. However, to many people's surprise, one year later, APEC 
members, chaired by Indonesia, endorsed the "historic" free trade proposal that put 
APEC into a new era. 
§ 6.2.1 Open-Regionalism: From PECC to APEC 
Central to APEC-style liberalization is the principle of "open regionalism." 
"Open regionalism" characterizes APEC as a distinctive model of regional 
cooperation. The concept of "open regionalism" did not originate from APEC. It was 
rooted in and facilitated by the PECC movement in the eighties. This concept was 
initially proposed as an "open economic region," and then transmitted to and 
moderately accepted by APEC, due to the close informal linkage between PECC and 
APEC. After years of discussion, PECC elaborated that "Open Regionalism" contains 
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these conditions: 
1. economies must increasingly remove barriers to trade, investment and technology 
flows; 2. GATT disciplines must be applied to trade and investment; 3. The region 
must provide commercial access to economies elsewhere and seek to ensure that these 
economies likewise provide commercial access on a non-discriminatory basis; 4. 
Liberalizing sub-regional trading arrangements within the region must be 
accommodated; and 5. to maintain momentum, the region must actively promote 
policies that strengthen this dynamic process.^ ^ 
Although PECC pioneered the idea of "open regionalism," its non-governmental 
nature hampered it from effectively encouraging the governments in the region to 
realize the concept. Trade liberalization is basically a policy determined by the state. 
Despite discussion on "open regionalism" in PECC for several years, 
APEC did not state clearly what "open regionalism" means, just as the Indonesian 
EPG delegate, Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, pointed out.^^ This ambiguity is especially 
significant when considering how status MFN is granted between members and to 
non-members, and how the pace of liberalization between members is coordinated. 
Despite the lack of specificity, "open regionalism" as a fundamental principle had 
been decided in the ministerial meeting in 1989. The Chairman's statement made it 
clear that "cooperation should be directed at strengthening the open multilateral 
trading system" and "should not involve the formation of a trading bloc."^^ The 
APEC Seoul Declaration soon stipulated that "APEC should serve as an exemplary 
model of open regional cooperation."^^ The objective of APEC would be: first, to 
develop and strengthen the open multilateral trading system in the interest of Asia-
Pacific and all other economies, and; second, to reduce barriers to trade in goods and 
services among participants in a manner consistent with the GATT principles and 
without detriment to other e c o n o m i e s . !， T h u s , "open regionalism" has often been 
operationalized in terms of non-discriminatory trade liberalization. This is that 
hallmark ofAPEC. 
"Open regionalism" has been criticized for being idealistic and impractical. 
The central issue is the "free-rider" problem; non-APEC countries，such as the EU, 
may not act reciprocally if they can just sit and wait for the benefits without any 
limitations. Thus, the United States and Australia proposed the granting of 
"conditional" MFN to non-members. U.S. media predicted that Congress would 
approve any deal only if APEC promised to help the U.S. extract bigger trade 
concessions from other trading partners, notably in Europe.^^ But many of the Asian 
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members disagreed with this opinion. Fearing that they might at the same time be 
subject to the "commercial" interest of the United States and that the relation between 
Asia and Europe would be worsened, Asia countries proposed liberalization should 
be achieved on a "voluntary" and "unilateral" basis without reciprocal negotiation. 
§ 6.3 The Turning Point ofAPEC: the 1994 Bogor Declaration of 
Common Resolve 
The 1994 Informal Meeting of APEC leaders in Bogor seems to be a great 
success. The Bogor Declaration was the first commitment from APEC members to 
carry out trade and investment liberalization through APEC according to a concrete 
goal and time table. The leaders' declaration shocked many observers, because 
several cautious APEC members had raised their oppositions till the ministerial and 
leaders' meetings. After the leaders' summit, most participants, especially the so-
called "activist" members (Australia, the United States, and Singapore), appreciated 
the achievement greatly. Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating called Bogor 
Declaration "an extraordinary new path for the Asia-Pacific region toward 
extraordinary goals" and added that "it [the declaration] is stronger than that made by 
parties to the GATT or G7 countries."^^ U.S. President Clinton considered the 
1 o 
achievement as of "historic importance." In spite of these appraisals, comment from 
Asian participants was diverse and generally conservative. The support from ASEAN 
members varied from one and other. Malaysia was the most critical participant. 
Whist appraising the general aspiration of free trade, Malaysia issued quickly a list of 
reservations to sum up its long-existing stands. It stressed that the deadlines were 
"indicative dates and non-binding on member countries."^^ Thailand also prepared its 
own statement of observations about the Bogor Declaration. Similarly, Chinese 
government also publicized its worry. Chinese President Jiang Zemin argued that 
"the agreement should be implemented in a phased and gradual manner."^^ 
In the making of Bogor agreement, there were two sorts of controversies. 
The first contention was whether APEC should proceed liberalization under a time-
frame. At the outset, Malaysia and China opposed to this suggestion firmly. The 
second contention was whether the developed and developing members should be 
treated differently, with the latter category being given ten more years to liberalize 
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their economies. Altogether, these two controversies reflect the great diversities of 
the region and the North-South concern of the less-developed members. The eventual 
compromise in these two issues was caused by the inevitable condition of 
interdependence led by globalization and the dynamic growth of the region. 
§ 6.3.1 The Second EPG Report 
A starting point to understand the contention in trade liberalization should 
be the Second EPG Report released in August 1994. The main theme of the Second 
EPG Report was that "APEC now adopt a comprehensive program to realize the 
vision of free and open trade in the region,"^^ together with programs of trade 
facilitation and technical cooperation. The second report urged APEC members to 
decide the plan of liberalization immediately in the coming meeting. As far as trade 
liberalization was concerned, it recommended that the leaders and ministers should 
adopt the long-term goal of "free and open trade and investment in the region" at the 
Indonesian Meeting in 1994, implement APEC's program to achieve that goal by the 
year 2000 and complete the process by 2020. Due to the great diversity in terms of 
level of economic development, the report suggested that "the most advanced 
economies in the region, including the United States and Japan, achieve the target in 
10 years; the newly industrialized economies, such as the Republic of Korea in 15 
years, and the region's developing economies by the end of the period."^^ 
Indeed, senior officials had been advising the EPG in producing the report, 
as decided by the ministers at the 1993 Seattle meeting. There were consultations and 
communications between APEC member government and EPG. At the first SOM 
held in Jakarta in February 1994, the senior officials suggested the group take into 
account different paths toward liberalization, the broad impact of the Uruguay Round 
outcome，and issues arising from sub-regional trade agreements?^ Thus, the theme of 
the second EPG report received government inputs and was not really an unexpected 
outcome. 
§ 6.3.2 Reactions and Considerations of Major APEC Players 
Although APEC members rhetorically supported the idea of free-trade, 
their individual interests prompted them to be cautious in this matter. The EPG 
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proposal was therefore debated vigorously among APEC members. If this idea was to 
materialize, a common position had to be cultivated among members. The process of 
fostering such consensus was not smooth since Japan, most ASEAN members 
(except Singapore and Indonesia), and China had varying degree of reservation 
regarding the idea. Their considerations are as follows. 
TndonesiaVs Enthusiastic Response 
As the host who was responsible for arranging the agenda items for the 
1994 meeting, Indonesia's attitude towards the document was most essential. Besides, 
being a leader in ASEAN, its decision was influential to other Asian participants. To 
many people's surprises, the response from Indonesia was indeed very positive and 
supportive. Indonesian State Secretary Murdiono said President Soeharto praised the 
EPG's hard work, and emphasized that Indonesia backed all efforts towards free trade 
in the region?^ Since Indonesia has been one of the most protected economy in the 
region (its average tariff rate is the highest one when compared with other ASEAN 
countries) and was the major proponent of non-alliance movement which promotes 
interest of the South, its sharp change in attitude made many people surprised. As 
commented by a senior Australian official, "Indonesia removed the blockage they put 
on the substance of past APEC meetings; they went from hindering the process to 
pushing it strongly."^^ Both the United States and Australia attributed the success of 
the Indonesian meeting to the leadership of Indonesia, particularly President 
Soeharto's personal stake in pushing the idea of free and open trade. 
What were the causes of Indonesia's change of policy? Some argued that 
Soeharto's support for free trade was related to his eagerness to make the Bogor 
Meeting a real diplomatic success for himself and Indonesia. He wanted to 
demonstrate the leadership of himself and increase the significance of Indonesia. But 
most analyses attributed his policy choice to the economic reality of the region and 
the need of Indonesia to deregulate its economy. For instance, Taizo Watanabe, the 
Japanese ambassador to Indonesia, was of the opinion that "Suharto is interested in 
getting investment that might be going to China or Vietnam He wants to activate 
the economy based on free markets."^^ In fact, Indonesia had been able to sustain an 
impressive economic growth in the eighties, with an average growth rate of about 6 
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per cent a year^^ and a ninefold increment in GDP level when comparing with the 
sixties.28 It had been much more confident than before to give support to trade 
liberalization recommendations. An Indonesian Trade Minister who was responsible 
for APEC meeting indicated that market reform is a necessary policy for Indonesia. 
He pointed out that Indonesia would likely to move faster than its GATT 
9Q 
commitments and would be on the fast track of cutting tariffs among the ASEAN. 
Actually, Indonesian government had already carried out liberalization and 
deregulation programs since 1986. The average tariff rate was decreased, whilst the 
non-tariff barriers were also reduced. This trend can be shown in table 8 and table 9. 
Table 8 ~ Average TariffLevels ofIndonesia After Deregulation (%) 
1986 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Simple Average ^ ^ ^ 20 ^ ^ 
Weighted Average 
-by import 13 14 11 11 11 12 
-by production ]^ l_S H U U 13 
Source: Mari Pangestu, "Indonesia in A Changing World Environment: Multilateralism vs 
Regionalism," The Indonesian Quarterly 23, no.2 (1995): 124. 
Table 9 -- Percentage Coverage of Non-Tariff Barriers in Indonesia 
After Reform Packages in Each Year (%) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Gross Production 4l 3S ^ ^ ^ ^ 22 ^ ~ ~ 
Manufacturing 68 58 45 38 33 32 31 31 
Agriculture 54 53 41 40 38 30 30 30 
Import Value 43 25 21 17 15 13 13 13 
Source: Mari Pangestu, "Indonesia in A Changing World Environment: Multilateralism vs 
Regionalism," The Indonesian Quarterly 23, no.2 (1995): 124. 
Like governments of other developing countries, the Indonesian authority 
also experienced considerable domestic pressure. Opposition from Indonesian society 
was aroused by politicians and business sectors, which feared that the domestic 
industries would not be able to compete with the foreign goods. Some legislators 
were wary of the instability caused by such initiative. In response to these criticisms, 
President Soeharto justified his choice in this way: 
It is normal that some people question whether or not we are capable and ready to tap 
the opportunities (of free trade). The question stems from the cautious attitude which 
we must always retain. But we have to realize that whether we're ready or not, or 
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capable, the free trade system has been chosen by the world. 
Our cautiousness must not degenerate into doubt or apprehension. Our cautiousness 
must be turned into a commitment and resolution to prepare ourselves to face the 
30 
challenge and take advantage of the opportunities offered. 
To meet the challenge of the Bogor liberalization, the Indonesian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (Kadin) called on the government to help the local industries 
to increase their efficiency and capability, to create a more conducive business 
climate through further deregulatory policies, to increase the investment in 
infrastructure, and to prepare a "baseline" program which schedules the reduction of 
o 1 
protection of local manufacturing industry. 
Despite the support for EPG proposal, as a developing country, Indonesia 
placed an even higher priority in development cooperation. According to the 
Coordinating Minister for Industry and Trade of Indonesia, Hartarto, APEC was a 
model for North-South cooperation and therefore Indonesia's agenda in 1994 would 
be to strengthen cooperative programs for human resource development，public and 
commercial infrastructure, development of medium- and small-scale enterprises, and 
business/private sector participation in APEC activities.^^ He emphasized at the 
ministerial meeting that "liberalization of trade and investment supported by 
development cooperation is the efficient way to bring about prosperity in our 
region."33 Actually, Indonesia's support for free trade of a limited scale does not 
mean that it was trying to address the interests of the developed countries. Rather, the 
interests of the developing countries remain to be the top priority of Indonesia's 
policy. After all, the APEC Declaration, which gave more than twenty years to the 
developing countries like Indonesia to carry out the promise, was a political 
commitment only and not binding. The cost and risk were largely reduced. 
Indonesian government might use its support for trade-liberalization proposal to 
show the international community and domestic sectors its determination to liberalize 
its economy and carry out market reforms. 
Australia: the Satisfaction of its Policy Objective 
From the very beginning, Australian Trade Minister Bob Mullan made it 
clear that it strongly supported the opening of trade and investment within region, but 
would not push for measures beyond a regional consensus.^^ The initial response 
from Australian Prime Minister to the deadline proposed by the EPG Report was: 
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"The faster the better.";� According to Australian projections, a free trade area under 
APEC could bring benefits of up to $366 billion annually for its members, and for 
Australia alone it would get a 3.8 per cent growth in output, plus an increase of $7 
billion in annual income，In addition to the commodity goods and raw materials， 
liberalization in services sector also benefits Australia greatly as "service industries 
such as tourism, accounting and computing produce 20% of Australia's total 
nn 
exports." Prime Minister Paul Keating pointed out that: 
With services the fastest growing category of world trade, and with Australia 
producing highly skilled, well-educated workers, we are ideally placed to gain a 
greater share of the expanding services, particularly in the Asian region. 
As the economies of Asia continue their high growth, as APEC continues to grow as a 
force for trade liberalization in the region, we can expect to see many more 
opportunities opening up， 
Apart from this obvious economic self-interest concern, Australian government also 
felt that such trade liberalization would have a positive impact on regional economy 
and the global trading regime. Australian government estimated that the benefits 
from APEC-wide liberalization would be three times the size of the Uruguay Round 
outcome.39 Moreover, Paul Keating expected that APEC could be used to force the 
European Union back into negotiations for freer global trade by "developing the 
modalities for freer trade ourselves [APEC m e m b e r s ] . " * � A n APEC-wide 
liberalization might accordingly have a positive impact on the future development of 
WTO. He specifically mentioned after the Bogor meeting that: 
It [the declaration] establishes an Asia-Pacific Association that makes any fracturing 
of the world into three contending trade groupings less likely. And it offers an 
unprecedented opportunity to maintain dynamic economic growth in Asia and the 
Pacific, while preserving strategic stability.*� 
In a nutshell, Australia considered that the APEC liberalization measure fulfilled its 
policy objective in the bilateral, regional, and multilateral dimensions. What it had to 
be careful was the reactions from other developing APEC members. 
United States: APEC as a Device for Trade T.iheralization 
Position of the United States' was straightforward and simple. Opening 
market for American goods and investment had been an important foreign policy 
objective of Clinton's administration. President Clinton himself repeated in many 
occasions that the U.S. considered APEC as a vehicle for liberalization. After the 
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leaders' adoption of the Bogor Declaration, Clinton explained the interest of the 
United States in this way: "our nation already has the most open markets on earth. By 
opening other markets, our products and services become more competitive, and 
more sales abroad create more high-wage jobs at home."^^ Indeed, just before the 
completion of the 2nd EPG Report, the U.S. Trade Representative had released a 
report about future U.S. priorities for free-trade negotiations which had a relatively 
high expectation on APEC in the expansion of trade and investment. The Report said 
that: 
While members have articulated a vision of 'free trade in the Pacific’ as a long-term 
goal, there is no agreed time frame for achievement of that goal. Nevertheless, 
significant potential exists for APEC members to work together to advance toward 
this objective in the near to medium term.^ ^ 
The United States perceived APEC as a supplement and a regional cornerstone to its 
global and bilateral initiatives in lowering trade barrier. Prior to the ministerial 
meeting, Secretary of State Christopher had indicated that the top priority of the U.S. 
was "to strengthen APEC's mandate to liberalize trade and investment."^^ 
In spite of this general direction, the United States was not really pleased to 
see the two-track approach with which the developing economies be given ten more 
years to liberalize their economies because of domestic pressure. U.S. Trade 
Representative reportedly feared that a specific deadline for the advanced nations 
might hurt chances for congressional approval of the global trade liberalization 
pact.45 But U.S. officials disclosed that they decided to drop the effort after numerous 
APEC countries began proposing significant revisions to Indonesia's proposal.^^ 
These attempts might lead to greater problem for APEC itself and the prospect for 
Uruguay Round GATT agreement. The United States had to be careful about the 
concem or difficulties of the developing countries. It could not push the idea too 
harsh. Actually, the policy objective of the United States was interpreted by several 
developing countries as simply using APEC to exploit the market and economy for 
its own advantage, the so-called "hidden agenda" behind APEC. 
Japan,s Middle Position tn Ralance East-West Tnteresfs 
Japan had a mixed and complicated consideration with respect to trade 
liberalization. On the one hand, Japan's policy was constrained by both of its Asian 
policies and the domestic pressure from several sectors to take a conservative 
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approach. On the other hand, as a G-7 industrialized member and one among the 
three largest economic entities in world, Japan was not in a position normatively to 
oppose free trade. Rhetorically, Japan supported the free-trade scheme of APEC that 
would lead to a favorable environment for its export. Actually, Japan's tariff level had 
already been low among the industrialized countries (its average tariff rate for 
manufactured goods was 1.5% when Japan implemented its agreement signed in 
Uruguay negotiation) so that it had little to lose in the free trade scheme. According 
to Japan's ambassador for APEC, Tetsuya Endo, Japan was eager to see APEC, 
representing half of the world's trade, make this step of liberalization.^^ However, for 
most of the time Japan was not as enthusiastic as the United States and Australia in 
advocating the free-trade scheme. It was even not as enthusiastic as its Asian 
counterparts ~ Indonesia and Singapore -- in promoting the free trade scheme. It 
delivered its support just before the summit after persuasions made by other APEC 
members. Several months before the Indonesian meeting, Japanese officials had 
indicated that most Asian members were not ready to support the liberalization 
proposal and that the immediate objective should be to concentrate on ratifying the 
GATT Uruguay Round result and on creating the new WTO.^^ 
Like its position in other controversies in APEC, Japan tried to mediate the 
differences between the Asian neighbors and the progressive proponents of free trade. 
According to Minister of International Trade and Industry Ryutaro Hashimoto, Japan 
must balance interests of the East and the West. He pointed out that "Tokyo regards 
APEC as a forum to help Asia's economic development while promoting the Japan-
U.S. cooperative relationship."^^ Hence, Japan had long stressed that the poorer 
countries should be helped in the process of liberalization so that their interests were 
not deprived, whilst also supported the liberalization measure to engage the United 
States, Australia and other industrialized members. At the Indonesian ministerial 
meeting, Japanese foreign minister stressed that trade liberalization and facilitation 
and cooperation for regional development were "the two wheels on the same axle."^^ 
Japan held that reduction of economic disparity through development project (track 
two) would further promote trade liberalization and facilitation (track one). For this 
reason, Japan initiated a "Partner for Progress" program to foster cooperation in 
improvement in infrastructure and human resources for development countries.^^ 
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A S E A N ; C a u t i o u g Regpons;eg w i t h o u t C o n $ e n $ q $ 
Except Indonesia and Singapore, the overall reaction from ASEAN to the 
Report was lukewarm and cautious. In an ASEAN economic ministers meeting in 
September 1994, the ministers downgraded the EPG Report as merely a "reference 
S9 
book." Thailand indicated its wary about the "hidden agenda" behind the EPG 
suggestion. Among others, Singapore was the most active supporter for the free trade 
proposal. Indeed, Singapore had done lots of persuasion and spent much diplomatic 
effort to promote the idea. In September 1994, three months before meeting, when 
the free trade scheme was debated seriously, the Prime Minister of Singapore, Goh 
Chok Tong, threw his solid support for the proposal. He expected a "strong 
statement" at the November Summit. "If the meeting declares clearly and 
unambiguously that we should have free trade in the area by a certain date, that will 
CO 
be a measure of success," he argued. According to Goh Chok Tong, 
Singapore had strongly supported this vision [of Suharto] of free trade in the APEC 
area. Asia has to go much further in reducing trade and investment barriers. The 
region's increasing prominence in world trade will not allow such barriers to go 
unnoticed. Lower trade barriers and fewer subsidies for uncompetitive industries are 
in Asia's own economic interest. This will also expand imports from the West, and 
thus help the West to make the economic adjustments necessary to compete in the new 
global marketplace. This will increase the West's stake in Asia, and help to assure 
Asian countries of ready, reciprocal market access in the W e s t , 
Indeed, Singapore would like to see the pace of liberalization being accelerated by 10 
years, ending in 2010. Nevertheless, in response to the inherit sensitivity of the 
matter, the government of Singapore indicated that it would have some elasticity in 
the approach.55 
Malaysia launched its severe objection to the EPG proposal at the very 
outset on the ground that this might violate the nature of APEC as a consultative 
forum. Malaysia wanted that trade liberalization to be achieved through the GATT 
framework rather than APEC and that the focus of APEC should be on trade 
facilitation, technology transfer and human resource management.^^ Besides, on the 
assumption that "no country can be bound by anything that APEC decides", the free 
trade agreement would only be an "academic exercise,"。？ Malaysia's International 
Trade and Industry Minister Rafdah Aziz argued. Hence, Malaysia held this solid 
stand right before the meeting and hoped that the free trade agreement could not be 
achieved. Since APEC operated by consensus, Malaysia argued that "having a 
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timetable is a sure way of not having a consensus in APEC." Malaysia also 
downplayed the contribution of those APEC advisory bodies. It maintained that the 
EPG should be disbanded and that the Pacific Business Fomm, which had suggested 
an earlier date for trade liberalization, "only represented the personal views of 
individuals."59 
Reaction from other ASEAN countries, namely the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Brunei, were also lukewarm. At the 26th ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting 
in September 1994, the delegates responded to the EPG Report by stating only their 
continuing commitment to the GATT's rule and principles of multilateral trade 
liberalization without any substantial reference to APEC-wide liberalization.^^ Rather, 
the top priority for ASEAN was still its own AFTA. Indeed, this ASEAN Economic 
Ministers Meeting showed the difficulty among ASEAN to obtain a common 
position regarding APEC. ASEAN members were divided by the perceptions on 
trade liberalization. 
China; Protecting its Economy & Taking Responsibilities 
China took a flexible, all-rounded position regarding the trade 
liberalization proposal Sometimes its stand was very similar to that of Malaysia, 
whilst at other times it said it fundamentally accepted the free-trade proposal. In two 
to three months before the Indonesian meeting, China's position towards the 
timetable was still that of objection. Chinese official argued that a timetable implied 
binding decision or action, which were inconsistent with the nature of APEC.^^ 
Chinese official reiterated its position in favor of a gradual evolution for the group 
and wamed against impatience.^^ Despite these opposing opinions, China was not as 
strong as Malaysia in resisting the APEC-initiated trade liberalization. According to 
Li Zhongzhou, director-general of the Department of International Trade and 
Economic Relations, if most of the APEC economies would like to have a timetable, 
China might go along with it, on the condition that the timetable should be 
"indicative, flexible and non-binding."^^ China was also caught by a dilemma of 
protecting its local needs and opening its market to meet its international 
responsibilities. 
In the first place, great diversity in terms oflevel of economic development 
was Beijing's major concern. It feared that opening market too fast might harm its 
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economy and only benefit the industrialized members. A senior official from the 
trade ministry explained that APEC could not move too fast or the developing 
countries could not catch up and that these developing economies would be left 
behind the developed countries like the United States, Canada and Australia.^^ Hence, 
"the development of APEC must take into full account the actual conditions of 
economic development of its members and of their diversity, and to respect the 
principle of progressing in an orderly fashion" the Foreign Ministry of China held.^^ 
China's difficulties lie in the transformation of its socialist economy into a more 
efficient one, the heavy reliance on a low productivity agricultural sector, the infant 
manufacturing industries that need protection, and a highly regulated service sector. 
China needed a prudent policy to ensure social and political stability. 
Secondly, strategically speaking, China could not completely rule out the 
possibility of getting in the liberalization train. Its support of trade liberalization was 
a means to assist its application to the WTO. China was well-aware that the long-
term opening of market was an irresistible trend. It was attempting to play the APEC 
card especially to put pressure on the United States with respect to China's MFN 
status and WTO membership. The Director-general of the Department of 
International Trade and Economic Relations stated that "China is basically in favor of 
trade liberalization, but on the condition that we enjoy the same kind of privileges as 
other members of APEC."^^ Specifically, Chinese government dissatisfied with the 
annual review by the United States on China's MFN status and wanted this policy to 
be abandoned. Hence, though declined to make public, Chinese official had indicated 
that "China's acquiescence [of free trade proposal] would be linked with the GATT 
accession and a resolution of the MFN issue."^^ Otherwise, China would lose the full 
benefits as other APEC members enjoyed. Since other APEC members did not want 
APEC to be a bargaining chip of China and became politicized, China's demand was 
not formally taken by APEC meeting. But China could still use its support for APEC-
wide liberalization to show its commitment to global trading regime and 
determination in market reform. 
At the Leaders' meeting, Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared that 
"APEC members should engage in mutual opening without exclusion or 
discrimination" while "narrowing the gaps and achieving common prosperity."^^ 
Such augments are very similar to the position of Japan. He asserted that "different 
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time-tables for trade liberalization should be adopted for APEC members at different 
stages of economic development"^^ since "it is unrealistic and inconsistent with the 
spirit of fair competition to demand that all APEC members bring down their trade 
barriers at the same pace."^^ China knew clearly that the trend of liberalization was 
irreversible. If it wanted to integrate itself with the global economy and participate in 
the WTO, it had to satisfy certain responsibilities as an actor in global economy. At 
present, the domestic conditions and institutions in China are far from reaching the 
standards of international community. Since the liberalization scheme gives China 
more than twenty years to deregulate its economy, China should be able to take this 
opportunity to reform its economy and increase the competitiveness of its industries. 
§ 6.3.3 Implications of the Trade Liberalization Program 
The contention in trade liberalization could be resolved only at a special 
meeting held just before the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting. As Indonesia 
skillfully avoided all the difficult issues, the "APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration 
of Common Resolve" contains only vague political intent. The document describes 
the decision of APEC leaders in these statements: 
With respect to our objective of enhancing trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific, 
we agree to adopt the long-term goal of free and open trade and investment in the 
Asia-Pacific. This goal will be pursued promptly by further reducing barriers to trade 
and investment and by promoting the free flow of goods, services and capital among 
our economies.. . 
We further agree to announce our commitment to complete the achievement of our 
goal of free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific no later than the year 
2020. The pace of implementation will take into account differing levels of economic 
development among APEC economies, with the industrialized economies achieving 
the goal of free and open trade and investment no later than the year 2010 and 
developing economies no later than the year 2020.” 
The document shows that there was a consensus on what was desirable for the region 
and needed to be pursued collectively by APEC members. The meeting determined 
the broad direction while technical matters were left to the ministers and officials to 
resolve. Still, two messages were very clear: first, the liberalization process must be 
GATT-consistent; second, developing economies are given more time to liberalize. 
The fruit of economic liberalization under APEC cannot be seen in just 
several years since it is a long-term process. The Economic Committee of APEC 
estimated in November 1997 that this APEC-initiated liberalization would carry a 
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substantially positive effect on the volume of trade in both APEC region and world. 
The 1997 APEC Economic Outlook examined five possible scenarios of APEC 
liberalization and the consequence of each scenario7^ Its findings are summarized in 
the table 10. 
Table 10 ~ Impact on APEC and Global Trade under 
Alternative Scenarios of Trade Liberalization 
// z / 
Scfenairios Exports Imports 
^ APEC World APEC World 
� ( 1 ) Preferential 19 .7%~~ 9 ^ ^ 2 0 . 0 % ~ ~ 9^5% 
_ . ' : ' � � (517US$ bn) (492US$ bn) (527US$ bn) (496US$ bn) 
' <2) Unconditional MFN- 21.7% 1 1 . 6 % ^ 20.6% ~ 1 1 . 5 % ~ 
based (571US$ bn) (590US$ bn) (542US$ bn) (582US$ bn) 
(3) Conditional (EU 21.8% 13.5% 22.4% K s 
Reciprocating) (574US$ bn) (673US$ bn) (590US$ bn) (678US$ bn) 
(4) Conditional (Rest of ~~~22.0% 14.3% 23.5% 14.4%~~ 
World-Reciprocating) (580US$ bn) (709US$ bn) (619US$ bn) (720US$ bn) 
(5) Global Trade 23.3% ~~21 .6% 24.3% 21.6%~~~ 
Liberalization (613US$ bn) |(1020 US$ bn)[ (639US$ bn) (US$ bn) 
*Changes for exports and imports were evaluated at 1995 market prices. 
Source: APEC, Economic Committee, 1997 APEC Economic Outlook (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 
November 1997). 
From this table, it is very obvious that global trade liberalization will be most 
beneficial to APEC members and other countries in terms of both exports and 
imports. The growth will be smallest if APEC members adopt preferential trade 
liberalization, i.e. by forming a free trade area. The above estimation indicates that if 
the involvement of non-APEC countries increases, the gains for both APEC and non-
APEC countries will also increases. This estimation supported the value of Bogor 
Declaration and called for greater participation from other non-APEC economies. 
Back to research question raised by this thesis, what are the implications 
and meaning of the Bogor Declaration? Obviously, as proposition (1) argues, vast 
economic disparity was the basic obstacle that impeded closer economic cooperation. 
It is this issue that divided the interest of the Pacific countries and the Asian countries 
for its introducing of uneven distribution ofbenefits and the cost ofadjustment bared 
by the developing countries. The market of the developed APEC members had 
already been open to Asian countries. The marginal benefits for the Asia countries in 
capturing the market of these developed APEC members would be small. Conversely, 
the business and market opportunities for developed countries would be increased 
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substantially if developing countries further deregulate their economy. The allocation 
of economic interest would be uneven, and the developing countries were therefore 
cautious towards the proposal. However, trade is a two-way activity and should be 
mutually beneficial. Otherwise, there is no reason for the developed countries to 
provide markets for the developing countries. Developing countries knew that they 
had to provide reciprocally market opportunities for the developed countries. Had 
this not been done, the developed countries would have resorted to protectionism or 
unilateral sanction. This would be a worse-off consequence for both of them. 
The Bogor commitment can illustrate the functions of APEC as a sort of 
weak regime in terms of information and nesting. APEC was able to foster a common 
stand, a regional consensus on global and regional trade liberalization, as proposition 
(2) argues. As far as the function on providing information is concerned, the decision 
to carry out liberalization measure under a time frame was an important step in 
further developing and specifying the rules of cooperation. APEC members were 
assured collectively that trade-liberalization rather than protectionism would be the 
trend of the region. The time-frame, even though non-binding, was a standard of 
behavior ensuring that trade-liberalization would be pursued by Asia-Pacific 
countries. The developed APEC members were assured that their interests in Asia 
were respected by the Asian countries and more market access would be given. On 
the other hand, the developing countries were also given promise that their major 
trading partners would not carry out further protectionist policies. For both of them, 
this result was the most desirable outcome. Through the Bogor initiative, the 
common interests of Asia-Pacific countries could be further emphasized. 
The function of institutional nesting was also evidenced from the trade 
liberalization programs. APEC's liberalization measure had been related to both the 
global institution (WTO) and the sub-regional arrangements (AFTA, ANZCETRA 
and NAFTA). Regarding the relationship between APEC-wide liberalization and 
global regime, APEC-liberalization was a measure that would "encourage and 
strengthen trade and investment liberalization in the world as a while" while at the 
same time be "GATT-consistent."^^ Therefore, APEC was a tool to foster high level 
cooperation. The incentive to liberalize a countries' economy stemmed from its 
commitment in the GATT negotiation. In this way, trade liberalization in the global 
perspective and regional perspective had a reinforcing effect on each other. APEC's 
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principle -- "open regionalism" -- explicitly linked its activity to global trading 
regime. Wisber Loeis, the Indonesian Chair of SOMs, pointed out the contribution of 
APEC as follows: 
. . .APEC supports liberalization under the multilateral framework. APEC has been a 
strong supporter of the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations. The pressure from APEC undoubtedly became one of the most 
significant driving factors that made possible the early conclusion of the Round. 
At the same time APEC also aims to supplement the multilateral trade system, by 
working towards a more liberal regional trade regime and enhanced investment flows. 
This process is expected to benefit not just the APEC members, but the entire global 
economy because APEC members are committed to applying "open regionalism". 
This concept is designed to encourage greater openness throughout the global 
economy as well as in the region.?< 
Moreover, APEC might affect sub-regional agreements since APEC 
members were obliged to make such agreements consistent with APEC and WTO 
requirements. APEC was also a place to provide linkage and communication between 
these agreements. According to Sandra Kristoff, the U.S. ambassador to APEC, 
APEC is an appropriate forum in which to explore links between subregional trade 
arrangements like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement fNAFTA); or 
between either of those two and the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations (CER) treaty7^ 
ASEAN ministers had also agreed to examine possible linkages through, for instance, 
exchange of information, with various regional trade groupings to further enhance 
multilateralism and globalization of trade7^ As such, ASEAN members and 
ANZECER members held their first informal consultations in September 1995. At 
the meeting, the ministers emphasized that both AFTA and CER should reflect the 
concept of "open regionalism" and reinforce the process of liberalization within the 
W T O f r a m e w o r k . 7 7 A P E C could be a venue to minimize the conflicts o f these 
subregional agreements and work towards the realization of open-regionalism. 
Undoubtedly, the nesting of political and economic issue is also relevant 
here. As long as Asian countries considered the continued engagement of the United 
States as a guarantee of regional stability, they had no choice but to provide 
commercial benefits to foster the engagement of the United States. APEC, then, was 
a place to arrange side-payments. To conclude, the presence of institutional nesting 
was related to the bilateral, regional, and multilateral policies adopted by individual 
APEC members. APEC members had to practice consistent policies. 
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§ 6.4 Concluding Remarks 
The year 1993 and 1994 marked the transformation of APEC from a purely 
consultation forum to a practical vehicle capable of defining the long-term goal of the 
region. Trade and investment liberalization became the consensus and convergent 
expectation among APEC members. The Bogor Declaration simply implied that 
some collective action was perceived valuable by the participants and that trade 
liberalization satisfied the interests of individual APEC members and the region as a 
whole. Although the principle of "open regionalism" had already been mentioned in 
the Seoul Declaration in 1991, the progress of realizing the idea was slow due to the 
worry of the developing countries and the sensitivity of the issue. The first and 
second EPG Report were initial impetuses causing APEC to seriously take up the 
issue of trade and investment liberalization. 
The successful making of the Bogor Declaration proved that APEC had 
established a complex and effective web of communication channels linking together 
state officials and private delegates. Governments were indeed ready to listen to 
opinions of others and engage in constructive discussion. The liberalization proposal, 
which was put aside in 1993, was successfully endorsed by members in 1994. Non-
state actors, namely the business people and the academia, played a part in this 
process. The need for trade and investment liberalization was accepted widely in the 
business and academic sector. This could foster market-driven economic integration 
in the Asia-Pacific region. Both the Eminent Persons Group and the Pacific Business 
Forum advocated progressive program of liberalization. Most important, through 
APEC, the participants could be informed of trade and economic policies of other 
members. The setting of a specific date for liberalization decreases the degree of 
information uncertainty. According to a high-ranking U.S. official, "when a target 
date is fixed, businesses and governments make anticipatory decision on investment 
and trade, and the pace quickens."^^ 
Even as a weak regime, APEC was able to reinforce the principle and 
norms of open regionalism that contributed to global trading regime and regional 
economic development. According to Vinod Aggarwal, norms ofAPEC and/or "open 
regionalism" were inclusive MFN, strong liberalism, diffuse reciprocity, safeguards 
(and economic development), and adapted multilateralism7^ These norms could be 
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inferred from the two EPG Reports and the Bogor Declaration. These norms told 
APEC members what they ought to do to realize the fundamental objective of APEC 
and hence could provide information on collective behaviour. The principle of "open 
regionalism" directly integrates APEC with the global regime. Moreover, as long as 
APEC members committed to such principle, further protectionist tendency could be 
reduced. Both AFTA and NAFTA declared openly that they were outward- rather 
inward-oriented. If individual members had proclaimed their support for free and 
open trade in both the global and regional dimensions, they could practice policies 
that contradict with each other. Global, regional, and bilateral policies were 
complacent to each other. Singapore characterized such multilayered cooperation as 
"concentric and overlapping circles of linkages."^^ This nesting of cooperation was 
where the promise or strength of APEC lay. 
As a whole, APEC ensured that its members would not form a close bloc 
by themselves. APEC members would carry out long-term liberalization, preventing 
the destructive fragmentation of world economy into three blocs P^orth America, 
Europe, and East Asia). APEC strengthened its members' commitment to global 
liberalization. At the informal leaders' meeting in 1994, APEC leaders decided to 
"accelerate the implementation of their Uruguay Round commitments and to 
undertake work aimed at deepening and broadening the outcome of the Uruguay 
81 
Round." The Bogor Declaration gave more specific rules in defining the 
relationships between APEC member themselves and between regionalism and 
globalism. The principle of "open regionalism" required that sub-regional groupings 
should be building-blocks rather than stumbling-blocks of global trading regime. 
To conclude, APEC became another device in addition to global trading 
regime and subregional agreement to promote trade liberalization. APEC reinforced 
the process of liberalization and deregulation that had been practiced by many Asian 
countries. 
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Chapter VII 
Politics ofTrade Liberalization: Implementation 
§ 7.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies the contentions in transforming the vision of trade and 
investment liberalization into real actions. Altogether, the three years from 1993 to 
1995 signified a significant period in the development of APEC. In 1993, leaders 
decided the long-term vision of free and open trade in the region. In 1994, based 
upon the vision previously established, a time-frame for the action was produced. In 
1995, plans and details for attaining the goal were produced. Hence, these successive 
three years represented a transformation from vision to action, tuming APEC from "a 
loose, consultative dialogue forum into a true vehicle for regional cooperation, 
regional trade liberalization."^ The APEC Meeting in Osaka marked the beginning of 
the first year in deciding the details and concrete plans for trade liberalization, 
facilitation, and development cooperation. As APEC began to touch upon some 
practical aspects, APEC members were even more insistent than before in their 
stands. Agreeing on broad principle is much easier than agreeing on specific plans. 
In fact, right from the very beginning, some APEC participants, such as the 
United States, had already been skeptical on the determination and leadership of 
Japan. These countries worried that the pace of trade liberalization might be slowed 
down by Japan's equivocal policy, which aims at emphasizing the developmental 
aspect of APEC and the interests of Asian countries. Their worry was based on two 
reasons. First, Japan had itself been a protected and considerably regulated economy 
and had not been a leader of trade liberalization. Second, Japanese bureaucrats were 
hesitant to any progressive move and preferred a cautious approach. An additional 
unfavorable factor was the weak, coalition government of Japan at the moment. The 
then Japanese government was handicapped to implement liberalization and 
deregulation programs that might affect entrenched social interests. 
Japan stressed that APEC was to help the developing countries. It hoped to 
direct the attention of APEC to trade facilitation and technical cooperation. Its 
proposal for "Partner for Progress" was a reflection on this thinking. However, at the 
first SOM in Fukuoka in February 1995, industrialized APEC members did not really 
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appreciate the Japanese initiative. They feared that it would divert the effort in 
liberalization? Some participants were concerned also that Japan was trying to take 
leadership in the APEC region through economic assistance. On the other hand, 
Japan had lately been identified itself more with voices of Asian countries. Hence, as 
pointed out by a foreign ministry official, "Japan's strategy is to pushjust little ahead 
of the consensus between the cautious Asians and liberalizing non-Asians, so that the 
Asian developing countries would not be upset."; Japan attempted to balance the 
interest of the East and the West. 
The main theme of the Action Agenda was to specify the mid- and long-
term framework for liberalization in the next 25 years. It contained several elements. 
First of all, the Action Agenda stipulated the principles that will guide APEC toward 
free trade and investment. Secondly, it identified specific issues and sectors for 
liberalization, such as tariffs, government procurement and services. Thirdly, it lay 
down, procedurally, how liberalization was to be achieved. The options include 
individual action plan, collective action, multilateral institution (i.e. the WTO), and 
the flexible consensus approach. Fourthly, the Action Agenda delineated how another 
pillar of APEC - economic and technical cooperation ~ could be promoted. 
Obviously, as a blueprint for implementation, compared to the previous APEC 
documents, the Action Agenda was more complex and detailed. It was able to supply 
more information to participants about what they would have to do. Nevertheless, 
when compared to other highly institutionalized form of cooperation, the Osaka 
Action Agenda contained many loopholes and unclear statements. 
To complete the challenging task of drafting the Action Agenda, Japan 
hosted six SOMs.^ At the first SOM held in February 1995, it was known at this 
meeting that a free-trade area approach was not favored by most participants. After 
the second SOM in which Japan presented the procedure of drafting the action 
agenda, Japan delivered its preliminary version of the draft action agenda in the July 
SOM in Sapporo. Several countries (Australia, the United States, and Singapore) 
were known to be dissatisfied with the slow progress and conservative attitude of 
Japan in this process. Since then, APEC members were involved in the severe 
contention in the substance of the Action Agenda. Participants could not resolve their 
differences at the remaining SOMs and required their ministers to settle down the 
remaining issues. 
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During the drafting of the Action Agenda, difficulties were found to exist 
in the first part of the document, namely the general principles. Among them, the 
guiding principle of "non-discrimination", "comprehensiveness" and "comparability" 
were the three contentious issues that this chapter examines. This chapter looks at 
why APEC members disagreed on these issues and how a compromise was finally 
obtained finally. As the proposition (1) assumes, APEC members were able to reach 
a compromise. The present compromise is one merging the acceptance of 
"liberalism" and the consideration of developing countries' capabilities. Section 7.2 
discusses the alternatives of non-discriminatory trade liberalization versus against the 
conditional granting of Most-Favoured Nation status. Section 7.3 analyses the 
difficulties in the requirement of "comprehensiveness," the most critical dispute that 
could derail the whole APEC process. Section 7.4 is about the stipulation in 
"comparability" ~ the balance between unilateral and collective action. Section 7.5 is 
the concluding remarks. 
§ 7.2 Non-discrimination 
Non-discrimination, representing "normal trade relation," means treating 
others equally, and the principle of most-favored nation (MFN) is so important that it 
appears at the first article of the GATT. "MFN treatment refers to the practice where 
a country treats imports from a trading partner in a way which is as favourable as that 
given to its most favoured trading partner."^ Trading partner without MFN is subject 
to higher tariffs. Still, the GATT parties or WTO members are allowed to proceed in 
a GATT/WTO-consistent "preferential" liberalization under certain condition 
(stipulated in Article 24 of the GATT), such as a free trade area or a custom union. 
Reciprocity^ means either the APEC members or non-members can obtain benefits of 
liberalization (be granted MFN status) only if they do it likewise. "Specific 
reciprocity" is a basic element of conditional MFN and preferential agreement. 
Although it seems that the embracing of reciprocity into the liberalization process is 
very reasonable for effectiveness and faimess, APEC had problems to follow this 
approach because the weaker members did not want to be subject to further pressure 
and control from the developed and stronger economies. 
In practice, there are several alternatives to proceed trade liberalization. 
The 1994 EPG Report recommended a "nonmutually exclusive four-part formula"^ to 
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realize open regionalism, but left to the individual economies to decide how to 
choose between options. In the context of APEC, according to a senior US official, 
the issue of non-discrimination regarded two dimensions. The first dimension was 
about granting MFN status to APEC members, whereas the second dimension was 
whether non-APEC members could enjoy benefit of APEC liberalization and the 
• • 0 • _ • 
condition to do so. There were widely divergent opinions among members of APEC. 
Among others, the United States and China were the sources of contention in 
granting MFN status among APEC members, whereas most Asian countries held that 
non-APEC members should enjoy benefits like APEC members. 
Australia did not take an inflexible stand in this issue and it could take 
either the MFN approach or the preferential approach to satisfy its national interests. 
Apparently, like most other Asian countries, it officially advocated a non-
discriminatory trade liberalization. In this way, no tough and difficult negotiation 
process was needed. Nevertheless, if such MFN approach did not work, Australia 
would take a harder stand. In an Australian government trade policy document 
entitled "Winning Markets: The Next Steps," it was stated that "Australia's first 
preference is to pursue trade liberalization on an unconditional MFN basis."^ 
Nevertheless, it did not rule out the possibility for a preferential option. It mentioned 
that "Australia may also be able to secure better and speedier market access from a 
preferential regional agreement."'^ From the Australian perspective, the most 
essential thing was to break down trade barrier and contribute positively to an open 
trading system, rather than discrimination against non-member. Despite the possible 
option of a preferential approach, the trade policy document stipulated two 
"minimum" principles to be maintained: first, no increased tariffs to outsiders as that 
o fEU and NAFTA; second, comprehensive liberalization in all sectors. At the Osaka 
meeting, Australia did not actively press the issue of MFN approach to avoid being 
locked itself into any "inflexible" positions. It simply let the controversy be resolved 
by other actors through extensive consultations. 
In contrast, the United States was much more assertive than Australia in 
demanding reciprocity and conditional trade liberalization. A preferential approach to 
achieve APEC liberalization was acceptable to the United States though it declined to 
endorse it formally. The United States did not believe in unilateral trade liberalization 
since it did not tolerate "free-riders," especially the European Union, who might not 
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liberalize its market otherwise but could enjoy the benefits automatically. However, 
most Asian countries did not want APEC to be a bargaining chip of the United States. 
Admitting that this issue was unlikely to be settled down immediately, the United 
States held that the MFN principle must be applied within APEC members, though it 
reserved the rights as required by domestic legislation to review the MFN status for 
China. Officially and diplomatically, the position of the United States seemed to be 
open. But implicitly it used a rigorous and legalistic approach. U.S. officials were 
glad to see an "APEC-round" negotiation: 
It [how to treat non-members] is an issue that I think is premature for APEC, but one 
that we are going to have to face sometime in the future. . . At some point in the future 
we'll have to decide whether we want to fold this liberalization into another 
multilateral round or whether we are interested in going down the line of a customs 
union.ii 
According to a Japanese Foreign Ministry official, "it seems the U.S. is seriously 
thinking that APEC should form a free-trade area over the long term."^^ 
Most APEC members, including Japan, were willing to proceed 
liberalization in an unconditional MFN manner among members and to non-APEC 
members. They were particularly sensitive to any suggestion that might resemble a 
free trade area. Japanese officials explained that doing otherwise would be 
"inconsistent with the World Trade Organization's most-favored-nation (MFN) 
13 
rule." According to Yamamoto and Kikuchi, "there have been few in Japan who 
have supported the argument that discriminatory regional liberalization measures be 
used as bargaining instruments to put pressure on other regional arrangements to take 
more outward-oriented position."^^ Arguments from Japanese representative at SOM 
confirmed their observation. Hidehiro Konno, Japan's SOM member, had argued that 
"the American proposal, which he sees as based upon the Reciprocal Trade Act of 
1934, is outdated and unsuitable for the current environment, in which advanced 
nations have reduced their tarifflevels to insignificant amounts."^^ 
Most ASEAN nations did not agree with the U.S. proposal for conditional 
MFN or a Pacific Free Trade Area. Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, the Indonesian EPG 
member, attributed the unfeasibility to the harmful consequences to the multilateral 
trading regime by stimulating protective posture and economic confrontation among 
rival blocs.i6 He elaborated that a conditional approach would be inconsistent with 
Indonesia's non-alignment position. Likewise, Malaysian Prime Minister had 
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mentioned many times the objection of creating a trade bloc. The position of other 
ASEAN members was basically similar, except Singapore, who carried an attitude 
similar to the United States. Singapore's Prime Minister argued that APEC 
liberalization should be extended to non-members only on a reciprocal basis, 
although i t also supported unilateral l i b e r a l i z a t i o n 」 ？ Singapore expressed its interest 
in joining an extension of NAFTA, implying that it did not object to a region-wide 
preferential agreement. Singapore thought the pace of liberalization was more 
e s s e n t i a l . i 8 
Among others, it was known that it was China who fought hardly with the 
United States on the issue of non-discrimination and unconditional MFN status. U.S. 
government could not give permanent unconditional MFN to China for two reasons: 
first, requirement stipulated by U.S. legislation; second, negotiation for China's 
accession to WTO. From the U.S. perspective, non-discrimination in APEC would be 
"sending a signal to China . . . that they need not undertake those commitments in a 
binding way in the WTO because they're going to get them for free in APEC."^^ On 
the other hand, China's strategy of using APEC to press the United States to stop its 
annual review on China's MFN status could be traced back as early as 1993. However, 
at that moment, APEC was not willing to take up the issue because most members 
did not want to be locked up by extensive controversial and political issue. Thus, 
Beijing's tactic was unsuccessful. From the outset, Beijing believed all countries in 
the region should give each other unconditional and long-term MFN status.^^ At the 
informal leaders' meeting in Osaka, Chinese President Jiang Zemin mentioned that 
"mutual opening and non-discrimination are internationally recognized norms for 
conducting international economic relations. APEC members should therefore take 
actions to remove their discriminatory trade policies."^^ 
Eventually, the Osaka Action Agenda adopted the principle of non-
discrimination. It stipulated that: 
APEC economies will apply or endeavor to apply the principle of non-discrimination 
between and among them in the process of liberalization and facilitation of trade and 
investment. 
The outcome of trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region will be 
the actual reduction of barriers not only among APEC economies but also between 
APEC economies and non-APEC economies.�� 
Indeed, the ministers could not solve all the ambiguity involved. This statement just 
reiterated the general position of Seoul Declaration and lacked specific prescription 
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on the path to achieve the goal. Indeed, it postponed the controversy to subsequent 
APEC meetings. The clause "endeavor to apply" was specifically directed to address 
the dispute between the United States and China. China was particularly dissatisfied 
with the result, saying that "endeavor" means the issue was not really resolved. In an 
interview after the Osaka Meeting, Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen indirectly 
expressed its dissatisfaction with the United States: "If a member cannot temporarily 
fulfill this requirement because of domestic reasons, it should at least promise to 
make efforts in this regard."^^ 
To conclude, this controversy regards the eligibility for enjoying benefit of 
trade liberalization. The developed countries, especially the United States, asserted 
that the granting of MFN would not be automatic and that some kind of negotiation 
would have to be commenced. Meanwhile, the developing countries held that as long 
as they decided to lower market barrier it was unnecessary to differentiate between 
APEC members and non-APEC members. The developing nations did not want to 
use the conditional trade liberalization because they were worried about the 
negotiation cost and the possibility of being controlled by the advanced countries 
who had more resources and bargaining power. 
The resulting statement indicates the characteristics of APEC as a "weak" 
regime. It did not have a strict requirement on the members since the lack of element 
of reciprocity means that the constraint on members is minimal. Nevertheless, as a 
sort of information and a standard of behaviour, this principle specified clearly the 
desirable or appropriate relationship among APEC members and between APEC and 
non-APEC members. Though with dissatisfaction, the developed countries had to 
accept this reality if they wanted the APEC process continued. The Australian Bureau 
of Industry Economics justified the advantage of unilateral non-discriminatory 
liberalization on the ground that the reduction in trade barrier would lower the overall 
cost imposed and increase the efficiency of a countries' economy; the problem of 
free-rider is really irrelevant.^^ This approach based on "open regionalism" simply 
challenges the existing common approach based on discriminatory trade barrier 
reduction. 
However, in terms of institutional nesting, the implication ofthis statement 
is very positive in the sense that APEC-initiated liberalization must strengthen global 
institution. This regional arrangement is certainly "nested" under the global trading 
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regime; the rule of "non-discrimination" ensures that APEC must conform to WTO 
requirement. This generous, friendly approach would not invite protectionist 
responses from other trading entities. The Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore 
explained the value and direction of APEC as follows: 
. . . t h e aim is to strengthen the region's influence on the global economy, not to tum it 
into a closed bloc. We want to strengthen ties with the other major economic groups, 
especially the EU. We do not want to exclude them from our region, and risk splitting 
the world trading system into two or three trading blocs at odds with one another.^^ 
This consequence of "open regionalism" would contribute to the smooth functioning 
of global trading regime, benefiting all Asia-Pacific countries. 
§ 7.3 Comprehensiveness 
The 1994 Bogor Declaration said nothing on what should be included in 
the course of APEC liberalization scheme. Although Australia and the United States 
maintained strongly that no exception should be allowed as the Bogor document 
clearly implied, several Asian economies did not think likewise. As a matter of fact, 
the issue of "comprehensiveness" was the most controversial item in the Osaka year. 
This critical contention could derail the Action Agenda totally. This issue regarded 
the scope of liberalization, i.e. whether some parts of the economies would not be 
subject to the APEC program of trade liberalization. This was an important issue 
because of the low competitiveness of the developing countries in certain sectors and 
the difference in comparative advantage between the developed and the developing 
countries. Substantively, the major point of conflict was on agriculture, which 
affected the benefits of major exporters of farming products, namely the United 
States and Australia, and the well-beings of farmers, and the relating political 
stability, of several importing economies such as Japan, China, Korea, and Taiwan. 
Actually, Japan and Korea asked for exemption on agriculture in the 1994 Bogor 
Declaration but Indonesia rejected their proposal. Apart from agriculture, the 
financial and service sectors of these East Asian countries were considerably 
protected or regulated. 
As proposition (1) argues, the root of this contention lay in the difference 
in economic structure between APEC economies. This concerned the relative share 
of the agricultural sector, industrial sector, and the service sector in an APEC 
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member's economy. Developing economies were characterized by relatively heavier 
weight in agriculture. However, the productivity in agriculture of these countries was 
often lower than that of the mature economies such as Australia and the United States, 
who were nevertheless characterized by a small share of agriculture in the total 
production. The brief composition of GDP in APEC economies is shown in table 11. 
As indicated by these figures, when a country developed, it experienced a shift from 
agriculture to manufacturing and subsequently to services.^^ Despite this 
development, its agricultural sector was still directly related to the livings of many 
peasants. Any instability in this respect might lead to social and political instabilities. 
Table 11 -- Composition o fGDP in APEC Economies 
Agriculture Industry Services 
1984 1994 1984 1994 1984 1994 % % % % % % 
Developing 
Chile 9 8 37 36 54 56 
China 31 19 42 55 27 26 
Indonesia 22 17 38 42 40 41 
Malaysia 20 15 38 46 42 39 
Mexico 8 7 31 33 61 60 
Papua New Guinea 36 30 27 40 37 31 
Philippines 27 22 34 34 39 44 
Thailand 28 17 32 36 40 47 
Newly 
Industrialized 
Hong Kong 1 0 32 17 67 83 
South Korea 13 7 42 43 45 50 
Singapore 1 0 40 36 60 64 
Taiwan 6 3 46 39 48 58 
Mature 
Australia 5 4 32 30 63 66 
Canada 3 2 35 33 62 64 
Japan 3 2 41 42 56 56 
New Zealand 10 9 33 27 58 65 
United States 2 2 ^ ^ ^ 73 
Source: Australia, Bureau ofIndustry Economics, Potential Gains to Australia from APEC: Open 
Regionalism and the Bogor Declaration (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1995), 8. 
Therefore, right from the beginning, Japan was under pressure from both 
its domestic pressure groups and neighboring Asian countries (such as China, Taiwan, 
South Korea, and to a lesser extent the Philippines) to take a softer stand in working 
toward the principle of comprehensive coverage. Whilst openly, Japan declined to 
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admit its urge for agricultural exception, it had from the very beginning been 
consistently seeking "special treatment" for certain sectors. This is an indirect way of 
attaining similar objective of "exception". When the pressure from Australia, the 
United States, and other liberalizing economies gradually increased and the prospect 
for a compromise was not optimistic, Japan adjusted its stand to argue for 
"flexibility" instead of "exception" or "special treatment." A failure in rounding up 
the Action Agenda would seriously damage the reputation of Japan, its relations with 
the United States and Australia, and its endeavor to be a leader in either the global or 
regional context. Officially, Japan's justification for its policy choice is as follows: 
Japan is not opposed to the comprehensive coverage of sectors in liberalization. 
However, with regard to the liberalization of certain sectors, such as Japan's 
agriculture, in which members may experience difficulties, we believe that it is 
important that a realistic and flexible approach be available.^^ 
Prevailing analysis attributes Japan's problem to the immense influence of 
farmers in the Japanese political system, although rice production only amounts to 
3% of GDP and farmers account for less than 10% of the total active population?^ 
Japan maintains restrictions and high tariffs on many agricultural products, and the 
production of rice is considered a "sanctuary" by a majority of the people?^ The 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of the ruling coalition had a deep connection with 
farmers and felt that they would lose vote if agreed to open rice market. For example, 
Koji Futada, chief of the agriculture and forestry section of the LDP's Policy Affairs 
Research Council, opposed to any concession in agricultural sector. He maintained 
that "APEC has no mandate to go beyond agreements in the Uruguay Round ofworld 
trade negotiations."^^ Conservative politicians and some bureaucrats thought that 
Japan should only declare its policy of supporting free and open trade rhetorically 
without substantive action or reform,! 
At the beginning, China backed Japan strongly to seek for exception or 
special treatment. Afterwards, it adjusted its position to urge for flexibility. From the 
Chinese perspective, "flexibility" is a necessary precondition for "comprehensive-
ness." According to China's ambassador to APEC, Wang Yusheng, "APEC's most 
important characteristic is its great diversity, different levels of development. It is 
most important to take into account of the great diversity."^^ He made it clear that 
China, being a developing country, had sensitive sector, including agriculture, that 
needed protection. At the ministerial meeting, Chinese Vice-premier and Foreign 
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Minister Qian Qichen specifically proclaimed that: 
Ifwe only care about speeding up trade and investment liberalization, but ignoring the 
actual conditions of various members and allowing them no necessary flexibility, it 
may result in economic crisis in a member or a region and finally do harm to the entire 
economic cooperation mechanism. This is no imagination. It was actually in the past.^ ^ 
Except Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea, other Asian members, 
including ASEAN, basically supported the idea of "comprehensiveness," though with 
varying degree. For instance, President Suharto's special assistant to APEC argued 
that different treatments for sensitive sectors would undermine the Bogor Declaration. 
He elaborated that "if several countries want to exempt certain sectors from the 
agenda, others will want to do the same • . . In the end, all we will have is an empty 
basket."34 Since Bogor Declaration was a great success of Indonesia, it had to try its 
best to ensure that its past endeavor would be in train. President Suharto had 
expressed his concern over the slow progress in preparing the action plan and the 
hesitation of Japanese govemment.^^ Indonesia's newly established reputation as 
supporter of trade liberalization had to be maintained. Besides, according to an 
APEC official, "agriculture protection is the least of Indonesia's worry because the 
government subsidy in this sector has been enjoyed by consumers rather than farmers, 
unlike in Japan and South Korea where farmers are politically powerful."^^ Singapore 
was also in line with the United States and Australia. Malaysia was, among ASEAN 
countries, least supportive of the principle although it did not stand with the opponent 
camp to fight for agricultural exemption that did not pose any immediate problem. 
The reaction from Australia and the United States to Japan's decision and 
other Asian countries' hesitation in this matter were vigorous. Australia had 
threatened to withdraw from the fomm if agriculture could be excluded.^^ They 
insisted that allowing exception or special treatment would mean a complete failure 
of the liberalization scheme. Both of them tried hard to press Japan to be bold and 
determined in exercising the necessary leadership on the matter. Australia placed the 
sustenance of "comprehensiveness" as the top priority of policy objectives in the 
Osaka Meeting. Australia's Trade Minister Bob McMullan justified their upholding 
of this principle as follows: "the inevitable result of one APEC member seeking an 
exception for a sensitive sector would be that the rest o f u s would be tempted to take 
out sensitive sectors off the table. If this occurs the APEC commitment to free trade 
and investment would be reduced in its effectiveness for all of us."^^ Officially, 
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Australia declared that it did not accept any "weasel" words, such as "differential 
treatment" or "divergent conditions," that diluted the strength of the principle of 
"comprehensiveness". Undoubtedly, Australia's tough stand stemmed from its 
commercial interest. Trade Minister McMullan pointed out that this principle was of 
critical commercial interest to the Australian agricultural industry.^^ In accordance to 
an estimation by the Australian government, Australia's rural exports, where its 
'strong' comparative advantage lies, would jump by up to 45 percent a year by 2020 
under APEC's free trade program.^^ Nevertheless, Australia finally softened its stand 
eventually, and reluctantly endorsed the "flexibility" principle. 
The United States dissatisfied with Japan's position and leadership on this 
issue. It had tried hard to press the matter forward to be in line with its vision. It had 
already launched criticisms for many times. For instance, U.S. officials had been 
complaining the unclear attitude and working style of the Japanese side. A senior U.S. 
official thought that although the Japanese officials were saying that exception or 
special treatment was not what they were seeking, they had not been able to define 
exactly what they were seeking. Hence, Japan's position, the U.S. official asserted, 
was "extraordinarily" confusing to anyone.^^ The United States' objection was based 
on its interpretation of the Bogor Declaration. Assistant U.S. Trade representative, 
Nancy Adams, maintained that "the leaders said free and open trade and investment 
by 2010 and 2020 . . . and didn't say free and open except in this area or that area and 
they suggested that we deal with sensitivities through phasing within the 2010 and 
2020 dates."42 Expectation and requirement from the U.S. administration was high in 
this issue. The U.S. administration demanded that not only agriculture must be 
included but also that services and finance sectors were to be included. Measures to 
clear non-tariffbarrier had to be derived. At the Osaka Ministerial Meeting, the U.S. 
Secretary of State insisted that comprehensiveness was the key to a successful 
implementation ofBogor Commitment. He stated that: 
We must maintain our leaders' commitment to liberalize all sectors of our economies 
by the 2010/2020 deadline. The growing integration of our economies means that 
when one member protects even one sector, many members suffer lost economic 
opportunities as a result. 
Given the diversity ofour economies, it is appropriate that we have some flexibility in 
the pace and sequencing of our actions. We will liberalize gradually because the 
Bogor Declaration gives us time to adjust before open trade is fully realized. But we 
must include all sectors in the Osaka Action Agenda. Failure to do so would 
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unraveling the core of our Bogor commitment and undermining APEC's credibility 
and influence as a force for global liberalization.^^ 
Eventually, this controversy was resolved at the special ministerial meeting. 
The Action Agenda contained simultaneously the principle of "comprehensiveness" 
and "flexibility" as a compromise among actors. The Action Agenda said that: 
Comprehensiveness: The APEC liberalization and facilitation process will be 
comprehensive, addressing all impediments to achieving the long-term goal of free 
and open trade and investment. 
Flexibility: Considering the different levels of economic development among the 
APEC economies and the diverse circumstances in each economy, flexibility will be 
available in dealing with issues arising from such circumstances in the liberalization 
and facilitation process. 
Information sources reported that Australia and the United States accepted this 
arrangement eventually because no particular wording was explicitly about different 
or special treatment of sensitive sector.^^ Australian Trade Minister's statement after 
the summit confirmed this report; "it was absolutely crucial, obviously, to have no 
direct language excluding agriculture, or any indirect language which would lend 
itself to that interpretation. That result has been achieved."^^ It seemed clear that the 
Action Agenda could not provide a satisfactory solution to the controversy among 
APEC members or in no way change members' basic thinking. Japan skipped the 
difficult task of defining the meaning of "flexibility" to obtain compromise, claiming 
that otherwise it would cause a lot of problems. Hence, how the conflict between 
these two principles would be reconciled was still unclear. Nevertheless, Japan could 
still claim that it had successfully accomplished its responsibilities. 
§ 7.4 Comparability 
The controversy in "comparability" is about the relative amount or pace 
undertaken by each APEC members when implementing the liberalization process. 
This ultimately concerns the power rested in APEC and the obligations of individual 
actors. The Bogor Declaration did not specify clearly the approach in which the goal 
of "free trade and investment in the region" would be achieved. Since APEC was 
originally articulated as an organization based on "non-binding" commitment and 
"voluntary" participation, how to achieve the objective while allowing each 
participant its maximum autonomy was a problem at stake. For one thing, if each 
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member was allowed to proceed at its own pace, then it would be meaningless for 
APEC members to gather together and work out an action plan. It seems unlikely that 
unilateral liberalization per se could be an effective means to achieve the Bogor 
vision. For another thing, most Asian economies did not want to be constrained too 
much by APEC decisions because they were feared of the "big brothers". 
In APEC, two types of approach - "individual action" and "collective 
action" - cound be distinguished in attaining the objective of trade and investment 
liberalization plus facilitation. The principle of "comparability" was an issue because 
it would ensure that the "individual action" performed by individual member was 
"comparable" to others. It required that APEC members aim at the same goal with 
similar pace or quality of programs. In other words, "comparability" was a constraint 
in a self-enforcing sense on APEC members' unilateral actions. The United States 
and Australia held strongly that this principle had to be included, "insisting on a 
fairly rigid definition of reciprocity and a heavy emphasis on collective action."^^ 
They considered this principle essential to achieve APEC's unique approach in trade 
and investment liberalization. The arguments for and against this principle were, to a 
certain extent, a matter of North-South concern. Developing countries insisted that 
they were not in a position to proceed at the same pace as their developed 
counterparts, whilst the developed economies thought that they should receive 
reciprocal, comparable benefits from the developing countries. However, the 
developing countries had been extremely alerting to the element of "reciprocity." 
The controversy of "comparability" had two related levels. First of all, 
APEC members had to decide whether this principle was desirable. Secondly, if 
APEC members wanted this principle, then they had to design the relating processes 
or method offormulating and reviewing the individual action plans. Since this would 
inevitably imply a move to increase the functions or responsibilities of the forum and 
to further institutionalize it, Asian members were wary about this. They claimed that 
APEC was not for negotiation and the structure should be kept as loose as possible. 
Australia, the United States and Singapore held firmly that the principle of 
"comparability" must be included. Australia's Trade Minister Bob McMullan 
elaborated the position of Australia as follows: 
The principle of comparability is also fundamental. . . I understand that there is 
sensitivity amongst some members about this issue. But comparability is important if 
APEC members, in taking the sometimes difficult decisions involved in ftirther 
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opening their economies, are to feel confident that we will all be making a major 
contribution to the process. Within the domestic political process of each APEC 
member, we all need to be able to demonstrate to our critics that others are in fact 
pulling their weight that we are not giving away concessions for nothing or for too 
little in retum/^ 
Besides, through the consultation and monitoring process, APEC members would be 
better informed of what others were doing. The robust economic growth of Asian 
countries, together with the economic recession of the developed countries, made the 
industrialized members aggressive in grabbing economic benefits from the 
developing countries. They did not tolerate free-riders as they did in the past. 
Later, in addressing the critics from other cautious Asian members, 
Australia claimed that it was seeking something in between the extremes. Australia 
envisaged that such compromise or middle position could be achieved in two ways: 
"first, APEC members will be guided by specific guidelines as they draw up their 
individual plans in each of the main areas; second, during the preparation of the plans 
and following their submission, extensive consultations will need to take place 
among members to balance and improve their plans."^^ 
The position and thinking of the United States were basically similar to 
Australia. Assistant Trade Representative Nancy Adams wamed that unless 
"comparability" was included, APEC would lose credibility with both the business 
community and the legislatures.^^ At the Osaka Ministerial meeting, U.S. Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher claimed that "comparability" was one of the three 
guiding concepts that made liberalization under Action Agenda successful because 
the existence of comparable outcome or benefits would encourage all APEC 
members to take difficult steps.^^ Regarding the procedures ensuring "comparability," 
the Clinton administration expected some guidelines to prescribe the process in terms 
of substance and pace, a consultation process to access each economy's individual 
proposal, and a system of assessment during implementation.^^ To ensure that free-
riders would not appear and to uphold the efficiency of the overall process of trade 
and investment liberalization and facilitation, the United States preferred the 
collective approach to the concerted unilateral approach. 
Japan and most other Asian members preferred a looser approach. Japan's 
support of comparability was based on the assumption that the purpose of APEC is 
"to strengthen the momentum for voluntary liberalization in the region."^^ Hence, 
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APEC's programs should be implemented not by "an excessively negotiation-like 
f r a m e w o r k . , , 5 3 Rather, "shared responsibility" and "mutual trust"^^ were said to be the 
underpinning or promise of "comparability." These reflected the peculiar way of 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific context. Hence, Japan proposed the idea of 
"concerted unilateral action" (CUA) as the mechanism to implement APEC programs, 
saying that it was an "APEC way of pursuing consensus."^^ As its name implied, 
CUA emphasized the "unilateralism" or "voluntarism" ofindividual APEC members, 
though their actions were "concerted" by some APEC guidance. Australia and the 
United States did not prefer this approach and wanted to give more weight to the 
collective approach, one that centralized liberalization through the establishment of 
guidelines and an extensive consultation process. 
China disagreed with the proponents of "comparability" principle and 
collective approach, most notably with the United States. In a keynote statement 
delivered at the Osaka Summit, Chinese President Jiang Zemin outlined five 
principles of China's position on APEC. The third principle held that "the goal of 
liberalizing trade and investment in APEC should be achieved on the basis of 
unilateralism and voluntarism."^^ He elaborated that: 
Differences in the development level of members and their unique conditions must be 
taken into full account. It is necessary to respect the right of all APEC members to 
make free decisions and use their own initiative and creativity when formulating 
targets ofeconomic development and cooperation. The principle of self-determination 
and voluntarism in collective actions should be the cornerstone o f A P E C ? 
This thinking represented China's objection to "comparability". 
Participants' views gradually converged on this matter, and the Action 
Agenda specified the principle of "comparability" in this way: 
APEC economies will endeavor to ensure the overall comparability oftheir trade and 
investment liberalization and facilitation, taking into account the general level of 
liberalization and facilitation already achieved by each APEC economy.^^ 
It was reported that the word "endeavor" was a compromise made to gain the support 
from the Asian members. According to the Action Agenda, APEC members' 
individual and collective action should be subject to guidelines of preparation, 
consultation, submission, implementation, review, and revision, though many of 
which simply specified the broad direction and lack details, reflecting the "flexibility" 
philosophy. It also contained a safety clause of "flexibility," permitting that those 
who were not ready to participate in implementing the programs mayjoin later. 
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§ 7.5 Concluding Remarks 
The successful conclusion of the Osaka meetings carried enormous 
positive implications to the subsequent development o fAPEC. As the Deputy Prime 
Minister of Japan put it, "the meeting represented APEC's embarkation upon a new 
phase of action for the attainment of its vision and goals, and would thus be an 
important first step that would set the tone for APEC for years to come."^^ The 
meaning of Action Agenda was that it delineated more clearly the actions of APEC 
members and therefore improved quality of information available to actors. In 
addition to the Action Agenda, the down-payments submitted by each country were 
another essential matter in 1995. This showed APEC members' commitment to 
liberalization and support of APEC. 
Proposition (1) contends that the root of these contentious issues lay in the 
economic situations faced by actors. Regarding the matter of "comprehensiveness," 
there had been an obvious gap in productivity and competitiveness in agriculture 
between the Asian countries and the developed countries. The Asian countries had to 
bear the cost ofadjustment whilst the exporting countries simply enjoy the economic 
benefits. Both the Japanese and Korean governments had to show, for political 
reason, to their domestic groupings their intention of defending their own interest. In 
the Uruguay Round negotiation, both Japan and Korea did not convey their 
compromise about agricultural liberalization until the very last minute. The condition 
faced by China was even more critical, due to its low economic development level 
and huge population. China was uncertain about the consequence of liberalization to 
its socialist economy. A "safeguard mechanism" was therefore provided by the action 
agenda to allow the participants to temporarily halt or reverse the liberalization.^^ 
On the issue of non-discrimination, developing countries were cautious 
towards the possibility ofbeing captured into the interests ofdeveloped countries and 
hence would like to use unconditional MFN, a practice that did not involve hard 
negotiations and the element of reciprocity. For the developed countries, 
unconditional MFN could still serve their interest of liberalization despite the 
decrease in effectiveness. Consequently, a commonly agreed solution was obtained 
without too much difficulty, despite China's dissatisfaction on the weak language. On 
the issue of comparability, which was in fact regarding the institutionalization of 
APEC, developing countries were worried about being subject to additional pressure 
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from developed countries through taking collective action. Like the previous issues, 
this controversy was resolved by deriving a middle position between two ends o f the 
suggestions, embracing features of unilateral and collective actions. 
As proposition (2) implies, the eventual compromise among APEC 
members demonstrated the function performed by APEC in providing information. 
The existence of several communicative means, especially the Leaders' Summit, was 
instrumental to the emergence of compromise since it was meaningless and 
embarrassing to convene such high-level meeting in the absence of consensus. The 
leaders' meeting was an indispensable force to remove bureaucratic blockage because 
of leaders' responsibility and power to make difficult but ambitious political choice. 
Apart from the effectiveness of the communicative channels, the guiding principles 
were themselves devices that conveyed information to APEC members. Altogether, 
these principles told how "open regionalism" and vision of APEC were translated 
into actions implemented by APEC members. These principles in Action Agenda 
defined more explicitly the relationship between APEC members themselves and 
with non-members, and also between APEC and the WTO, specifying the code of 
conduct of regional actors. The Action Agenda was a framework in defining the 
unilateral, collective, and multilateral actions to be implemented. To warrant 
effective implementation of the Action Agenda, APEC leaders decided that the 
ministers and senior officials should engage in continuous consultation process to 
facilitate exchanges of information, to ensure transparency, and to contribute toward 
attaining the comparability of respective Action Plans.^^ In short, APEC programs 
led to a reinforcement of extensive contact. 
Proposition (2) maintains that it was the presence of higher interest that 
caused APEC members to put aside their short-term interest in order to prevent a 
collapse of APEC. If APEC members could not settle down their disputes, the 
political and economic relationship between many influential regional actors would 
have been severely retarded. As the dimension of institutional nesting implied, the 
support for global trading regime and the interest in European and other markets 
caused APEC members to adopt the rule of "non-discrimination" to reconcile any 
conflict or harmful consequence that may exist. As a Japanese ambassador puts it, it 
was inconsistent with the spirit of open-regionalism to urge for conditional MFN and 
a few industrialized countries' attempts to impose their inclination in this regard will 
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jeopardize the existence of APEC.^^ In the absence of strong leadership and any 
obvious advantage, a conditional MFN approach, which is a relatively 
institutionalized form of cooperation, was hard to achieve. With respect to the 
dispute between China and the United States, the reliance on the American market 
forced China to accept the requirements set by the U.S. and not to hinge on the matter 
in APEC. Due to these inter-related considerations, APEC members were able to 
arrive at a final resolution. 
The issue of "comprehensiveness" indicated the functions of "cross issues-
linkage" and institutional nesting. APEC members had been interdependent on 
several issues. Agriculture was just one aspect of the complicated politico-economic 
relationship between the United States and Japan. Japan had also to be aware o f t h e 
reaction from Australia who had been an economic and political partner of Japan in 
many issues. Moreover, as long as Japan and Korea had made their commitment 
under the Uruguay Round negotiation, they were hard to reverse their positions. 
Similarly, China and Taiwan had to demonstrate their willingness to open the market 
to assist their application for WTO membership. At the APEC Osaka Meeting, China 
promised that it would cut the tariff-level of over 4000 items by bout 30% and 
eliminate tariff quotas and import control measures on more than 170 categories of 
products.63 Obviously, WTO carried a compliance effect on Asian countries. 
Regional actors recognized that comprehensive liberalization had become an 
irresistible trend ofboth the globe and the region. 
To conclude, the working process that led to the Action Agenda clearly 
demonstrated that APEC members had engaged in a process of bargaining that 
involved an adjustment of policies by the players. The outcome was that both the 
developed and developing countries obtained what they wanted. The camp of the 
United States and Australia was able to make their developing counterparts to be 
more acceptable to comprehensive liberalization and a comparable collective and 
unilateral approach. The developed countries were successful in defending their 
interests through the principle of flexibility. Both sides believed that they had made 
considerable concession and sacrifice to foster the eventual compromise. APEC was 
able to cultivate a consensus among its players through the established 
communicative network and pattern of nesting that affects calculation ofinterests by 





§ 8.1 Introduction 
In chapter I, two propositions are formulated respectively to describe the 
empirical fact of cooperation and to deduce the theoretical functions performed by 
APEC. Proposition (1) asserted that although APEC was shaped as a weak regime, it 
was still able to foster a convergence of expectations from its members. Then, 
proposition (2) holds that APEC provided information to its participants, linked up 
regimes of different level together, and clustered different sorts of issues. These two 
propositions are demonstrated from chapter III to chapter VII, all of which describes 
the policy objectives of individual APEC member, the contention among these 
players and the final compromises. Before stating the findings of this study, this 
introduction firstly provides some direct quotations on what the major APEC 
members said about the contributions by and desirable direction of APEC. These 
governmental evaluations can deepen our understanding on APEC and verify the 
proposition that APEC was charged with the functions to foster transmission of 
information, the nesting of regimes (APEC as support to global cooperation) and the 
linking of issues (economic issue is implicitly linked to political interest). These 
evaluations are as follows: 
Australia: APEC has achieved much in its short history. At a minimum, its function of 
bringing together Leaders and Ministers from around the region contributes 
greatly to regional dialogue and cooperation. In some cases, discussions 
among Leaders and Ministers have contributed significantly to improved 
relations or the resolution of important trade disputes. The breadth of 
APEC's agenda now serves to advance our national interests in a wide 
variety of ways. It constitutes the key arm of our regional trade policy, and 
works effectively to promote our trade objectives alongside the other key 
arms of multilateral and bilateral trade policy. It has strengthened both the 
sense of community in the Asia Pacific and Australia's credentials in the 
region.' 
United States: APEC also anchors us in a region where we have profound political 
and security interests. We have fought three wars there in the last half 
century. While relationships among the major powers in the Pacific are 
more stable than at any time this century, managing these relationships 
remains a key challenge for U.S. foreign policy. 
• . . we are working through APEC to open markets on a regional basis. 
Like our work on a Free Trade Area of the Americas in this hemisphere, 
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APEC gives us an important regional tool to level the playing in the 
field for our exporters and investors. It complements efforts to 
2 
strengthen the multilateral system. 
Japan: APEC is a framework whose goal is sustainable economic growth in the Asia-
Pacific region achieved through mutual cooperation among all member 
economies, or, in more concrete terms, through the liberalization and facilitation 
of trade and investment and through economic and technical cooperation. 
Achieving a free and open market through cooperation within APEC ~ an 
extensive region holding great potential -- will bring great economic benefits for 
all members, including Japan. Furthermore, if regional cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific expands, this will establish a strong base for the enjoyment of common 
benefits among Japan and its major partners, . . . and this will enhance mutual 
trust and foster a sense of community within the region? 
ASEAN: With these circles of growing regional and sub-regional groupings, the 
challenges to us is to ensure that they do not end up promoting inward-
looking economic policies. Fortunately, we now have a bridge that spans the 
pacific viz. the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. . . . the APEC Bogor 
Declaration has set out a vision for free and open trade and investment in 
the Asia-Pacific region by 2020. As the region intensifies its economic 
linkages and cooperation, it will provide momentum to the creation of an 
Asia-Pacific-wide community. Equally, if not more important, APEC also 
provides another avenue for the key economies to interact closely, 
broadening their strategic interests. This will help strengthen peace and 
harmony in this vital part of the world.^ 
China: First, achieving sustained economic development in the Asia-Pacific and the 
world at large should be the fundamental goal of our cooperation. Second, 
efforts should be made to create a favorable environment for sustained 
economic growth among the developing members. Third, the goal of 
liberalizing trade and investment in APEC should be achieved on the basis of 
unilateralism and voluntarism. Fourth, due consideration must be given to 
differences between APEC members, and the process of trade and investment 
liberalization must be kept at a carefully measured rate. Fifth, trade and 
investment liberalization and economic and technical cooperation should be 
given equal emphasis.^ 
These APEC members talked about the importance of Asia-Pacific region 
to their economic and political interests. They highlighted the challenge of 
maintaining a good relationship between the regional actors and building a sense of 
community. Whilst the developing countries publicly and tactically limited the scope 
of APEC to strictly economic affairs and declined any political role of APEC, what 
could not be neglected was that economic cooperation was a basic step to accomplish 
the political objective of regional stability and prosperity. In the economic dimension, 
they stressed the contribution made by regional trade and investment liberalization to 
the promotion of multilateralism and the growth of Asia-Pacific region. This idea 
was vigorously expressed in the principle of "open-regionalism," a synthesis of 
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globalism and regionalism. It was also essential to facilitate regional economic 
activities so that regional countries could obtain their greatest benefits from the 
condition of economic interdependence among them. Apart from that, Asian 
countries were particularly concerned with the necessity of technical cooperation in 
enabling the developing countries to narrow their gap with the developed countries. 
In short, APEC was one among the several devices used by regional actors to 
advance their national interests and should be assessed under actors' domestic 
situations, policies in bilateral relation with other states, and strategies in regionalism 
and in multilateralism. 
This chapter sums up the empirical findings and theoretical implications of 
such "politics" in APEC. Section 8.2 is a summary on the four contentious matters 
studied in the core part of this thesis. The observations in these four issues lead to the 
deductions, laid down in section 8.2.1 and 8.2.2, on the values of APEC to the 
developed and developing countries respectively. Section 8.2.3 then draws up the 
theoretical functions of APEC. It is argued that undeniably the information provided 
by APEC is to a certain extent defective and that the linkage of APEC with other 
regime is not so tied. This is why APEC's significance is reduced. Nevertheless, as 
section 8.3 argues, despite this weakness of APEC, the peculiar model of "open 
regionalism" was still able to address the needs of the region. The last section is 
about some limitations of this thesis and reflections from the Asian Financial 
Turbulence happened in 1997 and 1998. 
§ 8.2 Findings 
This thesis attempts to examine the contributions made by APEC from the 
contentious issues in the development of APEC. Between 1989 and 1995, APEC 
members held divergent positions with respect to the composition of regional groups, 
the strengthening of mechanism for cooperation, the vision of trade liberalization, 
and the details in conducting such liberalization. There was a common feature in 
these incidents; the need of developed and developing countries diverged, leading to 
a dichotomy in approach of regional cooperation. The developing countries were 
more eager to acquire a relatively formal and progressive form of cooperation. This 
policy orientation posed a dilemma for the developing countries because of the 
positive and negative consequences of the trade liberalization and facilitation 
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measures. Nevertheless, the eventual settlement of such disputes means that there 
was certain higher-level, long-term interest that could override the immediate interest 
ofactors. Actors' higher or long-term interests had to be evaluated from their bilateral 
relationship with others and the objectives in multilateral organization, and in terms 
of both economic and political dimensions. APEC members practiced a multifaceted 
approach of cooperation. This is why the idea of institutional nesting and cross issue-
linkage has been useful here. 
Before discussing the observed functions of APEC, it is necessary to 
review the main points put forward from chapter IV to chapter VIL Chapter IV 
discusses the contention in defining the composition of regional groups, an issue that 
disturbed the development of cooperation from the very beginning. The elementary 
problem discussed in chapter V is the mechanism to attain collaborative work. These 
two contentions, which are about the actors and method of cooperation, had to be 
resolved before substantive cooperation could be achieved. Since 1993, APEC 
members generally agreed that APEC should be the main venue for Asia-Pacific 
cooperation. Meanwhile, a gradual institutional development had been proceeded. 
These two compromises were instrumental to the consequent agreements in trade and 
investment liberalization, which are discussed in chapter VI and VIL These two 
chapters show that APEC states could be receptive to the idea of free trade. 
Developed countries were able to assert their interest through APEC, though the 
developing countries were also successful in asking for safeguard mechanism. In all 
those contentions happened in APEC, the continued interactions between members 
were able to foster some constructive adjustment of policies by the members. APEC 
members' resolutions are as follows. 
Formation ofRegional Groups 
The first controversy confronted by APEC members was the determination 
on the appropriate composition for cooperation and the choice between different 
groups of cooperation (APEC vs. EAEC). APEC members' consensus was that 
APEC should be the most appropriate forum for regional actors. EAEC should be 
nested under APEC, which was more useful in engaging those important actors of the 
region. The EAEC issue illustrates the complicated interdependent relations between 
several Asian countries with their Westem counterparts. For one thing, Asian 
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countries did not form a mature market by themselves and needed the markets of 
these developed countries. The developed countries, especially the United States, 
invested substantially in the Asian countries and were important sources of foreign 
investment. For another thing, the developed countries, most notably the United 
States, played an indispensable role in maintaining the peaceful environment of 
region. The presence of common economic and political interest with the developed 
countries precluded the Asian developing countries from adopting a hard-line policy 
with respect to EAEC. Most APEC members still preferred to shape APEC as a place 
for constructive engagement. 
The Institutional Development of A P E C 
The gradual enhancement of APEC's mechanism is a necessary step to 
achieve more effective collaboration and improve the quality of information available 
to participants. However, developing countries were reluctant to this trend because of 
the constraint that might be imposed on them. Rather, they maintained that APEC 
should only be a consultative forum without any binding power on its members. They 
asserted also that any decision made in APEC should be conformed to the 
"consensus" among the members. Despite the insistence held by the Asian 
developing countries, the organization of APEC had been strengthened to cope with 
the need of carrying out the task in trade and investment liberalization, trade and 
investment facilitation, and technical cooperation. To date, APEC has developed its 
own model of cooperation, something that lies between the two ends of strong 
international regime and pure discussion forum. The APEC model stresses 
constructive dialogues, consensus, informality, flexibility, and self-autonomy of 
participants. 
Thc Vision ofTrade and Investment Liberalization 
Trade and investment liberalization has been one of the most significant 
achievements in APEC. The 1994 Indonesian meeting marked the beginning of a 
new stage in APEC by moving it forward from consultation to observable action in 
trade and investment liberalization under a concrete time schedule. Developing 
countries agreed to join the free-trade train on the condition that they were given ten 
niore years to catch up with their developed counterparts and that the whole process 
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would be flexible enough to accommodate their concerns. The extensive dialogues 
between actors and the connection between regional and global cooperation were 
instrumental in fostering the compromise. APEC was able to reinforce the principles 
and norms conveyed by "open-regionalism. ” The decision to carry out liberalization 
under a time-frame is an important step to advance and further enhance the rules of 
cooperation. The time schedule is a standard of behavior and a general guidance, 
decreasing the degree of uncertainty. Moreover, APEC's liberalization measure is 
related to both the global trading regime (WTO) and the sub-regional agreement 
(AFTA, ANZCERA and NAFTA). By the provision of economic benefits and 
illustration of mutual respect, trade liberalization is also a means to foster the 
continued engagement of the United States. For all these reasons, trade liberalization 
became the agreed agenda in APEC. 
The Tmplementation o f T r a d e and Investment Liberalization 
The 1995 Osaka Meeting marked the beginning of transforming APEC 
vision to actions. The "Action Agenda" is a document that specifies the rules of 
liberalization up to 2020. APEC members were divided quite seriously in how the 
process would be conducted. Specifically, they disagreed on the guiding principle of 
"non-discrimination," "comprehensiveness," and "comparability." Their contentions 
were rooted at the great economic heterogeneity among APEC members. Developed 
countries wanted a reciprocal and comprehensive trade and investment liberalization 
on the basis of collective action, whilst the developing countries expected a non-
discriminatory and flexible process based more on unilateral actions. The eventual 
settlement of these disputes demonstrates the functions performed by APEC. Firstly, 
these guiding principles of Action Agenda were in itself a transmitter ofinformation, 
specifying the code of conduct of regional actors. The idea of free trade or liberalism 
was further stressed. Secondly, actors' compromise reflected the influence of global 
regime on regional cooperation and the influence of Western countries. 
Altogether, these four chapters illustrate APEC members' common interest 
in supporting the multilateral institution to regulate market access, and managing the 
economic and political relationship between themselves. Meanwhile, their divergent 
interests stemmed from who gains and who loses in the cooperation process. Even 
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though the participants must be better off as a result of cooperation, some of its 
domestic sectors must be affected and these groups would take action to oppose the 
process. Developing countries therefore had attempted to minimize the cost of 
adjustment or unfavorable impact from cooperation. Nevertheless, they had been 
gradually receptive to the ideas promoted by the developed countries. All these facts 
prove that APEC was functional and valuable to both sides. 
§ 8.2.1 Values of APEC to Developed Economies 
APEC is a trial of heterogeneous cooperation that involves the developed 
and developing countries. Developed APEC members include the United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. These APEC countries share some 
common vision about the utility of APEC. As shown in their position towards EAEC, 
developed countries hoped APEC could minimize the likelihood that Asian countries 
formed an exclusive bloc by themselves. They thought that APEC should improve 
the cohesiveness among the Asia-Pacific countries. From their stand on the ways in 
which trade and investment liberalization and facilitation should be conducted, 
developed countries (except Japan) wanted APEC to be an effective device -- a 
relatively strong regime - that would contribute to opening market of developing 
countries. These countries wanted APEC to shape a more favourable environment for 
their export strategies. These countries hoped also that APEC could be a step to build 
a sense of "community" among the actors. These economic and political 
considerations are to be discussed as follows. 
First of all, APEC could provide the developed countries with an explicit 
link between their interests in regionalism and globalism. The developed countries 
hoped that negotiations of the GATT could be concluded successfully. APEC was a 
support for their bargaining with others and an insurance for the developed countries. 
Firstly, by fostering a united front among the Asia-Pacific countries, these developed 
countries could have a larger say bargaining power in the global negotiation against 
the adversaries. Secondly, if the Uruguay Round negotiation had collapsed and the 
most detrimental situation had happened, Asia-Pacific countries would have formed 
another entity by themselves. Fortunately, as long as the worst case did not happened 
at all，APEC was simply been a device to articulate members' commitment to 
multilateral liberalization. APEC's underlying principle of"open-regionalism" was an 
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expression to achieve that end and established APEC itself as a "building block" of 
multilateralism. 
Apart from the strategic interest in global trading regime, APEC was a 
means for the developed countries to share the fruit of economic dynamism in Asia, 
the so-called "Asian Economic Miracle." Developed countries hoped APEC could 
enable them to shape a more favorable regional economic environment. The principal 
strategy was to make APEC an added vehicle for reduction of transaction costs in 
economic activities. For instance, the content of the Osaka Action Agenda covered 
not only tariff and non-tariff barriers but also the service sector, protection of 
intellectual property rights, competition policy, government procurement, and so 
forth. All these moves, if successfully put into practice, would increase the 
opportunities and surplus acquired by companies of the developed countries. For the 
United States, this could reduce the huge trade deficit it made with the Asian 
countries. The United States was active in proposing market-oriented policies in 
APEC and convincing its colleagues receptive to norms of liberalism and free trade. 
APEC was thus a venue for socialization and reinforcement of free trade principles 
and norms. 
I f the developed countries wanted to realize their economic objectives, they 
had to cultivate a closer connection with the developing countries. APEC was a 
bridge in this regard. It not only fostered the engagement of majors in the region but 
also sustained the leadership of the developed countries, especially the United States. 
APEC was a place where the United States could increase its contact with officials of 
different levels from Asian countries and reinforced the idea of free and open trade. 
APEC was a channel where certain values preferred by the U.S. could be promoted. 
In addition to the U.S., Australia and Japan also made use of APEC to show their 
commitments to the region and gathered support from others as complements to 
realize their policy objectives. Australia thought it could influence the outcome of 
APEC beyond its relative size because of its role in initiating the process and its 
innovative and active participation.^ Japan, through its proposal for "Partner for 
Progress," further strengthened its role of assisting the developing countries and 
expressed its friendship and concem for the developing countries. A caution has to be 
stressed here. Although APEC could facilitate the engagement and leadership of the 
developed countries, these countries were not in any position to dictate APEC and 
149 
Conclusion 
impose their agenda on other APEC members. 
All of the above ideas can be conceptualized by proposition (2). The ability 
of APEC to foster economic and political engagement depends primarily on the 
communicative means available to cultivate understandings between developed and 
developing countries. Information is a necessary element in attaining the policy 
objectives of developed countries. The APEC initiatives in institutionalization of 
cooperation, such as the holding of the leaders' summits and additional ministerial 
meetings, and the establishment of various committees, provided the developed 
countries with more opportunities to transmit their thought and persuade their 
partners. Such institutionalization led to the subsequent programs of trade and 
investment liberalization, facilitation, and technical cooperation. Sufficient 
information about the stands of others and the objective situations was a preliminary 
requirement to ease suspicion and increase confidence. APEC forum supplied 
information about the stand of developing countries while enabled the developed 
countries to advocate their policies. 
§ 8.2.2 Values of APEC to Developing Economies 
The number of developing countries in APEC far exceeds that of the 
developed countries. Up to 1995, developing APEC members included Brunei, Chile, 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, and 
Thailand. For these countries, the value of APEC was not so much as what their 
developed counterparts conceived, though with certain degree of overlapping. In the 
realm of economics, Asian countries expected APEC to play the role of assisting 
their development of domestic economy through sustaining external markets for their 
exports, providing them with sources of investment and advance technology, helping 
their development of human resources, infrastructure, capacity for economic analysis 
and other facilities for economic growth, and facilitating the productive use of 
interdependence with other countries. In the political sphere, APEC was a structure to 
engage and contain the interest of developed countries and to cultivate a sense of 
"togetherness." This is the reason for why Asian countries did not actively realize the 
idea of EAEC but instead tried to step-down down the anti-Western tendency and put 
EAEC under the framework of APEC. The overall objective was thus a regional 
consensus on certain essential economic and political issues. 
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Firstly, similar to the developed countries, developing countries used 
APEC to assert their collective influence and project their influence in multilateral 
forums or before other international actors. It is quite difficult for the individual 
country, who is relatively small in terms of influence or bargaining power, to realize 
its interest in world political economy that is largely controlled by the United States, 
Japan, and the Europe. For instance, although ASEAN had been proven to be 
successful in cultivating a consensus among Southeast Asian countries, this 
organization was still limited in its capability to assert their collective will because of 
its small size of economy and heavy reliance on external markets. Asian countries 
needed to form or affiliate to a larger group of cooperation in order to assert their 
interest. They had to engage major actors in international economy because this 
would allow them to get more support in pursuing their objective. One fundamental 
objective of APEC was to foster a united front regarding the GATT negotiation, 
which implies communication to bring up consensus among actors. 
Secondly, APEC was charged with the mission of sustaining the robust 
economic performance of the Asia-Pacific countries so that the developing countries 
could be benefited to the greatest extent. To achieve this end, the first necessary step 
was to collect information about regional economic activities and the factors of 
economic prosperity. Based on such information about the episode of economic 
interdependence, subsequent cooperation programs could be devised upon the 
findings. For this reason, those APEC developing countries were ready to accept a 
moderate institutionalization of APEC. APEC's ambitious programs in trade and 
investment liberalization, facilitation, and development cooperation were built upon 
the finding and recommendation from various APEC committees and advisory 
bodies. Research committees and working groups in APEC concluded that freer trade 
and the reduction economic transaction costs would benefit the developing countries. 
The deepening in understanding of global and regional economic activities was a 
forceful incentive to encourage further market reform or deregulation. 
Another economic objective of APEC for the developing countries was to 
obtain economic and technical assistance to minimize their gap with the developing 
countries. APEC's emphasis on development cooperation and Japan's proposal for 
"Partner for Progress" were initiatives in this regard. The "two-track" approach in 
trade and investment liberalization was also a tactics in helping the developing 
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countries to adjust their economies and obtain benefits from such liberalization. In 
1995, the initiatives were further elaborated and deepened by the adoption of Action 
Agenda. The Osaka Action Agenda laid down the practical collaborative works to be 
done in the areas of, to name a few, industrial science and technology, economic 
infrastructure, energy, transportation, telecommunication and information, and so on. 
These projects would cope with the bottleneck problems faced by many countries. 
Apart from these economic objectives, APEC was implicitly vested with 
political implications. The most simple but fundamental significance is that APEC 
was the place for engagement of important regional actors. For several Asian 
countries like Japan, Korea, and Singapore, APEC could attract the continued interest 
of the United States. Trade liberalization was one of the means to increase the West's 
stake in Asia. More than that, APEC was a place to foster dialogues among ASEAN, 
China, the U.S., Japan, all of which are principal actors in Asia-Pacific. For instance, 
APEC could make ASEAN be better informed of what their major industrialized 
trading partners were thinking, whilst allowing them to convey their positions 
collectively and more efficiently. These dialogues could be formal or informal, and 
political or non-political. Their interactions were started and cultivated at lower 
levels of cooperation and contacts in economic or non-political affairs, and then 
proliferated to the higher-level officials and finally to the leaders. It was a long-term, 
slow progress of confidence building and maintaining good relationship rather than a 
rigid process of negotiation. The combined effect of such dialogues, sufficient 
information, and nesting of regime or issue led to the emergence of regional 
consensus. 
To conclude, developing countries wanted APEC to fulfill their objectives 
of assisting their development of economy and sustaining a favorable regional or 
global environment where they pursue their goals. APEC satisfied the demands of i ts 
members through the engagement of several indispensable actors of the region and 
the pursuit of practical programs in trade and investment liberalization, facilitation, 
and economic and technical cooperation. APEC's feature of a weak regime while 




§ 8.2.3 Theoretical Functions Performed by APEC 
APEC is a kind of regional public goods that reduce economic transaction 
costs among regional countries. However, this kind of public goods was 
n 
underprovided in the absence of collective action by governments. Altogether, 
propositions (1) and proposition (2) specify the values of a weak regime to its 
participants. APEC is a weak regime in the sense that its rules do not adequately 
contribute to the realization of its principle of open-regionalism and the associated 
norms. Its rules are weak and vague in language, and lack internal consistency 
considerably. These defects allow room for different interpretations in stipulations 
made by APEC. Compared to other strong institutions, APEC does not owe any 
effective device for monitoring of resolutions. Nevertheless, the flexibility exhibited 
by APEC is an advantage if the heterogeneity among participants and past experience 
of little cooperation are considered. As proposition (1) observes, APEC's unique 
model of cooperation was caused by the extensive economic disparity in the region. 
To embrace the divergent needs and difficulties of each player, APEC had to be 
flexible enough to enable the actors to arrive at a mutually acceptable position in 
cases ofdisputes. The pursuit of consensus and mutual understandings was where the 
promise of APEC lies. 
If cooperation is to be achieved, the first element is a sufficient amount of 
information about the situation, and intention and policies of others. Information can 
reduce the degree of uncertainty and suspicion that the actors have. In the realm of 
international cooperation, information is provided by two means. First, international 
regimes provide formal and informal channels of communication to exchange 
opinions and share information. Second, the rules of a regime constrain the actions of 
participants so that the actors can be better informed of what others are doing. The 
rules of a regime can increase the transparency of members' actions. Without doubt, 
APEC had done a lot to foster the exchange of opinion and the share of information. 
These endeavors enabled APEC members to deepen their understandings in the 
policies and needs of others, the fact and problems of global and regional economies, 
and the possible methods to sustain the prosperity of the region. However, APEC has 
not done well regarding the second aspect of information. The making o f t h e 1994 
Bogor Declaration and 1995 Action Agenda is only a small step in this direction. 
Although APEC's ability in monitoring the actions of its members and 
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enforcing the implementation of actors' commitment is limited, the prospect for 
cooperation is not at all pessimistic. This is becausejust like other regimes APEC has 
been able to promote productive nesting of regimes at various levels and the linking 
of different issues. This explanation has been elaborated frequently in this thesis and 
it is not necessary to repeat it again here. If actors in the international environment 
are characterized by a substantial degree of interdependence across a wide variety of 
issues, the possibility for them to cooperate is higher than the case with fewer 
common interests between states. What needs to be highlighted is that, depending on 
their respective economic and political needs, different APEC member held varying 
attitudes towards the desirability of such nesting of regimes or linking of issues. For 
instance, China opposed the present structure of security regime that is defined by the 
United States, whilst Malaysia has strong reservation on the leadership of the 
Western countries. They might not be willing to use trade liberalization as a 
concession to gain the continued engagement of other actors. All the Asian countries 
objected to the attempt to discuss security or political issues inside APEC. Therefore, 
the concept of regime nesting and issue linkage is not without its limitation in 
application. 
To conclude, APEC does not possess all the functions of a regime. It only 
established some communicative channels but it could not standardize the actions of 
its members. Transparency of members' actions was not obviously increased. 
Moreover, some member states were reluctant to the explicit application of regime 
nesting and cross issue-linkage. From the very beginning, APEC was only a means 
rather than an end in itself; it was a complement to members' effort to attain some 
other interests. Strong incentive had not been present from all members to make 
APEC a principal institution to govem behavior of its members. On the other hand, if 
APEC were a strong regime, it would have been unlikely that APEC members could 
resolve their disputes because such decisions would not be acceptable to the 
developing countries. Nevertheless, as long as Asia-Pacific countries are subject to 
the trend of continued globalization and regionalization, they are propelled to 
participate in some sorts of collective actions. 
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§ 8.3 A Theoretical Discussion on APEC 
The investigation of APEC can shed light on two theoretical issues. Firstly, 
APEC leads to the query on whether there can be an alternate model of international 
cooperation. If the result of "open-regionalism" is fruitful, this model can be 
promoted to enable heterogeneous countries to cooperate with others. Li this way, a 
relatively loose form of cooperation can be a first and functional step towards 
consequently concrete and higher-level cooperations. Secondly, the empirical study 
of APEC can give clues to the hypotheses made by international relations theorists. 
Specifically, APEC is a case to demonstrate both the merits of and obstacles to 
cooperation. On the one hand, the evolution of the Asia-Pacific political economy 
and APEC indicates how liberalism can give rise to imperatives for cooperation. 
Market force alters the thinking of the decision-makers. On the other hand, the 
uneven allocation of benefits and the dislocation of adjustment costs still hinder the 
actors to arrive at a pareto-optimal solution. There is no easy clue to solve the 
dilemma of cooperation; "weak regime" is perhaps a partial method. 
§ 8.3.1 The Significance of Open Regionalism 
Central to the discussion of APEC is the principle of "open-regionalism". 
The idea of open-regionalism is relevant to the general non-exclusiveness or 
openness of membership, the flexible or loose mechanism for cooperation, and the 
resolute support for multilateralism in the course of trade and investment 
liberalization. This distinguishes APEC from other common types of regionalism 
which have restrictive membership, are relatively discriminatory against non-
members, and are inflexible in their mechanism of cooperation.^ "Open regionalism" 
is voluntary and non-binding in nature. Professor Ippei Yamazawa, the Japanese 
member of the EPG, held that APEC resembled an "Open Economic Association," 
which is ”open, in that its structure and policies do not lead to discrimination against 
trade and investment with the rest of the world; economic in its focus; a voluntary 
association, in that its members do not cede sovereignty to any supranational regional 
institution."^ It is generally said that the promise of "open regionalism" comes from 
the benefits of non-discriminatory liberalization. For instance, a World Bank Report 
indicated that a non-discriminatory trade liberalization would enable the East Asian 
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APEC members to achieve the greatest income ga ins . i�The Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade of Australia also found that, by using some mathematical modals, 
preferential trade liberalization would just result, for APEC, in around two thirds of 
the benefits of non-discriminatory liberalization.^ Despite these theoretical 
projections, in practice, what can the case of APEC really tell us about "open 
regionalism"? 
Firstly, "open-regionalism" defines the relationship between regionalism 
and globalism, a manner in which the former contributes to the latter. This 
enthusiastic advocate of multilateralism is hardly present in other form of 
regionalism, which places the focus on regional affairs and tends to restrict the 
interest to members only. "Open regionalism" is a straightforward manifestation on 
the regime property of institutional nesting. Chapter II and III indicate that the 
primary and explicit motivation for forming APEC was to express and guard regional 
interest in multilateral forum and Uruguay Round negotiation. Chapter VI and VII 
highlight that the APEC program of trade and investment liberalization was 
stimulated by consideration of globalism - the support for WTO. For these reasons, 
APEC members did not seek to discriminatory against non-members. Unlike other 
forms of regionalism, there had not been strong political or economic reason to grant 
obvious preference to APEC members themselves. Most APEC members did not 
think it is necessary to adopt a discriminatory approach to deal with other adversaries. 
"Open regionalism" was useful simply because all of the members had been relying 
on the opportunities secured by global trading regime. Even for those weaker APEC 
members, their trading relation with other APEC members are protected by the 
GATT or WTO. Hence, the most pressing objective was put on globalism. 
Secondly, "open-regionalism" specifies the form for cooperation. As 
reminded by Prof. Ippei Yamazawa, "open" implies openness in structure, 
membership, and voluntarism. Chapter V argues that the structure of APEC 
facilitates transmission of information, making it a consultative fomm based on 
consensual decision-making and voluntarism of its members. This style was to deal 
with the extensive diversity of the region. If APEC were originally aimed at deriving 
a formal and rigid framework of cooperation, most members would not have agreed 
to any institutional development at all. It was virtually impossible to start an APEC-
round of negotiation to reach formal agreement on reducing barrier to economic 
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transaction. For one thing, APEC included too many actors that did not have 
common bond or political reason to establish a formal integration. Many of them 
were competing for similar markets rather than complementary with each other. For 
another thing, the path in multilateral negotiation was full of obstacles in itself. The 
APEC approach did not require the actors to negotiate detailed texts that have to be 
1 ^ 
ratified by the legislatures of each member. Under this condition, the APEC model 
was a realistic solution. This prudent form of cooperation could elicit the confidence 
and sense of togetherness of members for its alleviation of disputes. Chapter VI and 
VII indicate clearly that several members' willingness to participate in the collective 
actions was related with the vagueness and flexibility associated with the 
liberalization process. 
Thirdly, "open regionalism" represents a resolute identification with 
liberalism. It argues clearly that liberalization and deregulation of domestic economy 
are in itself worth doing. It is quite often assumed that such regional liberalization is 
a "positive-sum" game that will benefit all p a r t i e s ” For this reason, the "free-rider" 
problem is not so relevant to the actors. No Asian countries had insisted strongly that 
this drawback must be remedied. Chapter VI and VII point out that APEC's 
acceptance on free and open trade stemmed from their believe in the benefits from 
liberalization and deregulation. APEC members apparently believed that the market-
driven integration in the area did not require further institutionalization. They just 
wanted to administer the "spill-over" effects stemmed from interdependence. 
In short, open-regionalism is a synthesis of the dialectic processes of 
globalization and regionalization. It embraces the features and interests led by the 
two processes. It encompasses the Westem ideology of liberalism and the Asian style 
of flexibility, gradualism, and harmony. It is a realistic and practical solution to the 
needs of APEC members, who are divided by a great degree ofheterogeneity. 
§ 8.3.2 Theories of International Regimes 
The findings of this thesis can shed light on the applications oftheories of 
international relations in general and the theory of international regime in particular. 
The considerations of APEC members reflect members' mixed attitudes towards 
international cooperation. Realist theory maintains that the uneven power capabilities 
among states preclude them from cooperation despite the presence of common 
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interest. However, the development of APEC implies that this inference is only 
partially valid. Those weaker APEC states were aware of their limitations in realizing 
their interest in international political economy and the necessity of cooperating with 
the stronger states. Without doubt, they were concerned with the uneven distribution 
of benefits and the cost of adjustment they had to bear. Nevertheless, they generally 
appreciated the benefits arising from cooperation. The "relative gain" problem is not 
so influential as realist theory proposes. No evidence indicates that APEC members 
thought that the gains by others might lead to exploitation on themselves. 
International relations theory needs to be refined to describe the incentives for 
cooperation and the conditions under which it is more likely to happen. This thesis 
suggests that the "weak" regime model of APEC can be a good starting point for 
cooperation under a difficult situation. 
The development of APEC certainly enriches the understanding of 
international regimes. It demonstrates the usefulness of a "weak" regime in the 
context of politico-economic interdependence. APEC was a meaningful device to 
assist the improvement of economic environment. It was intended to improve the ties 
between regional actors. In the special situation in the Asia Pacific region 
characterized by diversity, the flexibility of a weak regime could attract the 
participation of smaller countries. ASEAN's initial acceptance of the 1989Canberra 
meeting was based on the condition that APEC would not become a strong institution. 
A strong regime might simply deter the participation of those weaker countries. The 
primary function of a weak regime is the transmission of relevant information, which 
is a preliminary step to achieve a sense of "community" and prepare for the further 
deepening of cooperation. As APEC evolved, its members were gradually receptive 
to a moderate level of institutionalization. A weak regime can be instrumental to 
leading to consensus among its members. 
To conclude, the events of APEC illuminate the gray area and uncertainty 
in theories of international cooperation. For one thing, vast disparity or heterogeneity 
is surely an obstacle to cooperation. For another thing, this obstacle can be overcome 
by employing some tactics. The APEC case indicates that a "weak" regime can be a 
suitable and practical choice of institution under this situation characterized by 
considerable degree of economic and political suspicion among members. As the 
participants build up their confidence and trust, a certain degree of 
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institutionalization can be proceeded. At least, a "weak" regime may attempt to 
minimize the conflicts between members and cultivate a consensus among them in 
maximizing their common interests. Haggard and Simmons pointed out that a 
convincing proof of value of regime is to show that domestic policy-makers were 
actually concerned with reputation, reducing transactions costs, the need for 
transparency, and so forth/^ This thesis had illustrated that the decision-makers 
surely have some concerns in these matters. The contemporary trend of globalization 
has significantly altered the settings under which the states exist and has increased 
the chance for cooperation. 
§ 8.4 Limitations of this Thesis and Some Reflections from the 
Asian Financial Turbulence 
This thesis attempts to demonstrate the overall theoretical functions of 
APEC by examining actors' stands in contentions of APEC. It seeks to provide a 
comprehensive analysis. I admit that the degree of investigation in each of the actor 
may not be sophisticated enough. I mainly survey the opinion of the officials and the 
content of official documents. I should examine more deeply the domestic political 
process and the socio-economic conditions of the APEC members. If this is done, the 
needs of APEC members will be better comprehended. For example, Indonesia 
showed in 1994 its willingness to get in the free-trade bandwagon. How was the idea 
of deregulation cultivated in the Indonesian business sectors and then transmitted to 
the government? What were the impacts of market-reforms in Indonesia? These 
questions deserved serious examination. Another actor that is worthy of in-depth 
investigation is China. China is struggling hard to develop its economy. It has 
executed a number of measures, such as large-scale privatization of state enterprises 
and deregulation oftrade and investments, to reform its huge and inefficient economy. 
China's foreign economic or APEC policies take root in these demands. Chinese 
government's thinking and tactics should be better explored. In short, each Asia-
Pacific state's APEC policy is in itself a complicated research. 
Future research should also be conducted in pragmatic policy issues of 
APEC's programs. This can only been done only if information about regional 
economic activities is better obtained and shared. According to Australia's Bureau of 
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Industry Economics, further work is required to document industry policies and trade 
barriers in the APEC region.^^ This work should include an estimate of the cost of 
protectionism, the impacts of APEC policies, the interactions between sub-regional 
groupings and major actors within APEC, the relationship between Bogor agenda and 
international agreements, and other related issues in technical cooperation. In this 
light, this thesis ignores an accurate economic analysis of APEC. While it studies the 
utility of APEC as a regime, it ignores a practical policy analysis, especially without 
an economic model on effects of trade and investment liberalization. This thesis only 
stresses the politico-economic relationship among APEC members as a determinant 
of their cooperation in APEC. 
Today, interests in APEC appears to decrease, especially after the Asian 
Financial Crisis. APEC did not play any significant role in dealing with this 
unprecedented financial turmoil which happened in 1997 and 1998. The financial 
turbulence substantially undermined the economic achievement of most Asian APEC 
members. For South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, their economies have been 
seriously retarded and need at least several years to recover. Economic crisis led to 
political chaos in Indonesia. Japan has also experienced an unprecedented economic 
recession since 1945. In sharp contrast to the optimistic atmosphere in the birth of 
APEC in late eighties and its high tide development between 1993 and 1995, at 
present no one talks about either the "Asian Economic Miracle" or the "Asia-Pacific 
Century." How should these events be interpreted? Does APEC's inability to resolve 
the financial crisis imply that it is no longer worthwhile to pay academic effort and 
concrete resources in this forum? 
For one thing, APEC was constrained by its nature of a weak regime and 
its lack ofresources to take substantive actions to deal with the crisis. The institution 
that is responsible for solving the problem is the much more powerful International 
Monetary Fund. For another thing, the financial turbulence entirely demonstrates the 
great influence from the globalization of financial market and investment to the 
individual APEC economies. This proves that the individual state is not capable of 
controlling the flow of finance. In the development of APEC between 1989 and 1995, 
actors were disagreed over the scope and pace of trade and investment liberalization. 
Compared to the actual loss in this financial turbulence, what the delegates struggled 
hard to defend is only a minor issue. Whether the regional statesmen like it or not, 
160 
Conclusion 
they have no choice but to reform and liberalize their economy. They have to 
intensify the cooperation among themselves to prevent the future occurrence of 
similar crisis. 
Actually, as a weak regime, APEC made some positive contributions in 
dealing with the crisis. It cultivated a regional consensus on the causes and remedies 
of the turmoil. The Asian financial turbulence was discussed in the ministerial 
meeting and leaders meeting in Vancouver in November 1997 and the Fifth Finance 
Ministers Meeting in Alberta, Canada in May 1998. APEC leaders agreed that APEC 
should play a pivotal role to support other global and regional efforts by the World 
Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank in stabilizing the financial market.^^ 
The finance ministers have agreed on the causes of the crisis and developed some 
ways to deepen the cooperation among APEC members. Indeed, APEC can still 
contribute to a regional consensus on what should be done to cure the problems. 
Discussions in APEC continue to foster a reinforcement of its objectives in trade and 
investment liberalization, facilitation, and technical cooperation. 
APEC is an ongoing process that involves more and more joint initiatives. 
It has been the only trans-Pacific economic institution developed so far. Therefore, its 
future development is still worthy of continued observations. For the academia, the 





A Brief Chronology ofRelated Events, 1989-1995 
19S3 
Jan 31 The then Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke announced his proposal 
for APEC during a visit in South Korea. 
Mar Australian and Japanese officials started to conduct practical works and 
diplomatic visit to discuss the APEC concept with other countries. 
June The U.S. announced its support to the Australian initiative. 
July ASEAN decided to accept the Australian proposal in the Post-Ministerial 
Conference in Bumei. 
Sept First SOM was held in Sydney. 
Nov 6-7 The First Ministerial Meeting, which was attended by 12 countries, was 
held in Canberra. The delegates held discussions about world and 
regional economic development, trade liberalization, and measures for 
cooperation. They agreed to hold subsequent APEC meetings. 
msi 
Feb ASEAN foreign ministers made the "Kuching Consensus" in Malaysia to 
be their stands of participation in APEC. 
Mar SOM I was held in Singapore. Delegates discussed the issues of setting 
seven work projects. 
May SOM II was held in Singapore. 
July 29-31 The Second Ministerial Meeting was held in Singapore. The delegates 
set up seven work projects for practical cooperation. They issued an 
"APEC Declaration on the Uruguay Round." 
Sept A special meeting of APEC Trade Ministers was convened in 
Vancouver to consolidate the Asia-Pacific view about the Uruguay 
Round and assure a desirable outcome. The ministers agreed on common 
trade-liberalization approaches to a number of important issues. 
Oct SOM I, organized by South Korea, was held in Seoul 
Dec 3-7 GATT Uruguay Round ministerial meeting wad held in Brussels. 
Delegates cannot reach conclusion due to disputes between the U.S. and 
the E.C. on agriculture. 
Dec 30 Malaysian Prime Minister made publicly his advocate for an "East Asian 
Economic Grouping" when he visited China. 
l S M 
Mar SOM II was held in Cheju-do, Korea. 
July At the Post-Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN foreign ministers endorsed the 
Thailand proposal for an AFTA. 
Aug SOM III wad held in Kyongju, Korea. 
Oct EAEC (formerly named EAEG) was endorsed as an ASEAN initiative. 
Nov 12-14 The Third Ministerial Meeting was convened in Seoul. The number of 
working groups was extended. The delegates endorsed the "Seoul APEC 
Declaration" that sets the foundation for the future development of 
APEC. They also issued an "APEC Declaration on the Uruguay Round." 
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were admitted as member economies. 
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Jan AFTA was established by ASEAN at the 4th ASEAN Summit. It was 
designed to eliminate most tariffs between the member countries over the 
next 15 years. 
Mar SOM I was held in Bangkok. 
Apr Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating advised U.S. President Clinton to 
hold a summit of APEC leaders. 
June SOM II was held in Bangkok. 
Sept !0-i 1 The Fourth Ministerial Meeting was held in Bangkok. APEC ministers 
adopted the Bangkok Declaration on APEC Institutional arrangement and 
agreed to establish a permanent APEC secretariat in Singapore and the 
formation of the EPG. 
Dec 2-4 SOM I, hosted by the U.S., was held in Washington to deal with the 
establishment of the Secretariat and other administrative issues. 
1 3 2 3 
Jan The APEC Secretariat was established in Singapore. 
Mar 28^Apr 1 SOM II was held in Williamsburg, Virginia. 
Jun 28 - July 2 SOM III was held in Seattle. 
Oct The EPG released its first report ~ "A Vision for APEC - Towards an 
Asia Pacific Economic Community." 
Oct NAFTA was endorsed by the U.S. Congress and would be implemented 
in 1994. 
Sept 22-24 SOM JM was held in Honolulu. The proposed Trade and Investment 
Framework was approved. 
Nov 1446 SOM V was held in Seattle. 
Nov 17-19 The Fifth Ministerial Meeting was held in Seattle. APEC ministers 
agreed to establish the CTI and BAC. They adopted the Declaration on 
APEC Trade and Investment Framework and action plan. Mexico and 
Papua New Guinea were admitted to APEC. 
Nov 20 The First Informal Meeting of Economic Leaders was hosted by the 
U.S. in Seattle. The leaders declared a vision of "Asia-Pacific Economic 
community" that emphasized partnership, openness, and dynamic growth 
of the region. They established the PBF. Malaysia declined to participate 
in the meeting as protest against the U.S. opposition to EAEC. 
Dec 15 The Uruguay Round was concluded after the United States and the 
European Union agreed to compromise. 
m A 
Jan 31 - Feb 4 SOM I was held in Jakarta. CTI and BAC began to work. 
Mar 18-19 The First APEC Finance Ministers Meeting was held in Hawaii to 
discuss some fundamental economic challenges facing the region. 
Mar 23-25 A meeting of APEC Ministers responsible for the Environment was 
• convened in Vancouver. 
May 16^0 SOM II was held in Bali. 
Juae The PBF began to work. 
Aug The EPG delivered its second report -- "Achieving the APEC Vision, 
� \ Free and Open Trade in the Asia Pacific." 




’ O c t 6 广‘‘‘ The First APEC Trade Ministers Meeting was held in Jakarta to 
, " � review the results of the Uruguay Round and its implications for the 
region and consider next steps for regional and global trade 
liberalization. 
Oct 15 The PBF presented its first report, "A Business Blueprint for APEC: 
Strategies for Growth and Common Prosperity," to President Soeharto. 
Oct 22-23 The First APEC Small and Medium Enterprises Ministerial Meeting 
was held in Osaka to strengthen APEC dialogue on SMEs and enhance 
the vitality ofSMEs. 
Nov 8-10 SOM IV was held in Jakarta. 
Nov 11-12 The Sixth Ministerial Meeting was held in Jakarta. APEC ministers 
established an Economic Committee to replace the Ad Hoc Group on 
Economic Trends and Issues. They endorsed the "Non-binding 
Investment Principles." Chile was admitted as member. 
Nov 15 The Second Informal Meeting of Economic Leaders was hosted by 
Indonesia in Bogor. The participants announced the unprecedented, 
historic "Bogor Declaration" that prescribe the timetable to achieve free 
and open trade and investment. 
1 3 9 5 
Jan 1 The WTO went into effect. 
Feb 13-16 SOM I was held in Fukuoka. The 1st special session ofSOM was also 
held. 
Apr 11-12 The 2nd special session of SOM was convened in Singapore. 
Apr 15-16 The Second APEC Finance Ministers Meeting was held in Bali to 
discuss issues about economic developments, capitals, exchange rate, and 
so on. 
May 29-30 The First APEC Ministerial Meeting On Telecommunications And 
Information Industry was held in Seoul. 
June 13 The First APEC Transportation Ministers Meeting was held in 
Washington to exchange views and opinions on transportation issues of 
common interest . 
July 4-7 SOM 11 and the 3rd special session of SOM were held in Sapporo. 
Aug The EPG released its third report -- "Implementing the APEC Vision." 
Sept 12-13 4th special session ofSOM was held in Hong Kong. 
Sept 14-15 The Second APEC Small and Medium Enterprises Ministerial 
Meeting was held in Adelaide, Australia to explore the role and 
importance ofSMEs and make concrete recommendation. 
Oct 5-6 The First APEC Ministers' Conference on Regional Science & 
Technology Cooperation was held in Beijing. 
Oct 9-13 SOM III was held in Tokvo. ^ 
w> 
Nov SOM IV was held in Osaka. 
Nov 16-17 The Seventh Ministerial Meeting was held in Osaka. The ministers 
terminated the PBF but established a new APEC Business Advisory 
Council. The work ofEPG was also ended. 
Nov 19 The Third Informal Meeting of Economic Leaders was hosted by 
Japan in Osaka. The APEC leaders adopted the Osaka Action Agenda to 
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Seoul APEC Declaration 
OBJECTWES 
Representatives of Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, the People's Republic of China, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and the United States of America, meeting 
in Seoul from 12 to 14 November 1991 at Ministerial level, 
Recognising that the dynamic growth of economies of the Asia-Pacific region has brought 
with it growing economic interdependence and strong common interests in maintaining the 
region's economic dynamism; 
Conscious of the vital interests shared by the Asia-Pacific economies in the expansion of 
free trade and investment, both at the regional and global level, and of the dangers inherent 
in protectionism; 
Recognising that the healthy and balanced development of economic interdependence within 
the Asia-Pacific region based upon openness and a spirit of partnership is essential for the 
prosperity, stability and progress of the entire region; 
Convinced that closer cooperation is needed to utilize more effectively human and natural 
resources ofthe Asia-Pacific region so as to attain sustainable growth of its economies while 
reducing economic disparities among them and improve the economic and social well-being 
of its peoples; 
Recalling the productive outcome of their two previous meetings held in Canberra, 5-7 
November 1989 and in Singapore, 29-31 July 1990, the basic principles for Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation which emerged therefrom, and the process of consultations and 
cooperation evolving among the participating Asia-Pacific economies; 
Acknowledging the important contribution made by the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and the pioneer role played by the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Conference (PECC) in fostering closer regional links and dialogue; 
Recognising the important role played by the GATT in fostering a healthy and open 
multilateral trading system, in reducing barriers to trade and in eliminating discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce; 
Believing that Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation should serve as an exemplary model of 
open regional cooperation; 
Do hereby declare as follows: 
1- The objectives of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (hereinafter referred to as APEC) 
will be: 
(a) to sustain the growth and development of the region for the common good of its peoples 
and, in this way, to contribute to the growth and development of the world economy; 
(b) to enhance the positive gains, both for the region and the world economy, resulting from 
increasing economic interdependence, including by encouraging the flow of goods, services, 
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capital and technology; 
(c) to develop and strengthen the open multilateral trading system in the interest of Asia-
Pacific and all other economies: 
(d) to reduce barriers to trade in goods and services and investment among participants in a 
manner consistent with GATT principles, where applicable, and without detriment to other 
economies. 
SCOPE OF ACTWITY 
2. APEC will focus on those economic areas where there is scope to advance common 
interests and achieve mutual benefits, including through: 
(a) exchange of information and consultation on policies and developments relevant to the 
common efforts of APEC economies to sustain growth, promote adjustment and reduce 
economic disparities; 
(b) development of strategies to reduce impediments to the flow of goods and services and 
investment world-wide and within the region; 
(c) promotion of regional trade, investment, financial resource flows, human resources 
development, technology transfer, industrial cooperation and infrastructure development; 
(d) cooperation in specific sectors such as energy, environment, fisheries, tourism, 
transportation and telecommunications. 
3. In each of these fields, APEC will seek-
(a) to improve the identification and definition of the region's common interests and, where 
appropriate, to project these interests in multilateral forums such as the GAIT; 
(b) to improve the understanding of the policy concerns, interests and experiences of 
economic partners, particularly of their international implications, and to help promote 
consistency in policy making in appropriate areas; 
(c) to develop practical programs of economic cooperation to contribute to economic 
dynamism and improved living standards throughout the region; 
(d) to enhance and promote the role of the private sector and the application of free market 
principles in maximising the benefits of regional cooperation. 
MODE OF OPERATION 
4. Cooperation will be based on: 
(a) the principle of mutual benefit, taking into account the differences in the stages of 
economic development and in the socio-political systems, and giving due consideration to 
the needs of developing economies; and 
(b) a commitment to open dialogue and consensus-building, with equal respect for the views 
of all participants. 
5. APEC will operate through a process of consultation and exchange of views among high-
level representatives ofAPEC economies, drawing upon research, analysis and policy ideas 
contributed by participating economies and other relevant organisations including the 
ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum (SPF) Secretariats and the PECC. 
6. Recognising the important contribution of the private sector to the dynamism of APEC 
economies, APEC welcomes and encourages active private sector participation in 




7. Participation in APEC will be open, in principle, to those economies in the Asia-Pacific 
region which: 
(a) have strong economic linkages in the Asia-Pacific region; and 
(b) accept the objectives and principles of APEC as embodied in this Declaration. 
8. Decisions regarding future participation in APEC will be made on the basis of a 
consensus of all existing participants. 
9. Non-participant economies or organisations may be invited to the meetings of APEC upon 
such terms and conditions as may be determined by all existing p articipants. 
ORGANISATION 
10. A ministerial meeting of APEC participants will be held annually to determine the 
direction and nature of APEC activities within the framework of this Declaration and decide 
on arrangements for implementation. Participants who wish to host ministerial meetings will 
have the opportunity to do so, with the host in each case providing the chairman of the 
meeting. 
11. Additional ministerial meetings may be convened as necessary to deal with specific 
issues of common interest. 
12. Responsibility for developing the APEC process in accord with the decisions of the 
ministerial meetings and the work program determined at those meetings will lie with a 
senior officials' meeting of representatives from each participant. The senior officials' 
meeting will be chaired by a representative of the host of the subsequent annual ministerial 
meeting, and will make necessary preparations for that meeting. 
13. Each project on the work program will be pursued by a working group composed of 
representatives from participants, coordinated by one or more participants. The working 
groups will identify specific areas of cooperation and policy options relating to each project. 
THE FUTURE OF APEC 
14. Recognising the ongoing and dynamic nature of the APEC process, APEC will retain the 
flexibility to evolve in line with the changes in regional economic circumstances and the 
global economic environment and in response to the economic policy challenges facing the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
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7. Simultaneous Start, Continuous Process and Differentiated Timetables 
8. Flexibility 
9. Cooperation 
Part One: Trade and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation (Areas listed are to be 
covered by Individual Action Plans (IAPs) and subject to joint actions embodied in 
Collective Action Plans (CAPs)) 
I. Tariffs 2. Non-tariff measures 
3. Services 4. Investment 
5. Standards and conformance 6. Customs procedures 
7. Intellectual property rights 8. Competition policy 
9. Government procurement 10. Deregulation 
I I . Rules of origin 12. Dispute mediation 
13. Mobility of business people 14. Implementation of the Uruguay Round 
15. Information gathering and analysis 
Part Two: Economic and Technical Cooperation 
1. Human resources development 
2. Industrial Science and technology 
3. Small and medium enterprises 
4. Economic infrastructure 
5. Energy 
6. Transportation 
7. Telecommunications and information 
8. Tourism 
9. Trade and investment data 
10. Trade promotion 
11. Marine Resource Conservation 
12. Fisheries 
13. Agricultural Technical Cooperation 
Source: Australia, Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade, "Inquiry into Australia and 
APEC," Canberra, August 1997, p.9. 
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